EMERGENCE OF NEW ZAMINDARS IN THE MUGHAL SUBA OF GUJARAT DURING THE FIRST HALF OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

THESIS SUBMITTED IN THE FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I do hereby declare that the thesis entitled "Emergence of New Zamindar in the Mughal Suba of Gujarat During the First Half of Eighteenth Century" which I am submitting for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (History), Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, is the result of the work done by me in the department of History under the supervision of Prof. S. N. Sinha.

I further declare that this thesis has not been previously submitted for any degree within this or any other University.

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EMERGENCE OF NEW ZAMINDARS IN THE MUGHAL SUBA OF GUJARAT DURING THE FIRST HALF OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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Abstract

Emergence of New *Zamindars* in the Mughal *Suba* of Gujarat During the first Half of the 18th century

This study essentially a preliminary attempt in the direction. seeks to trace and analyse the pattern and process of discernable changes in the position and the role of some of Mughal nobles/officials during the period (1700-50) of 'instability' and 'conflict' at the level of a region, the Mughal Gujarat. It focuses on the following aspects.

Identification of some such nobles/officials who transformed their non-hereditary official positions into hereditary one and survived the fall of Mughal rule in the province, examining elements of continuity and change in

their position visa-a-vis the state and the sources of revenue (peasantry), change in the nature of imperial hold over them and nature of emerging relationship with the Marathas and other strong elements of the region. The pattern, process and direction of the emerging mode of state noble/official/*nawab* - peasantry Maratha relationship during the first half of the eighteenth century is examined in the context (which had already been studied in satisfactory detail by various scholars) of pre-1700 period when the state operated at the peak of efficiency.

The study is mainly based on Persian chronicles and a number of province- *sarkar*- *pargana* level documents. In addition to the celebrated *Ain-i Akbari* and *Mirat-i Ahmadi* we have also used a number of local works, both in Persian and regional languages. Works of later date which were written at the seat of power of local magnets (*nawabs*) have also been utilised.

The Mughal nobles /officials in Gujarat , as elsewhere did not constitute a single monolith block. The differentiation manifested, among others, in their rank, official status, nativity and personal following. Thus the *nawabs* of Junagadh and Radhanpur who belonged to the Babi-

Afghan tribe, had settled in the region long before the establishment of the Mughal rule in Gujarat; the Jaloris who were *Lohani Pathans* enjoyed a similar status in terms of their arrival in the region and local base. On the other hand *Rajas* of Idar were Rathors, though having their origin in Jodhpur still enjoying support of the Rathors of Idar itself; *Nawabs* of port towns belonged to Saiyad and Mughal casts among the Muslims whereas the *desai* of Viramgaon (*Thakur* of Paldi) was members of local Patidar family.

In terms of their official status these officials turned- *nawabs* enjoyed different positions. The Jalori's of Radhanpur enjoyed *mansabs* and the hereditary *faujdari* of the place. The Babi family of Radhanpur enjoyed *faujdari* of the *pargana* but ultimately rose to the position of *de facto* Governor of the province by their sheer ability. The ruling (Babi) family of Junagadh also held position of *faujdar* at different places but the one of Junagadh was usurped by Sher Khan Babi, the founder of the ruling house. *Rathors* were *mansabdar* - *Jagirdar* of Idar which they had virtually snetched through from the ruling chief of Jodhpur. The *nawabs* of port towns were, originally *faujdars* but one of them had acquired the status of Governor of the province. The *nawabs* of Surat, initially, did not enjoy any official position.

Political situation in the province, as in other parts of the empire, underwent a qualitative change during the first half of the eighteenth century and the emerging situation obliged as also enabled different state nobles/officials to take care of their interest on their own. The imperial centre failed to apply administrative checks and maintain continuous vigil. Then, the appointment of the leading officials in the *suba* came to be governed not so much by imperial interests as much by factional considerations which, ultimately seem to have set the political attitudes and behaviour of the appointees towards the state and its affairs. Secondly, the *Zamindars* of the region were gaining in strength and trying to stop payment of revenues to the state. Such a situation seems to have contributed to the visible bankruptcy of the state at the centre and at the level of province, particularly after the reign of Farrukh-Siyar. To the complex situations with increasing problems, the Maratha entry added a new dimension which turned out to be insoluble. With the emergence of Marathas in the reign, particularly from the year of Aurangzeb's death, the state had to fight on more than two fronts. The Marathas diverted imperial attention and resources, created condition of insecurity in the region and rendered the position of Mughal officials all the more vulnerable. Over all emerging

situation created conditions conducive for rebelliouness and defiance. More so the Maratha encroachments reduced the area of Mughal hold and led to erosion of its authority over its officials as appointed in the region. The Mughal state gradually found itself incapable of ensuring safety and security of person and position of its own officials, much less ensuring continuity in their official position and in the sources of their income.

The process of factionalism and defiance seems to have originated from above. The nobles at the imperial centre defied and encroached upon the authority of the king, the provincial leading official (Governor) defied the imperial centre and encroached upon the authority of another important officer (*Diwan*) who was mainly depended upon the centre. In the same fashion a section of *sarkar* and the *pargana* level officials supported the Governor against the centre at one stage and then defied the authority of the Governor and attempted to behave independent of the state authority. Attempts of many of them met with success. This development is visible in the transformation of official position, whether *de-jure* or *de-facto*, into hereditary one and then their continuity in the same position even after the extinction of Mughal rule from the region.

The Mughal officials of the region displayed their talent by making use of the prevailing political situation in their favour. In the multi-corned strength for supremacy which went undebated between various contestants for power, the officials adopted strategy which was at variance from situation to situation and person to person, though it was not in variably the case. All of them fought and as also entered into alliance with the Marathas, the most domineering force in the region. In this they shared revenue with the Maratha *sardars* and simultaneously defended their position by force of arms. Strong forts and fortifications which under their comand placed them in a strategic position which was not hard to defend. Secondly, they supported as well as opposed the Mughal Government as the situation demanded. They could as they did, side with the Marathas against Governor and vice versa. They also took active part in the struggle between the outgoing and incoming Governors. They found it expedient to extent their helping hand to the Governors against the centre. Thirdly, these emerging *nawabs* acted as mercenaries for any party which could afford to pay them. In this role the *nawabs* did not differentiate between Governor and the Marathas and even ignored their own family bonds. Next, these emerging *nawabs* paid due attention to acquire support or at least sympathy of the local magnets such as

Zamindars, revenue grantees, traders, emerging leaders and tribal chiefs, and in Surat the European traders too. It seems that these officials made a determined bid to create this own power- base so as to fall back upon the local sources of strenght. In this element of nativity seems to have played a vital role.

In their bid to acquire roots in the region, the emerging *Nawabs*, so far as our knowledge goes, adopted two way strategy: they did not disturb the position of locally influntial magnets and allowed them to continuously enjoy the rights which they had earlier been granted by the Mughal state. In this, mention may be made of the Revenue Grantees (Holders of *madad-i-ma'sh*, *inam* grants etc.); the *desais* the *Petals*, *(muqaddams)* and their ilk. Secondly they tried to creat new interests: they made fresh grants in favour of influntial or at least respectable elements of society like the once made in favour of *Bairagis*, *mehants* etc. by the *nawabs* of Junagadh. Moreover, these new rulers renunciated some of the well-established claims of the State in favour of *Zamindars* and through such act they tried to communicate that the interests of local land magnets were not only safe and secure but could also be enhanced under the new authority.

It is also important to note that the emerging *nawabs* did not fight among themselves. Instead, they supported each other, particularly after 1737 i.e after the withdrawal of the last of the Governers as deputed directly from imperial centre.

The struggle for supremacy which led to the emergance of new *Zamindars (nawabs)*, seems to have been carried without casteist or communal considerations. The Rathors of Idar, though once attacked by Jawanmard Khan Babi, are subsequently and continously seen in the company of Momin Khan and the Babis themselves, except on one occasion when, for a while , they had joined hands with Marathas. Likewise the Maratha attitude towards them all was the same: attempt to capture the fort and/or demand a share in the revenues. It is thus evident that the politics of the time in our region cut across the caste and community bond.

It is also evident that none of the emerging *nawabs* could succeed to acquire, establish and/or retain its hold over the entire territory which otherwise fell within the jurisdiction as imperial officials. The sway of the *Nawabs* of Surat, Bharuch and Cambay was confined to the four walls of the ports and the forts. Even within the fortifications, their authority was qualified by the Maratha's presence and their share in the revenues. Similarly, the *nawabs* of

Junagadh and Radhanpur, new rulers of Palanpur and Idar had, likewise, to share their revenues with the Maratha's and exercise their authority over a limited part of *faujdar's* jurisdiction. However, their achievements were not so insignificant. The vary fact that they survived the Marathas onslaught and imperial pressure and, then, its withdrawal denominates that they were persons of some potential.

It seems that the local people's prejudices against the imperial centre's hold over the region, strong feeling of nativity amongs the people of the area, Mughal official's determined bid to dissociate themselves from the hold and control of the imperial centre and its representatives(Governor) in region and, finally, their calculated more to identify themselves with the regional elements went a long way in providing them the roots in the local and, thereby, perpetuating their positions there.

The class of *Zamindars* enjoyed superior rights in land or its produce on hereditary basis. The right stood over and above the peasantry. With the process of transformation of non-hereditary official positions into hereditary one having been completed, a new section from amongst the state officials came to enjoy the same rights on exactly the same pattern and, thus, transforming, though only marginally, the

social formation of the class of *Zamindars*. But the difference between the two may not be lost sight of: The *Zamindars* were obsorbed into the empire and sought to be reduced to the position of officials with varying degree of success, the *nawabs* carved their estate out of empire and transformed their position of non-hereditary State-officials into hereditary one and, thus, changed their character; the *Zamindar*'s position carried 'legitimacy' as *Zamindars* whereas the *nawabs* were still, at least technically, the Mughal officials, approval of which was sought from the Mughal emperors. But then, like the *Zamindars*, the new-*Zamindars* too ceased to Share their revenues with the empire, except the offering of tribute at the time of succession. Accepting the prevailing situation and the changed position of their officials as *fait accompli*, the Mughal emperors extended their approval, acting morely as rubber stamps.

CHAPTER-I

THE POLITICAL MILIEU

The first half of the eighteenth century constitutes an important land mark in the history of Mughal Gujarat. Having passed through an era of relative peace and stability for more than a century the *suba* entered a phase, marked with administrative instability and political chaos. As the imperial Mughal control began to recede in the first half of the eighteenth century, a new scenario of local level tensions and subsequent realignment of authority and power began to emerge. With the recession of Mughal imperial control over the province, authority devolved drawnward at all levels and the devolution seems to have stopped at the level of village/town. The loss of Ahmadabad to the Marathas (1753) merely signified the culmination of a process which had increasingly excluded Gujarat from amongst imperial concern.

At the outset of our period, the *suba* of Gujarat occupied a significant space in the imperial scheme. The

region formed a bridge between the empire's northern and southern territorial units. Political developments in the bordering provinces of the Deccan and Ajmer had their direct impact on Gujarat[1]. That the *suba* of Gujarat comprised an important link in the commercial life of Mughal India, is too well known to be discussed in any detail.[2]

Administratively the suba was regarded as sensitive

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1 P. Saran, *Provincial Government*, pp. 127-30; M.S. Commissariat, *A History of Gujarat*, II, N. Delhi, 1957, pp. 199-205, G.S. Sardesai, *New History of Maratha People*, II, Bombay, 1948, pp 105-10.

2 For instance, Surendra Gopal, *Commerce and Craft in Gujarat, 16th and 17th centuries*. New Delhi, 1975, B.G. Gokhle, "Ahmadabad in 17th century" *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol XII, pt. 11 April, 1969; A.D. Gupta "The Marchants of Surat c 1700-1750;" Elites in south Asia: Edmund Leach and S.M. Mukherjee (ed), Cambridge University Press, 1970; Kotani, "Politico-economic condition of 17-18th century Gujarat" *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol XXX, No. 2.

region, a problem province.[3]

In view of the nature of *suba* in general and the turbulent nature of the Rajputs and the Kolis (*zamindars*) in particular, the imperial centre had to make special arrangements. Thus, only a *mansabdar* who enjoyed high rank was appointed *subadar* of Gujarat.[4] He was assisted by rank

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3 Eempror Aurangzeb described Gujarat as a 'refractory' region (Gujarat......*zortalab ast*) S.M. Azizuddin Hussain (ed), *Kalimat-i Taijibat* by Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri, Delhi 1982, p. 114; please see also *Ibid.*, pp. 84-5. In one of his letters addressed to prince Mohammad Azam, then *subadar* of Gujarat (1701-4), the emperor advised him to follow the foot prints of Shujat Khan (noted for his continual and effective administrative control), "otherwise this is the province of Gujarat, may God forbid, there will be disorder and confusion." J.H. Billimoria (ed), *Ruqat-i Alamgiri*, Delhi, 1872, letter No. XIX, pp. 24-6.

4 *Kalimat-i Taiyibat*, p. 114; M. Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb*, Delhi, 1970 p. 147.

assisted by the *faujdars* and the *thanadars* who, at the time of need, had to furnish half of troops maintained by them against their conditional and unconditional ranks for serving directly under the *nazim's* command.[6]

In order to maintain continual administrative pressure the empire took preventive steps to keep the office always occupied. It was provided that the outgoing *subadar* should leave the office after the arrival of the next incumbent.[7] Emperor Aurangzeb also ordered that the incoming and outgoing *nazims*, and implicitly, the official associated with them, must perform the ceremony of arrival and departure in a single meeting on the same place, instead of separately as it was done previously.[8]

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5 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p. 226; *Mirat-i Ahmadi Supplement* (Persian Text) Baroda, 1930, p. 169, Account, f. 16a.

6 *Account* 76a: *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p. 26; *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, p. 169.

7 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 224, 289, 348, 372.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 372. In case of an offcial's death in office, the establishment of the deceased was retained until the alternative arrangement

With a view to bringing to bear extra administrative pressure and ensure effectiveness of the existing one, preventive military expedition were undertaken into the region, special task force was deputed from the centre, incapable officials were replaced by more competent ones, new fortresses erected and *thanas* were established, or the strength of the existing one waqs raised on the trouble-spots. complaints of the *riaya* were entertained and necessary redress was provided to remove the immediate cause of discontent.[9]

The provincial administration was divided into two mutually independent halves-the *Nizamat* and the *diwani*[10]

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had been made *Ibid.*, I, pp. 302, 306-7, 326, 345-16, 389.

9 For the reprresentative instances. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 137-8, 141-2, 148-51, 188, 190-1, 209-10, 217-8, 234. 266, 305, 333-4, 336, 338; Nicolo Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, ed and tr by W. Irvine, London 1907, I, p. 198; P. Saran, *op. cit.*, p. 144, & Appendix to chapter, III; *Ibid.*, pp. 75-80.

10 For details, please see, P. Saran, *op. cit.* *pp.* 157-164, 169-180, 193, 196-97.

each being answerable to the sovereign. The purpose of the "ingenious administrative device was to create a most potent and reliable check on the highest officials of the province".[11] The administrative system of 'checks and balances' and division of functions designed as a safeguard against the abuse of power and authority, had generally "narrowed down the opportunity of revolts" by officers.[12] Its keynote was the 'careful and vigilant control exercised by the imperial centre'. Just how much respect the 'centre could enforce for the system of checks and balances, depended on its strength.[13] Obviously it was liable to be upset by severe struggle for power at the centre and dissatisfaction in the nobility. Such a struggle and dissatisfaction emerged at the centre during the first half of the eighteenth century, gradually breaking down the

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11 *Ibid.*, pp. 180-1.

12 H.K. Naqvi "Incidents of Rebellion during the region of Akbar" *Medieval India, A Miscellany*, II, 1952, p. 155.

13 Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court"- 1707-1740*, New Delhi, 3rd edn; pp. I, iii-iv

administrative arrangements which had been so meticulously evolved and enforced with relative tenacity during the preceding century.

Changing Milieu.

The Imperial Scene:

There seems to have started a downward process of devolution of power from, if not earlier than the reign of Bahadur Shah. To beginwith, the Mughal emperors lost their commanding position over the state apparatus, particularly the nobility, the power and authority of the emperor came to be grabbed by one or the other group of nobles that exercised it for subserving the factional interests and regardless of the emperor's authority. The imperial power and authority virtually came to be vested with the dominant faction of nobles at the court.[14]

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[14] For a detail view of these developments, *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 27-8 and n, 43, 60, 64-9, 77, 101-14, 134, 136-44, 147-54, 168-71; Zahiruddin Malik, *The Reign of Muhammad Shah 1719-48*, Asia, 1975, pp. 6-12, 57-64, 76-85, 92, 96-7.

Despite the fact that the nobles successfully grabbed the emperor's authority and made him dependent upon them, they failed to provide effective leadership to the empire.[15] Scramble for fertile and easily manageable *jagirs* and the conflict and confrontation for *wizarat* widened the rift between sections of the nobility. The recurrent strife of rival factions tore the ruling class apart. The power shifted repeatedly. Hence no single noble (or group of the nobles) could enjoy the power continuously. Also in order to retain and acquire power, the group of the nobles had to enter into bargains and make compromises which affected cohesion and effectiveness adversely. Consequently the nobility and, for that matter, the imperial centre lacked cohesion and uniformity, much less consistency in approach. So everything there was in confusion.[16] In the process the strength of the centre declined consistently, thus it found increasingly beyond its capacity to enforce respect for the administrative norms which were thrown to the winds.

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15 Satish Chand, *op. cit.* pp. 57-60, 82-3, 127-8, Zahiruddin Malik, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-18.

16 Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-9, 60-1, 116, 168, 197; Zahiruddin Malik, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-9, 12, 79-85; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 48.

Continued friction disorganized and even paralised administration at all levels.[17]

The Provincial Scene

The kind of struggle that had started at the imperial centre, had its direct bearing on the affairs of the *province* of Gujarat. The process of devolution of power and authority seems to have gone further downward. The *nazims* gradually grabbed the authority of imperial centre, and, it led to erosion of the imperial vigil, the power and position of such others who were directly and exclusively dependent upon it. In their turn, the *nazims* too could not retain control over their sub-ordinates and develop a power base in the face of opposition of the locally strong nobles, the *Zamindars* and the Marathas. The process of downward devolution of power went on and seems to have stopped at the level of village/town.

The *Nazims*:

A definite change in the position and role of *Nazims* is discernable from the available evidence. Appointment of

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[17] Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 81, 116; Zahiruddin Malik; *op. cit.*, p. 13.

Nazims came to be made not so much in recognition of efficiency, merit or loyalty as much for narrow and immediate factional consideration.[18] Ghaziuddin Khan Ferozjung though considered unfit to render any useful service in battle, was, at the instance of Khan-i-Dawran Momin Khan, appointed *Governor* of Gujarat (September 1708) where military operations were the call of the hour.[19] Similarly Saiyid brothers managed appointment of Daood Khan Panni (1713) for 'some state reasons' even through he was 'a poor and careless' administrator.[20] Maharaja Ajit Singh (1715), a careless' administrator who was not even trusted by the emperor, was likewise granted *subadari* on extra administrative consideration i.e., the Saiyid brothers had entered into a secret understanding to which the king was

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18 For earlier period, P. Saran, *op. cit.*, pp. 159, 167.

19 Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34; Zahiruddin Malik; *op. cit.*, p. 27; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 382-3, 385, 388.

20 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 401, 403, 412; The tenure of his predecessor, Shahmat Khan, lasted only three months. Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

entered into a secret understanding to which the king was not a party.[21] The next incumbent Muiz-ud dawla Haider Quli Khan got the *subadari* in recognition of the effective role he had played in the fall of Saiyids.[22] Nizamul Mulk's claim for the *subadari* was, for the emperor, too difficult to resist.[23] Similarly Mubarizul Mulk Surbuland Khan whose record of service in Kabul khan been 'most unsatisfactory' and Maharaja Abhey singh got the office on extra administrative considerations.[24]

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21 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 3. Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, PP. 92, 102, 110 and n. The Maharaja got a second tenure (1719) in recognition of the valued support he had provided to the Saiyid brothers against emperor Farrukhsiyar even though his first governorship had evoked numerous complaints, *Ibid.*, p. 179. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 11-2, 21.

22 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 35-8, Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, p. 169; Zahiruddin Malik, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-8.

23 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 45-7 Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-3, Zahiruddin Malik, *op. cit*, pp. 86-7.

24 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 54, 116-8; Zahiruddin Malik, *A Mughal Statemenship of the Eighteenth Century, Khan-i Dawran*, Asia 1973, pp 30, 56,

The strong nobles desire to procure administrative position in the province and not to move away from the court, gave rise to the practice of governing the *suba* through *naibs* gradually extended to the *province* of Gujarat.[25] Thus Asaf Khan acquired the *subadari* of Gujarat (March 1712) decided to stay at the court and govern the *suba* through deputies.[26] Similarly, Khan-i darwan (1717-19),

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Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp 197, 206-7, *Reign of Mohammad Shah*, pp. 92-7.

25 The 'practice of pluratity' (i.e. one person holding several appointments simultaneously) also arose as the strongmen at the court came to hold other administrative assignments in the province, *Reign of Mohammad Shah*, pp. 12,15, 18, 21, 33 206-7; Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 40, 80, 120-1; 206-7. Please see also discussion in the following pages.

26 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 396-7. During his tenure which lasted little less than an year the *subadar* appointed Muhammad Beg Khan, Iftikhar Khan and Surbuland Khan in succession as deputies. The last of them appointed another person as the *naib's naib* and left the province soon after Jahandar Shah's dethronment. *Ibid.*, I, p. 397.

Maharaja Ajit Singh (second tenure 1719-21) and Maharaja Bakht Singh (1744) did not even visit the province.[27] Impact of running the province with the help of deputies, presumably enjoying low ranks and the indifferent administrators, is not difficult to perceive.[28]

Effective performance of the assigned duties could hardly be expected from the *subadars* who were appointed on

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[27] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 12, 13, 21.25-6, 28, 31, 34, 38, 48; Balmukand Mehta *Balmukan Nama* ed. Satish Chandra, Asia, 1972, pp 11-2, 36-7, 49-50. Similarly Nizamul Mulk governed the province through a deputy. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 34, 38, 48. Moreover Haider Quli Khan (April 1721, October 1722) took more than an year to reach (June, 1722) the *suba* only under great pressure, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 54, 79-80.

[28] During the year 1700-43 the centre appointed 18 *subadars*. The *nazims* ruled the *suba* in person for 27 years. During the remaining period it was governed by deputies, interim-governors, or *naib-i suba* whose number comes to 26. Then, no *subadars* was appointed during sept 1707 to Sept 1708 and November 1710 to March 1712. Please see the Appendix.

extra administrative considerations. Thus Daood Khan Panni (1713-5) did not look after the governor's establishment well. He did not bother to ensure enforcement of imperial orders concerning transfer of *faujdar*, take the required sureties from the rebellous element whose raids became a regular feature from the period of his administration.[29] From the time of his *subadari*, the Governor's virtually abandoned the policy of defending the *suba* against the Marathas on the frontier, leaving the official, to fight against them single handed.[30] Also the local officials who indulged in infighting were not brought to book.[31]

The *subadars* committed illegalities which had damaging effects on the administrative arrangements itself. Thus Feroz Jung (1708-10) extort Rs. one lakh out of revenues of *jagris* of some eminent nobles occupied *mahals* of *khalsa* and *paibaqi* and appropriated revenues for

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29 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; pp. 27, 341, 403, 412-3.

30 For details, please see discussions in the following pages.

31 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*; I, pp. 410-12.

himself.[32] Shahmat Khan (1711-2) followed in his foot steps.[33] Muizaddawla (1721-2) occupied *khalsa* and *paibaqi* lands, and the *jagirs* of the *mansabdars* posted in and outside the *suba*.[34] He defied the centre with boldness and raised the banner of absolute authority.[35] Muizuddawala's this innovation remained as his memento and a dead of

32 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 401-2, 408-9 The court compensated the *mansabdar* by paying them out of the provincial treasury. At the death of Feroz Jung in office, his *naib* resisted by force auditting and escheat of his master's property. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 292-3, 401-2, 408-9.

33 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 401-2, 408-9. At this time Shahmat Khan held the *suba* independantly as no governor was appointed. Likewise Asad Khan's *naib* (1712) and later on Shahamat Khan (1713) appropriated revenues which were disportionate to their claims. Again the provincial treasury had to 'bear the burden'. *Ibid*, I, pp. 401-2, 409.

34 *Ibid.*, II, p. 40.

35 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 45-7. The *Nazim* also captured the imperial stable. S.H. Askari (ed), *Iqbal namah* by anonymous, N. Delhi, 1983, p. 101.

boldness on the part of the Governors.[36]

Nizamul mulk's *naib* Hamid Khan also occupied the *khalsa*, *paibaqi* and *jagir* lands and seized office records, relived *diwani* officials of their duties, leaving the *diwan* with no duties to discharge.[37] His successors retained the *diwani* establishment under their control.[38] Hamid Khan and his successors also occupied *sair-mahals*, *bait-ul mal* and the *mint*, thus allowing the *diwan* to exit but in name.[39]

As such the provision of the 'checks and balances' was done away with. The Nazim thus emerged as the sloe authority at the level of *suba*.[40] In consequence of the

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36 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 45.

37 *Ibid.*, I, p. 8. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 64, 78 271-2.

38 *Ibid.*, I, p. 8. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 64 99-100, 118, 136-7, 143, 256-7.

39 *Ibid.*, I, p. 8; *Ibid.*, II, pp. 64, 78, 140-1, 256-7, 271-2, 348

40 The *Mirat* perticularly mentions that the matter was brought to the notice of imperial centre. But the centre could not make even an enquiry. *Ibid.*, I, p. 8.

seizure of *jagirs* the *mansabdars* posted in the *suba* lost their means of livelihood and spent their lives in starvation.[41] The development rendered the office of the provincial *bakhshi* meaningless and deprived the governors of their own base of power in the province.

Behaving almost as sovereigns the governors from the time of Firoz Jung levied illegal exactions, particularly from the relatively vulnerable action of populace.

Firozjung imposed a 'slight duty' on the items of trade which were brought from the rural areas to the markets in Ahmadabad.[42] Maharaja Ajit Singh's *naib* extorted many taxes from the populace of *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad during both the tenure of his governorship.[43] Since the *nagar seth* Kapur Chand, resisted levying of illegal taxes,

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41 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 64, 78, 99-100, 118; Account, f. 16a.

42 *Mirat-i Ahmadi.*, II, p. 11.

43 *Ibid.*, II, p. 34.

the *naib subadar* had him done away with.[44] Similarly other *subadars* levied illegal exaction from the populace of Ahmadabad and came into clash with the *nagar seths* as also faced the ire of the people on different occasions.[45]

likewise, Hamid Khan extorted a fixed amount with force from all sections of people of Ahmadabad be way of *bewra*, a tax which the author of the *Mirat* had not even heard of earlier.[46] Subsequently all the *Nazims*, without exception, imposed the unpleasant tax and other cesses on

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44 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 34-5. For a view of position and role of the *nagar seth*, Dwijendra Tripathi and M.J. Mehta, "*The Nagar* Seth of Ahmadabad: The History of an urban Institution in a Gujarat city"; *Essay in Medieval Indian Economic History*, Satish Chandra, ed., Delhi, 1987, pp. 261-75.

45 For instance, Please see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 36, 136-9, 170-2. Sarbuland Khan imprisioned the *seth* but the one during Maharaja Abhay Singh's *subadari* fled the town. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 136-9, 170-2.

46 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 67-8, 92-3, 95.

various pretexts.[47] The *naib* of Maharaja Abhay Singh mixed copper with silver and gold coins as a result of which the Ahmadabad mint lost its credibility.[48]

Daood Khan Panni imposed a new levy, called *chhattaman* (literally release) from the holders of the *madad-i mash* lands.[49] Similarly Maharaja Abhay Singh's *naib* levied a separate cess on them and appointed separate *amils* and *tehsildars* for the purpose.[50]

As such the *subadars* from the times of emperor Bahadur Shah encroached upon all the sources of revenue and levied new laxes and revived the prohibited ones. The governor thus encroached upon the emperor's prerogatives, *jagirdar's*

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47 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 67-8, 92-3, 95, 97, 99, 104-6, 136-41, 143, 163-64, 170-71, 190, 204, 256-57,.

48 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 143, 256-7.

49 *Ibid.*, I, p. 413.

50 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 141-2, for similar references, *Ibid.*, I, p. 364, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 40, 45, 64, 78, 99-100, 118, 136-7, 256-7.

rights, and the provincial departments which had virtually been rendered ineffective and defunct.

The Governors seem to have particularly from 1722, refused to share revenues with the imperial centre. Prior to 1722, the *Mirat* mentions, the remittance of revenues to the emperors and the imperial court.[51] But during the post 1722 years the only reference appears in 1734 when the court commanded then *naib* Governor Ratan Singh Bhandari to tremit the revenues. The *naib* remitted Rs. 1, 23, 000 out of which Rs, 75,000 were contributed by the *mutasaddi* of Khanbat only.[52] The remaining claim on *jagirs* (i.e. of the *mansabdar* posted at the imperial centre) was never complied with.[53] At the later date (1747) the emperor ordered the Governor and the Port Officer of Bharuch each to remit a meargre sum of Rs. 10,000 but neither of the two obeyed.[54]

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51 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 385-6, 401-2; *Ibid.*, II, pp. 4, 19, 24, 27, 30-3, 37-8.

52 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 162, 67.

53 *Ibid.*, II, p. 167.

54 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 380-1.

It has already been discussed that every Governor from Ibrahim Khan (1705) onward restored to such activities as under normal circumstances would have invited imperial wrath leading to punishment of varying magnitude. But now the only sword of punishment the imperial centre wielded was dismissal and even the burden of ousting him from office came to lay with the noble appointed to replace him.

Some of the Governors during the first two decades of the eighteenth century, left the *suba* without having been served with the transfer orders. Ibrahim Khan (1705-Sept 1707) left the *suba* after resigning the post on his own accord 'for leading retired life' without prior permission.[55] Sarbuland Khan, the *naib* of Governor (*wazir*) Asad Khan (May 1712-13) nominated his *naib* and left (Feb. 1713) 'due to exigency of time'.[56] Which seems to be the fall of *wazir* with the rise of Farukhsiyar to power in

55 *Ibid.*, I, p. 381. It seems that Khan found it inconvenient to serve under the new regime. *The reign of Muhammad Shah*, p. 5.

56 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 397; *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, p. 10.

January 1713.[57] Likewise Shahmat Khan (May 1713 July 1713) Daood Khan Panni (August 1713 July 1717) and Shams Ud dawla Khan-i dawaran's (May 1717-18) *naib* Haider Quli Khan appointed their respective *naibs* on their own accord and entrusting the charge to them left the *suba* well before the transfer orders were served on them.[58] It was in violation of long established norm governing transfers[59] and standing

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[57] *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 349; *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, p. 10.

[58] *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 401, 413, *Ibid.*, II, p. 20. It may be pointed out that Shahmat Khan (as *naib*) was transfered for accomodating Mohammad Beg Khan, an old associate of Asad Khan who enjoyed supreme position at the court *Ibid.*, I, p. 395. As Governor he was transfered at Kokaltash's instance (Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 32, 70n) Daood Khan Panni and Shamsuddawlah were transfered to accomodate Maharaja Ajit Singh for subserving factional interests. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 11, 21; Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics* pp. 97, 101-2, 145, 147; *The Region of Muhammad Shah*, pp. 11-3, 19, 20.

[59] The *farmans* of appointment or transfer were sent through a *sazawal* whose duty it was to announce the news to the *Nazim* and escort him

imperial orders specifically meant for the ***subadars*** of Gujarat as mention earlier.

Maharaja Ajit Singh (1715-17) appears to be **the only** Governor whose oppressive acts finally led **to his** dismissal.[60]

Shams-ud dulah Khan-i Dawran, the next **incumbent**, managed his ouster secretly through Abdul Hamid **Khan** (ex.

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to his new charge, asking the outgoing incumbent to make over charge to the new arrival. P. Saran, *Provincial Government* pp. 163-64.

60 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 11; Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 137n 179; The charge of oppression on Ajit seems to have been old standing. On August 22 sept, 5 and 27, 1715 there were complaints that the Rajput of Ajit Singh were laying their hands on the royal *mahals* and the *jagirs* of the royal *mansabdars*. The *mutasaddis* and the *jagirdars* dare not say anything as the news writers were in collusion with the Raja. The Rajput sources attributed the cause of dismissal to his friendship with Saiyids. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics* p. 137.

diwan) who bore enmity towards the Raja.[61] During his second tenure (1719-21) the Maharaja's *naib* had been disobeying imperial authority mal administering the affairs and oppressing the people. His dismissal, however came in the wake of the Saiyed's fall for the Raja had always been their staunch.[62] Haider Quli Khan the next incumbent managed *naib* Governor Anup Singh Bhandari's expulsion with the help of Mehar Ali Khan, a leading local noble (ex-*diwan*) with whom he had come into confrontation.[63]

Haider Quli Khan who had turned a rebel from the

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61 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, pp. 11-2. At the time the new was received, the Maharaja was away in Dwarka (*sarkar* Soreth). Abdul Hamid Khan occupied the capital in his absence and placed it in the state of preparedness. The Raja was further dissuaded from his design of war by Nahir Khan. *Ibid.*

62 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 31-33, 35-8, Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 170, 179.

63 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 37-40. Bhandari had to jump out of window of the fort to save his skin from the furious populace of Ahmadabad. *Ibid.*, II, p. 40.

beginning of his stay in the province (July 1722-Feb. 1723) was, likewise, determined to resist his transfer. But when the "revived his companions" he found them "not powerful enough" to fight Nizam-mul mulk who headed 'a large army commanded heavy artillery.'[64]

Nizam-ul mulk was transferred after he had been declared a rebel.[65] His *naib* Hamid Khan was ousted by Shujat Khan, the deputy governor under Sarbuland Khan (1724-30).[66] With the assistance of the Marathas, Hamid Khan reoccupied Ahmadabad defeating and killing the leading imperialist in action.[67]

Surbuland Khan could succeed in expelling Hamid Khan with the active support of local officials who were

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64 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 45-47.

65 *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp 89-90,93

66 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 54-55.

67 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 58-79.

promised position and promotions.[68] In his turn, Sarbuland Khan turned a rebel (Dec. 1725 October 1730)[69] Even though he had resigned (1728) but he was transferred (1730) only after he fell in disfavour with Amir-ul Umra Shams-ud dawalah. The dismissed Governor put up armed resistance but failed to resist Maharaja Abhay Singh who was assisted, among others, by the leading officials of region.[70]

Likewise Maharaja Abhay Singh and his *naib*, Ratan Singh Bhandari defied the imperial authority and oppressed the people from the very beginning of their administration.[71] His transfer was contemplated only after he fell in disfavour with his patron, Amir-ul umra, and the latter found in Momin Khan (*mutasaddi* of Khambat and enemy of the *naib* Governor) a candidate who could, as desired, oust the Bhandari who had already annoyed the leading local

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68 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 79-81, 82-86.

69 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 91-94, 99-101.

70 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 118-28, 129-30.

71 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 133-41, 157, 162-5, 170-72.

nobles.[72] Thus Momin Khan, a candidate picked up from the region itself, succeeded unassisted by the centre in ousting the *naib* after a fight of one year with the assistance of local officials and the Marathas.[73] The formal *farman* appointing him Governor was issued only after he had occupied Ahmadabad.[74]

None of the three Governors appointed subsequently could assume charge in the face of opposition put up by a local noble, Jawanmard Khan Babi, who had occupied the capital during the crisis that followed Momin Khan's death (Feb. 1743)[75]

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72 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 183, 195-6; For details, *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp. 219-23.

73 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 1957, 212-27, 231-6, *The reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp. 219-23; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, Orient Longmans 1957, II, pp. 459-65, 476.

74 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 242-3, *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp. 219-23; M.S. Commissariat, *op. cit.*, II, p. 476.

75 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 277-8, 302-3, 312, 314-5, 321-2, 326- 31, 374-5. At the time

The centre as such failed to appoint a suitable candidate strong enough to oust Jawanmard Khan Babi, a *faujdar* from the region itself who had thus risen to the highest seat of provincial power in his own right and continued to hold it until (1753) the surrender of Ahmadabad to the Marathas.

Thus in the downward process of devolution of imperial authority and power the nobles dominant faction at the court was replaced, at the provincial level, by the Governor(s) whose authority was finally grabbed by the sub-ordinate officials (*faujdari*) who, obviously, commanded power in the region in his own right.

Despite their successful moves to acquire hold over all the provincial departments and determination, particularly from Muizuddawla onward, to retain the province, none of the duly appointed governor could

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Jawanmard Khan Babi occupied Ahmadabad, the town folk were happy to see that the man of the region had come to power. (*Sakna-i baldah umuman b', tasawwar-o-khayal een kal hal Nazim hum-wanti shude khushiha namude*). *Ibid.*, II, p. 312.

succeed. The cause appears to be worth probing into. The available evidence suggests that the Governors could not pool required resources even to regularly pay salary to their soldiers, much less develop a strong financial base. From the time of Sarbuland Khan each Governor was confronted with the same difficulty.[76] In the year 1750-51, the entire income of the *subadar* from all sources, according to the *Mirat*, stood at a meager sum of Rs. four lakh only[77] which amount was not even equal to the income from the *haveli* Ahmadabad of the opening years of the century. It was despite the fact that the Governors had encroached upon all the legitimate sources of income and levied illegal exactions whenever and wherever they could so

Among the factors which led to a sharp decline in revenues the one appears to be the Maratha occupation of

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76 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 86, 93-5, 99, 107, 110-4, 116-9, 129-31, 139, 163, 170-2, 193-4, 234-5, 262, 278, 284-6, 300-1, 310, 337-9, 410-13, Mohammad Hashim Khawfi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, Bib., Ind; Calcutta, 1874, p. 971.

77 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 396-7.

lands in Gujarat.[78] But the income also declined even from those areas which were still under Mughal control. It would also appear from the available evidences that the fall in revenues was also caused by frequent transfers (in early years) of officials and internal strifes.[79] More particularly may be mentioned the fact that some Mughal officials failed to effect assessment and collection of the revenues whereas the more competent and strong ones refused to share their resources with the Governors.[80] Moreover the Governor own capacity to effect collection of revenues suffered set backs in the face of increasing opposition put up by the *zamindars* who were emerging as the real authority

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78 For references see discussion in the following pages.

79 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 401-2, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 2, 12, 54-8, 82-83, 108-9, 234-6.

80 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 403-5, *Ibid.*, II, 241: For further references on the officials incapacity, chapter IV below. For the process and outcome of the 'officials' refusal to share income with the Governors see discussion in the following pages and chapter VII below.

at village level.[81]

THE *FAUJDARS*

The *faujdars* seem to have followed in the foot prints and stepped into the shoes of Governors at *sarkar/pargana* level. They too tried to corner all administrative powers. But only a few of them who could stand in their own right, could succeed.

The begin with, the criterion of selection of *faujdars* as it came to be influenced by extraneous considerations, underwent a change. Thus Kunwar Abhay Singh and later on Kunwar Bakht Singh, were appointed *faujdar* of *sarkar* Saurath and *sarkar* Pattan during the period of Maharaja Ajit Singh and Maharaja Abhay Singh's *subadari*.[82] Both of

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81 For details, see Shaukat-ullah khan, *Zamindars in the Mughal suba of Gujarat during the first half of the 18th Century*, unpab. *Ph.D. Thesis*, *JNU, 1993*.

82 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*., I, p. 401, *Ibid*., II, pp. 41-2, 196-7, Kunwar Abhay Singh's men restored to plundering traders and caravans. His *naib* also resisted his transfer under the Maharaja's instigation; *Ibid*., II, pp. 8-9.

them governed the affairs through their deputies.[83] Likewise Bakhshi ul mumalik, Qamar-ud din acquired port-officership of Surat; Amir-ul umra Shams-ud dawal's father-in law got the *faujdari* of Soreth.[84] Such appointees discharged their administrative responsibilities through deputies.[85] Moreover, the principle of heredity became a common, if not universal practice as the administrative position came to

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For similar instance of politically motivated appointments and its consequence, *Ibid.*, I, pp. 347, 374. It may be recalled that Aurangzeb prefered to appoint *faujdars* who enjoyed respect in and communicated with the inhabitants of the concerned area; *Ruqat*, letter Nos. XIX XXXVI- VII, pp. 24-6, 38-41, addressed to the Governor's of Gujarat.

83 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 401; *Ibid*, II, pp. 8, 41-2, 196-7.

84 *Ibid.*, II, p. 37, also *Ibid.*, II, p. 48. For similar instances, *Ibid.*, 41, 47-8, 101, 103, 163, 166-7, 245., *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp. 206-7.

85 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 37-8, 41-2, 47-49, 101, 162-63, 166, 246.

be usually granted to son after father.[86] But so far as our knowledge goes, the *naib* as were deputed from the centre failed to retain the position once a noble commanding influence locally stood up in arms against them.[87]

The practice of cornering more than one official positions in one person acquired momentum during the first half of the eighteenth century. The administrative practice of granting *faujdari* rights to the *jagirdars* crept into the eighteenth century also.[88] But the practice in the province came to an abrupt end with the confiscation of all *jagirs* by the Governors.[89]

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86 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 30, 101, 117, 132, 163, 201, chapter VII below; *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp. 206-7.

87 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 9-11, 166-7, 196-7, 246-7.

88 *Ibid*, I, pp. 226, 230, 231-2, 235, 274, 279, 306-7, 328.

89 For references see discussion in the preceeding pages.

In violation of the well established norms of keeping the revenue matters independent of the executive during the closing year of his reign, Aurangzeb appointed (1699) one Mir Muhammad Beg as *faujdar* and *amin* of Dholqa.[90] From Bahadur Shah's reign (1707-11), the revenue positions (i.e. *amil*, *amin*, *mutasaddi*) came to be frequently associated with the executives (i.e. *Faujdar*, and *kotwal*) officials as a matter of routine administrative practice.[91] The *faujdars* aggrandised their positions further by contracting *ijara* rights.[92] As such the *faujdar* followed Governors

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90 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 342, Emperor Aurangzeb, according to *Mirat*, had sanctioned the *faujdari* of Vijapur to Safdar Khan Babi (1703 A.D) "as he had no relation with *Diwan*" (*Ibid.*, I, p. 355). It may be inferred that the *faujdars* were not desired even to be remotely linked with the financial affairs.

91 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 304, 390-1, (*Kotwal* and *Karori*, *Faujdar* and *Amin*) *Ibid.*, II, pp. 48, 88, 91, 156 (*faujdar* and *amin*), *Ibid.*, II, p. 6 (*Naib faujdar*, *mutasaddi* and *amin*), *Ibid.*, II, pp. 264, 270, (*faujdar* and *amil*); also see Ibid, II, pp. 1-2, 6-8, 13-4, 38-42.

92 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 50, 56, 103, 106-7, 165-67, 183-84, 197.

footprints at *sarkar/pargana* level. The system of 'checks and balances' so far as it was based on the principle of 'division of power' was thus rendered meaning less at *pargana* and *sarkar* level also.

More so as the *faujdars* thus vested with extra authority over revenue matters, also came to enjoy immunity from administrative actions. There is evidence to show that the imperial authority during its heyday took action, such as dismissal from service, reduction in *mansab*, imposition of fines confiscation of property, imprisonment etc, against the erring officials.[93] But during his closing years, Emperor Aurangzeb showed leniency in taking actions against such officials.[94] Subsequently, the Mughal Officials

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93 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 142-3, 209-10, 217-9, 234-5, 266, 305, 333-4,, 336, 350, 352, 355,, 371-2; also see P. Saran, *Provincial Government*, pp. 180, 186-88 and n; M. Athar Ali, *Nobility Under Aurangzeb*; pp. 149-50., *Reign of Muhammad Shah*, p. 204 and n.

94 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 261-2, For leniency shown against the oppressive *jagirdars*; *Ibid.*, I, p. 263, 275, shown towards a noble who indulged in exacting money illegally, *Ibid.*,

who indulged in infighting, embezzled state revenues, refused to settle accounts and resisted audits and transfers continued to hold positions and hardly faced punitive action.[95] Some of them had indulged in the act of gross indiscipline were, on the contrary, favoured with promotions and other administrative assignments because of the patronage extended by some strong noble at the imperial court.[96] With the passing of the entire administrative authority of the province into the (Governors hand as discussed above, the imperial as well as the Governor's authority and power came to be gradually devoted upon the *faujdars*.

I, p. 338 towards levying unpaid labour, *Ibid.*, I, pp. 266; 360-61; towards *mansabdars* on not maintaining required troops, M. Athar Ali, *Nobility Under Aurangzeb*, p. 150.

95 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 392-3, 402-3, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 14-5, 31-3, 39-41.

96 See for instance Muhammad Beg Khan (*ex-naib* Governor) resisted auditing but was favoured with the position of *mutasaddi* and the Governorship because of Asad Khan, *wakil* with whome he had 'old relation'; *Ibid.*, I, pp. 392-4; also see *Ibid.*, II, pp. 41, 47-8.

The prevailing political situation-internal strifes and Maratha invasion placed the local officials in general and locally influential nobles, in particular, in a highly bargainable position which they endeavoured to utilize for attaining and retaining administrative and other positions.

Since each Governor designate, particularly from the time of Nizamul Mulk, was called upon to oust the Governor in power, the former (for want of effective imperial assistance) had to enlist support of locally influential and well informed nobles.[97] Thus, for instance, Salabat Muhammad Khan and Jawanmard Khan Babi agreed to assist Governor Mubariz ul Mulk against Hamid Khan only after they extorted a promise for the grant of *faujdaris* of Viramgaon (Biramganm) and Pattan.[98] Later on Jawanmard Khan Babi and

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97 Thus, the Babi's assistance was sought because they were "well informed and in accord with the people" of Gujarat. *Mirat-i -Ahmadi*, II, p. 86. For details about the Babis M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II pp. 169-70, 405, 435; see also *Nawabis* of Radhanpur and Junagadh below.

98 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 86. The two nobles had been close associates of Hamid Khan and, now, were pursuaded to change side, *Ibid.*, II, pp.

Muhammad Babi procured through Maharaja Abhay Singh under a similar situation *watandari* (?) of Badnagar (Vadnagar) and *naib faujdari* of another *pargana*.[99] Likewise Momin Khan "induced and persuaded" Jawanmard Khan Babi (junior) to assume charge of *pargana* Pattan" on 'condition of confederation with the former against the governor in Office.[100]

In addition to their procurement of offices by extending valued support to the Governors some of the local nobles successfully captured offices fraudulently and by applying their military might.[101] The 'power of purse' was also put to effective use for acquiring hold over administrative apparatus, (as in Surat), and for procuring orders of appointment as in Palanpur, Bharuch, Cambay

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69, 73, 78.

99 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 133, 145; also *Ibid.*, II, pp. 119-20, 132.

100 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 196, 239.

101 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 82-3.

etc.[102]

As regards the consistency in their attitude towards the Governors, the nobles in the province may, broadly, be categorized into three groups. There were the nobles like Muhammad Iraj (*faujdar*, *Amin* of Dholqa under Mubariz-ul Mulk) Himmat Dil Khan, Zanbil Khan (*faujdar-i gird* and *amin*) and other who consistently stood by and assisted the Governor in office.[103] These officials emulated and even surpassed the Governors their patron, in assessing the land revenue arbitrarly, levying cesses under various pretexts and imposing fines etc.[104] Under the *Nazim's* patronage these

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[102] For details see discussion under the Nawabis of Surat, Bharuch, Cambay and Palanpur below.

[103] *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 88, 93-4, 104-6, 164, 256-7.

[104] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 94-5, 105-6, 164-5, 256-260. J.H. Gense DR. Banaji (ed,) *The Gaikwards of Baroada, English Documents*; vol 1 (1720-68,) Bombay, n.d. (Hereafter English Documents) Letters dated 4th May, 1725, 22nd January 1734, 20th May 1743 and 16th February 1744.

officials enjoyed immunity from punishment.[105] As these officials continued to assist the *Nazim* even when the latter resisted his ouster from office, their tenure depended on his pleasure and ended with that of the *Nazim*.[106]

But then, the officials like Abdullah Beg (*naib mutasaddi* of Bharauch under *mutasaddi*-Governor Mubariz-ul Mulk) continued to hold the office even after the Gvernor's expulsion. Once the Governor was placed under transfer, the *naib mutasaddi* withdrew his support and did not participate in the battle of resistance fought by Mubarizul Mulk. To ensure his continuity against the imperial desire and counteract the new Governor Maharaja Abhay Singh's design, the Beg obtained a *sanad* of deputyship from Nizam-ul Mulk

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105 Our sources do not speak of such actions as having been taken on the basis of their oppressive acts, against any of them. Instead, they are continuously noticed in office until the *Nizam* himself was dismissed. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 94-5, 105-6, 164-5, 250, 260.

106 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 94-5, 105-6, 164-65.

Asaf Jah whom thus he chose as his new master.[107]

In the third category may be counted Babis and their ilk who also assisted the Governor in power but with a difference. After making due bargains they threw in their lot invariably with the Governor-designate and actively assisted in his efforts to oust the dismissed Governor from the office.[108] Unassisted by the imperial centre the Governor had to lean heavily on their support for assuming charge and running the administration of the province.[109] It was this 'section of nobility' that did not identify its interest all through with the Governors that succeeded in transforming official position into hereditary *nawabi*.

From the time Maharaja Abhay Singh's period of

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107 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 135-6, For details please see *Nawab of Bharuch* Chapter VII below; A.K. Forbes, *Hindoo Annals of Western India* (*Rasmala*) Reprint, New Delhi, 1973, pp 362-63.

108 For references see discussion under *Nawabi* of Radhanpur.

109 For Governor's keenness for registering their support , *Ibid.*, II, pp. 119, 196.

Governorship the position of local official vis as viz the Governor underwent further change. The Maharaja's *naib* alienated and annoyed most of them who, in turn, refused to serve him.[110] Hence forth the leading amongst them like Muhammad Ashraf Khan Ghorni (*faujdar* of Barasinwra), Jawanmard Khan Babi (*faujdar* of Pattan and Viramgaon) Zorawar Khan Babi (*faujdar* of Vadnagar) agreed to serve only after they had 'settled expenses' with the Govenors 'by way of daily expenses' for their soldiers and thus tended to turn mercenaries, aligning the same way with the Maratha as and when it served their purpose.[111]

The alienation of the nobles that commanded respect and power in the region by *naib* Governor Ratan Singh Bhandari, cost the Maharaja his governorship. Momin Khan (*faujdar* of Khambat) who bore ill- will towards the Bhandari, rallied round him other annoyed officials and with their help expelled the *naib* out of office.[112] Subsequently the centre appointed three Governors, one

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110 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 186, 191, 196.

111 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 257, 288-9, 327-8.

112 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 184, 191, 196, 236.

after another, but none of them succeeded in assuming charge of the province, as Jawanmard Khan Babi, strongest of the local nobles[113] had captured power after Momin Khan's death (1743) and proved too strong to be ousted by the imperial nominees.[114] As such the actual power or whatever had remained of it with the imperialists, passed into and came to stay with the locally influential section of provincial officials.

The development discussed above must have, cumulatively, disturbed the administrative arrangements, disrupted continuity and consistency of administrative control and eroded its intensity.

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113 Thus Fakhruddawalah, the Governor designate, had sent '*sanad-i nayabat* without naming anyone with the condition 'that anyone of the provincial *mansabdar*.....able to discharge responsibility' could be appointed *naib*. As "there was none who could hold the office". Jawanmard Khan wrote down his own name as *naib*. *Ibid.*, II, p. 322.

114 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 302, 314-8, 321-2, 326-30, 371-5.

Struggle for Power:-

The *Marathas*

The Maratha penetration into Gujarat that had strated during Shivaji's time bacame a common feature with the opening of the eighteenth century and culminated in the conquest of the provincial capital, Ahmadabad, in 1753. But well before the fall of Ahmadabad, the province had , as discussed above, ceased to be an administeative concern of the imperial centre as it authority had come to be devolved, practically, upon its own officials. Acting as a catalyst, the Maratha presence accelerated the process of deterioration which had already sit in and hastened the extinction of Mughal power from the province.

The Maratha conquest of the province was the consequence of their endeavours spread over more than four decades. The phased conquest may broadly be divided into three stages, as discussed below:

During the first phase (1701-1724) the Marathas seem to have, by and large, remained confined to south Gujarat

which included *sarkars* of Ramnagar, Nadot and Surat.[115] The Marathas did make some headway during the period but it is quite important from other angle also.

In the first place the imperial defence strategy for the province seems to have undergone a vital change. During the year 1701-12 the reigning emperors endeavoured to deny the Marathas an entry into the province by fighting them on the frontiers, ensuring availibility of necessary resources for taking preventive steps by the Governors and other officials who were specifically directed to do so.[116]

During the years 1713-24 the *mutasaddi* of Surat, and not the Governer, are mentioned as fighting defensive battles against the Marathas well inside the Surat *sarkar*,

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115 *Kalimat-i Tayyibat*, pp. 11, 36, 40, 46, 57, 61; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 342, 347, 351-57, 359-64, 373, 377-78, 381-82, 385, 387, 392-3, 394, 397, *Ibid.*, II, 27, 52-3, 58-9, M.S. Commissionariat; *History of Gujarat*, II, Bombay, 1957, pp. 209-10, 212, 386, 388.

116 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 342, 351, 360, 362, 367, 370, 373, 381-2, 385, 387, 391, 392, 394, 397; *Kalimat-i Tayyibat*, pp. 11, 36, 40, 46, 57, 61.

instead of on the frontiers of the province[117]. It seems the imperial authorities had virtually abondonned the policy of defending the province on the border after 1712.[118] Secondly the setback which the Mughals suffered at Marathas' hand affected the provincial administractive control and the imperial credibility adversely. The Maratha forces inflicted a crushing defeat, imprisionning a number of officials, *mansabdars*, including the commander of the Mughal army, the *naib* Governor at Baba Piyara pass near Surat in 1705.[119] The battle not only exposed the deplorable state of Mughal *mansabdars* but also shattered their

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117 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 29, 52-3, 58-59 M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujrat*, II, pp. 389, 391, 401. 402.

118 During this period our sources do not mention the reigining emperors issuing instructions as for the preceding years. Instead, the *mutasaddi* and *qiladar* of Surat are shown as indulging in fighting and going unpunished. Mirat-i Ahmadi, I, pp. 402-3,410; *Akhbarat*, No. 2099 dt. Jammadi 14th RY Farrukh-Siyar.

119 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 359-67.

morale.[120] The defeat, moreover, caused a great oommotion and vast relaxation in the adminidtrative cintrol leading to disorder and anarchy.[121] The Kolis, ingeneral raised disturbance and plundered Baroda[122]. The *Zaminadars* of Rajpipla and Jagat rose in rebellion.[123] A similar situation prevailed in the province following Maratha attack of 1707 that was made soon after emperor.Aurangzeb's death.[124] Further ,*naib mutasaddi* of Surat Shaikh-ul Islam's defeat (1718 - 19) opened the flood gates of Marathas

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120 Many of *mansabdars*, had not even the horses to ride and could gather 2000 troops as against the required strength of 25000. *Ibid.*,I, p. 361. The *mansabdars* were "so seized with horror that they are unable to perform duties as *faujdars*" noted the *Mirat*. *Ibid.*, I, p.367.

121 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 366-68.

122 *Ibid.*, I, p. 366.

123 *Ibid.*, I, p. 370-71.

124 *Ibid.*, I, p. 377.

"repeated annual incursions into *sarkar* of Surat.[125] Pilaji Gaikwad fixed upon the hilly country in the neighbourhood of Songadh, befriended the *zamindar* of Rajpipla and secured his consent to erect small forts between Nadot(Nandot) and Sonpara (Sagpara), atteched to his cause the Bhils and Kolis of the neighbourhood and finally (1719) secured from the Bhils the hill fort of Songadh.[126] With the defeat of Momin Khan the port officer of Surat in 1723-24, the

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125 *Ibid.*, I, p. 27.

126 M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujrat*, II, p. 401., Campbell etc.(ed) *Bombay Gazetter*, II, (Surat and Baroda) Bombay, 1892, pp. 168-69. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* (II, pp. 52-3) does not mention the year and the act of befriending the Bhils and Kolis. Elsewhere the work however speaks of the Kolis etc. as rising into rebellion,against the Mughals and thus lending tacit support to the Marathas in Surat Baroda reign. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 89 144-45, *English documents*, Letters dated 10th April 1725; By this date the Marathas had imposed a *dakhla tax* (Rs. 2.5 percent) "on all goods (on which) the king receive custom". Also see *Rasmala*, pp. 360-61.

Maratha ascendary in *sarkar* Surat increased further.[127]

The second stage begins with the year 1724. In this year the Maratha entered other parts of Gujarat and their incursions may be said to have cintinued hence-forth from year to year without a break till they secured mastery over the province.[128] More particularly Hamid Khan, deputy of Nizam-ul mulk, in the wake of his master's dismissal and his explusion,allied himself with the Maratha for recapturing the province and surrended to them the *chauth* and *surdeshmukhi*, thus inflicting a severe blow on imperial authority in the province.[129] Subsequently, none of the Governors could resist the Maratha claims to *chauth* and

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[127] *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 52-3, M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, p. 402.

[128] *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 58-64, 78. M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat* II, p. 402, *Iqbalnamah*. pp. 118-19.

[129] *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 52-64, 78., M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 411-16.

surdeshmukhi succesfully.[130] The imperial court, however, did not (technically) approve of the Governors act of surrending the *chauth* for quite samething as will be pointed out a little later.

As regards the defence mechanism, the imperial authority continued to rely, almost exclusively, upon the *subadars* who were left to cope with the situation as best as they could.[131]

Lacking resources and determination, the *subadars* entered into agreement with the Marathas, fighting them

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130 *Mirati-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 92-3, 157 160-1, RBG Chimmanji, D.B. Parasnis (ed), *Selections from the Satara Raj* And The Peshwa Diaries, I, *Shahu Chhatripati*, 1907, Poona, Doc No. 105, p. 47., *English Documents*, dt. 7th April 1731., M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 425-27, 438-40.

131 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 79-81, 87-8, 160-1, Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics* p. 188., *The reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp. 118-24.

only when they were hit directly[132]. The *subadar* did not come to the rescue even of such province/*sarkar* level officials as were attacked by the Maratha for levying *mal-i amani*(also called *Khandni*, meaning security money) or *chauth* or for capturing the area itself.[133] The centre thus left the *subadar* to cope with the situation single handed who in turn passed on the responsibility to local officials. Every official thus chose his own course of action independently of others.[134]

Having successfully enforced their claim to *chauth* and *surdeshmukhi*, the Marathas endeavoured to make outright annexations. In additions to their territorial acquisitions

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132 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 92-3, 150, 160-61, 164-5, 186-7; *Reign of Muhammad Shah*, pp. 48-51.

133 *Mirati-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 52-3, 55, 58-9, 62, 64-6, 68-9, 89-90, 99-100, 101-2, 157, 160-4, 167-8; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 518, 550.

134 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 52-3, 55, 58-9, 62, 64-6, 68-9, 74-81, 89-90; *English Document*, pp. 8-9; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujrat*, II, pp. 417-8, 426, 447, 451, 453, 474.

in South Gujrat they made prized acquisitions in central, eastern and northern parts of the province.[135] Thus during the second phase the Mughal defence mechanism had broken down and the Marathas had become a power that had to be reckoned with in the affairs of the region.[136]

The third stage begins with Momins Khans agreeing to share with the Marathas as equal partners the income from the entire province and the administration of the provincial capital in 1736.[137] The development was facilitated by the half hearted decision as also inability

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135 *Mirati-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 82-5, 90-102, 186-9, M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujrat*, II, pp. 426, 437.

136 Please see particularly the imperial advice (1737) asking Momin Khan to behave well with the Marathas *Mirati-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 195-6.

137 *Mirati-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 195-96, 219-20; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujrat*, II, p. 460; *Historical Selection from Baroda State Records*, I, (1724-68) Baroda ,1934 p.19 Doc No.23 dt. 20th May, 1737.

of the imperial court to oust the then *subadar* in office.[138] Not strong enough to undertake the task, Momin Khan allied himself with the Marathas to fulfil the pre-condition for obtaining the Governorship.[139] Thus there began the joint Mughal-Maratha rule (1737). With the issue of the *farman*, the Marathas gained formal imperial recognition of their new position though the Maratha- Momin agreement carried tacit approval of the court from the very beginning.[140] The same agreement, it may be mentioned, continued till after the close of the period of the present study.

In the light of this discussion, it may be suggested that the process of Maratha conquest was gradual, spreading over a little than half a century. The process seems to have been rendered easy and its speed accelerated by the prevailing factionalism.

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138 *Mirati-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 195-6, 198-212.

139 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 195-6, 198-9.

140 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 261, 273-4, *The Reign of Muhammad Shah*, p.125.

The Governors:-

In the ongoing multi cornered struggle for power in general and the Mughal Maratha struggle for supremacy in particular, the role of Governors seems to have been determenatal to the imperial interests.

In the year 1707, the *Mirat*, for the last time, notices the Rajputs and Kolis to have turned up to surve the Mughals against the Marathas.[141] In another instance *desai* of Viramgaon is also mentioned espousing the imperial cause when the place was attacked by the Marathas.[142]

On the other hand, there are more instances to show the Governors serving the Maratha interest. When the Mughal forces pressed the Marathas hard (1725-26) the Kolis of

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141 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I. p. 378, Leading ones amongst them had ceased to serve from the year 1701 itself. *Zamindars in the Mughal suba of Gujarat*, *op. cit.*, chapter II.

142 Please see dicussion under *Thakur* of Patdi below.

Maratha's hands.[149]

Even though the instances showing the *Zamindars* espousing Maratha cause are not many, however the vary fact that they ceased to serve the empire[150] is worthy of consideration. Here it seems important to point out that from the point of view of the *Zamindars* the emerging conditions were quite favourable. The Marathas very presence in and around the province must have meant that the Mughals would be much less able to concentrate on the front opened by the Governers, then the imperial administrative control was declining and its consistency being disrupted. The shrinking Mughal authority was not simultaneously being replaced by the Marathas. The situation thus being propitious for advancing their own cause, the Mughal officials might have grapsed and endeavoured to

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149 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 359, 366, 377, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 27, 95-6, 144-45., *English Documents*, dt. 23 April 1725, p. 7., *Akhbarat No.* 1448, 21 *Shawwal*, 4th Ry Farrukh-siyar., B.N. Rieu, "Another letter of Maharaja Abhay Singh about the murder of Pilaji" *Proc. IHC*, 1943, p. 284.

150 *Zamindar in the Mughal suba of Gujarat*, chapter II.

capitalize it.

The complex forces let loose by the wars of succesion, economic crisis, Marathas pressure and constant convolutions at the imperial court as well as provincial politics determined the political behaviour of many of the Nobles of the province. The explosive impact of these forces aroused the daring hopes of ambitious military adventures to carve out independent principalities for themselves.

In their bid to retain and perpetuate delegated positions, power and a hold over revenue some of the Mughal nobles and officials strove incessantly and the efforts of some of them met with success. As a result, the first half of the eighteen century witnessed the emergence of a number of petty "states"carved out of the Mughal empire by the Mughal nobles and officials themselves. Possessors of such land known as *nawab*, *diwan*, *thakur*, *raja* etc in our province, enjoyed *Zamindar*-like, superior position but with a difference. Their position was not legally sanctioned, even though it was virtually recognized. Theoretically they did not dissociate themselves from the Mughal empire, but practically they broke it up into fragments. The *nawabs* even sought legal confirmation of

their position as Mughal officials which they had virtually converted into *Zamindars* but, as a matter of fact, the Mughal Emperors acted only as rubber stamp. Such *Zamindars* enjoyed hereditary rights, claimed a share in the revenue and surrendered a part of it to the provincial authorities only whenever forced. In the following pages we purpose to discuss some of such *Zamindaris* which emerged during the first half of the eighteenth century of the province.

APPENDIX

subadars of Gujarat (1700-50)

Sl.No.	*subadars* with Tenure	*subadar*'s Period of Actual Stay in *Suba*	Sl.No.	Interim/*Naib subadar*/*naib-i suba*	Period of Administration of *naib* etc.	References
1.	Shujat Khan (1685-1701)	1685-1701	-	-	-	*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 311, 345
2.	Prince Mohammad Azam 1701-1705	1701-1705	1.	Kh. Abdul Hamid	1701	*Ibid.*, I, pp. 346,348,356-7.
			2.	-do-	1704-1705	*Ibid.*, I, pp. 357,360-61.
			3.	Mohd. Beg Khan	1705	*Ibid.*, I, pp. 360-61,366.
3.	Ibrahim Khan 1705-1707	1707 1707	4.	Prince Muhammad Bedar Bakht	1705-1707	*Ibid.*, I, pp. 357,367,369, 372-4,381.
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4.	Ghazi-ud din Khan Firuzjung 1708-1710	1708-1710		-----	-----	*Ibid.*, I, pp. 382-3, 389.
			6.	Mohd. Beg Khan	1707-1711	*Ibid.*, I. pp. 389, 391.
			7.	Shahamat Khan	1711-1712	*Ibid.*, p. 391.

5. Asif-ud-dawal Asad Khan 1712-13	-------	8.	Mohd. Beg Khan	1712	*Ibid.*, I. pp. 395-96.
		9.	Iftekhar Khan	1712	*Ibid.*, I. pp. 396-7.
		10.	Sarbuland Khan	1712-1713	*Ibid.*, I, pp. 396-97.
		11.	Saivid Aqil Khan	1713	*Ibid.*, I. pp. 397-8.
					Ibid., I. pp. 398-99. 401.
6. Shahamat Khan 1713	1713	----	-----		
7. Daood Khan Panni 1713-1715	1713-1715	12.	Kh. Abdul Hamid	1713	*Ibid.*, I. p. 401.
		13.	Ghazni Khan Jalori	1715	*Ibid.*, I, pp. 401, 413.
8. Maharaja Ajit Singh 1715-1717	1716-1717	14.	Rajeraj Bhandari	1715-1716	*Ibid.*, I, pp. 413. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 1, 11-2
9. Shams-ud dawla Khan-i Dawran 1717-19	--------	15.	Abdul Hamid Khan	1717	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 12-3.
		16.	Haider Quli Khan	1717-1718	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 12-3, 20.
		17.	Ghazni Khan Jalori	1718-1719	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 20-1.
10. Maharaja Ajit Singh 1719-1721	--------	18.	Meher Ali Khan	1719-1720	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 21, 23, 31.
		19.	Anup Singh Bhandari	1720-1721	*Ibid.*, II. p. 31.
11. Muizud Dawla Haider Quli Khan 1721-1722	1722-1723	20.	Shuja't Khan	1721-1722	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 38, 39. 43, 47.

12. Nizam-ul Mulk 1722-1724	--------	21.	Safdar Khan	?	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 47, 48.
		22.	Hamid Khan	1723-1724	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 48, 54.
13. Sarbuland Khan	1725-1730	23.	Shuja't Khan	1724	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 54, 58, 60, 80,
		24.	Hamid Khan (*DE FACTO*)	1724-1725	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 58, 60, 80, 83, 86.
		25.	Sardar Mohd. Khan Ghorni	1725	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 83, 86, 118, 129-30.
14. Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37)	1730-33	26.	Ratan Singh Bhandari	1733-1737	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 118 119, 129-30, 162-3, 195, 234-5.
15. Momin Khan (1736-43)	1737-1743	---	-----------	----------	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 195-6, 234-6, 277.
16. Fida-ud din Khan and Muftakhar Khan (1743)	1743	---	-----------	----------	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 277-8, 301, 312.
17. Maqbul-i Alam (By Forgery) (1743)	--------	27.	Jawanmard Khan Babi (*de facto*)	1743-53	*Ibid.*, II, pp. 301, 312, 319-21. 411, 413.

18. Muftakhar Khan (1743)	Fails to oust Jawanmard Khan Babi		-do-	----------	*Ibid.*, II. pp. 301-2, 312, 314.
19. Fakhr-ud dawla	-do-	---	-do-	----------	*Ibid.*, II. pp. 321-2, 326-7, 331, 411, 413.
Fakhr-ud din Shuja't Jang (1744)			*de jure naib* *de facto* Governor		
20. Maharaja Bakht Singh (1745)	-do-	--	*de facto* Governor	----------	*Ibid.*, II. pp. 374-5, 377, 411, 413.

CHAPTER II

INTER-CLASS STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY: *NAWABI* OF SURAT[1] (PORT)

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1 According to the *Ain-i Akbari*, Asiatic Society, 1872. (II, pp. 497-98). *Sarkar* Surat comprised 31 *mahals*, with Surat being the headquarter of the *sarkar* as well as the port. The township is located along river Tapti, about 20 km. off the sea.

The city had a strong fort and the fortification around it was raised during Aurangzeb's reign and further strengthened during Farrukhsiyar's rule. *Mirat-i Ahmadi* Supplement, p. 222.

Administratively *sarkar* of Surat was placed under a *qiladar*, a *mutasaddi* and a *diwan*. These three officers were appointed by the emperor and they functioned independent of the Governor and the *diwan* of the province. During Aurangzeb's reign the *sarkar* was declared a *chakla*. Being situated at a distance exceeding 100 kuroh from the provincial capital, the *diwan* of the *sarkar* was granted a status independent of the *diwan-i suba* by Emperor Aurangzeb. However, Governor of the province was responsible for the protection of the *sarkar* and had to keep a

Surat was another leading town, rather the most prominent trade centre on the western coast which was sought to be converted into a hereditary *nawabi*. The story of establishing family rule at Surat is somewhat different from the rest of the *nawabis*, which emerged in Gujarat. Here a trader aspired to acquire hold over the administrative apparatus of the port and, with this, the struggle for supremacy started.

Mulla Muhammad. Ali, the *umdat ul Tujjar*[2] (the best

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watch on the fords and passages which possibly could be used by an invader coming from the Maratha reign *Account*; ff 19a, 21a.

2 Mulla Muhammad Ali was the son of Mulla Abdul Ghafoor, the *umdat-ul Tujjar*. At the death of Mulla Ghafoor, the then i*mutasaddi* (1716-18) Haider Quli Khan confiscated his property. Besides precious material and articles he is reported to have left a fabulous sum of Rs. 80,00,000 in cash. After making arduous efforts, Mulla Muhammed Ali was allowed to take back his father's belongings. For details see, Zahiruddin Malik, *The Rise of Tegh Beg Khan* (1733-46)", *Islamic Culture*, XXXVI, 1972, pp. 57-8.

of the traders) initiated a political game to acquire ascendancy over the economically important sea-port of Surat. But he could not succeed. Instead, Tegh Beg Khan appeared as a compromise candidate and emerged out of strife as practically the independent ruler- the *Nawab* of the place. Tegh Beg Khan's attempt to capture power and, later on, by other adventurers and the related developments constitute an interesting episode in the history of unscrupulous politics.

The history of this episode may be divided into three broad phases: the first phase when Tegh Beg Khan succeeded twice in capturing the *mutasaddi's* (port officer) office displacing Behram Khan, the officially appointed *mutasdaddi*, with the help of Mulla Muhammad Ali, the trader and Begler Khan, the *qiladar* (commander of the fort); the second phase when having been officially appointed as *mutasaddi* of Surat, Tegh Beg Khan attempted to consolidate his position and power, a new game began in which the *mutasaddigiri* (Port-officership) changed hands more than once.

The *Umdat-ul tujjar*, an ambitious rich merchant of Surat "gave up" according to *Mirat* " his ancestral ways due

to abdunance of wealth" and laid the foundation of a palatial fort-cum-port at Athwa island, three miles off Surat. Behram Khan, the then *mutasaddi* (port officer) forbade (1729) the trader from carrying out his unauthorised work of construction.[3] Humiliated but resolute in his design the trader, with big power of purse at his command, resolved to dislodge Behram Khan from his office. He devised a plan. He purchased the loyalty of fort-commander (*qiladar*), Beglar Khan, by making a lucrative offer of securing appointment order (*sanad*) for the post of port officer (*mutasaddi*)for his brother, Tegh Beg Khan. The fort commander agreed to execute the trader's designs of expelling Behram Khan from the office (1729-30)[4]. Tegh Beg Khan, thus, appeared on the political chessboard; previously he held no post in the imperial administration.

To translate his own and the trader's political ambitions into reality, Tegh Beg Khan gave out that he had received *sanad* for the post of *mutasaddi* of Surat. Having

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3 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 103-4., Account, f. 70a.

4 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 103-4; Sarabhai Mehta, *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, M.S. No.146, Apparao Bholanath Collection, Ahmadabad. f.77.

brought about a keen controversy around Behram Khan, he and his brother Tegh Beg Khan dragged him into conflict and gave him battle. Under the terms of agreement concluded through the peace making mission of interested traders of Surat, Behram Khan vacated the office and waited for the arrival of a new *sanad* in his name. Tegh Beg Khan entered the official palace (*darbar*) and began to rule over Surat from 1730 as a *de facto* ruler with no legal rights to rule.[5]

The agreement came under a strain soon after the merchant recommenced the work of building his palatial fort- cum- port without procuring the *sanad* of confirmation for the post of Port officer (*mutasaddi*) in the name of Teg Beg khan from the imperial court. Teg beg khan did not allow him to proceed until the *sanad* had been procured. The snubbed trader turned to Behram khan- the port officer (mutasaddi) out of office. Muhammed Ali, the trader, assured him of the *sanad* of confirmation. In turn Behram Khan undertook to allow the merchant to accomplish his object. The trader spent a sum of Rs. 1,80,000, procured appointment order (*sanad*) for the new ally and thus enabled

5 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 104-5,109. *Hadiqat-ul-Hind*, f. 39.

him to reoccupy the official palace of port- officer (*mutasaddi*) after a lapse of ten months (1731). Muhammed Ali, then, put his design into effect and built a palatial fort- cum- port at the island of Athwa.[6]

Even the newly formed alliance did not last long. Mulla Muhammed Ali had aspirations which were disproportionate to his size. Having raised the palatial fort-cum-port of his dream, he assumed princely ways, he appointed his own fort- commander (*qiladar*) and police officer (*kotwal*), kept retinue, put cannons on the fort and, above all, succeeded in attracting the merchant to the newly developed port. The new port registered very rapid growth at the expense of Surat. The port officer (*mutasaddi*) could not and would not suffer the financial loss in terms of revenues nor political prestige.[7]

In order to protect his interests, Behram Khan appointed a military commander (*faujdar*) at Athwa to supervise the trade. The action was sharply objected to by

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6 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 109-10, 142. *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f.40., *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* f.70

7 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 109-10, 142, 147.

the merchant prince.[8] With the help of trading communities and 'an amenable religious leader' Syed Muhammed Ali Waiz, the merchant prince gave the issue a sectarian fervour which led to a big tumult.[9] Behram Khan, however, succeeded in overcoming the problem with a firm hand.

Mulla Muhammed Ali was not inclined to sit idle. He persuaded his abandoned allies, Beglar Khan and Tegh Beg Khan, to resume the task of expelling Behram Khan. In addition to his promise of securing the appointment order (*sanad*) from the imperial court, the trader by advancing the required amount of money and providing the ammunition, demonstrated the sincerity of his intention.[10] In his revengeful mood, the trader sought the assistance of the Dutch, the English and the Marathas.[11] The port officer

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8 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 147-8.

9 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 69, 147-8 Syed Mohammed Ali Waiz who had bribed the *qazi* declared that Tegh Beg Khan had not kept his word, cheated the trader and thus acted against the *sharia*. Z.U. Malik, *The Rise of Tegh Beg Khan*, p. 59.

10 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 148-9., *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f.61.

11 *Surat District Gazetteer*, p. 135; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VI, pp. 109, 111. The *Mirat* does

(*mutasaddi*) gave a long battle but could not succeed. Hence Tegh Beg Khan was reinstalled as the *de facto mutasaddi* (1731-32)[12] The trader resumed the princely ways and busied himself with enhancing the trade at Athwa. Tegh Beg Khan, alongwith his brother ally Beglar Khan, the fort commander (*qiladar*) ruled over Surat.

Apparently Mulla Muhammad Ali did not remain content with what he had achieved till then. To keep Tegh Beg Khan on *sanad* tenter hooks, the Mulla made no effort to procure the *sanad* from the court for the Khan. Instead, he secretly arranged for seeking a grant of *mansab* of 3000 with a title of Fakhruddin Khan for his younger son and the *sanad* of the post of port- officer (*mutasaddi*) exclusively for himself,

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not mention the European's participation in the struggle but notes Devji Nagvir Maratha supporting the trader as a mercenary general at the head of ten thousand soldiers, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 149-51. The trader had himself collected 10,000 horse-men and footmen to strengthen his ally. *Ibid.*, II, p. 147.

12 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 148-54; *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f. 61., *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* f. 81.

with the specific request that he be allowed to appoint any one of his choice as his deputy.[13] Apparently he wanted to acquire the legal supremacy at Surat port, so as to perpetuate his gains at Athwa or at least to make the position of Tegh Khan vulnerable. To translate his desire into action, he sent a *hundi* of Rs. 60,000/- to Hafiz Khidmatgar, the favorite of Emperor Muhammad Shah.[14]

But the merchant's scheme of attaining a position of legal eminance did not succeed. His court-bound messenger fell into the hands of Tegh Beg Khan. The Khan changed his strategy and embarked upon a policy of cleansing the stage of his foes so as to consolidate his positions there.

The *de facto* port officer (*mutasaddi*) without revealing the news of arrest of the trader's messengers decided to out with him. He invited the trader to a feast and put him under arrest in 1732 and sometime later,

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13 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 153.

14 Khawafi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*. II, pp. 103-5., *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 152-3.

(1733-34) deprived him of his life.[15] Mulla Muhammed Waiz who had sided with the trader was also assassinated.[16] One Ahmad Chalpi who had also tried to create a rift between Tegh Beg Khan and the British was put to death (1735), at the instance of the former.[17] Thus the port was cleared of his known opponents. Then 'he breathed of authority and absolutism with tranquility'.[18]

As yet Tegh Beg's position by the year 1732 was neither regularised nor had he sought legal confirmation

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15 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp.154-5, 168-9, *Selection from the Peshwa Diaries*, III, Letter No. 185. According to *Mirat* (II, pp. 153-6) the *mutasaddi* confiscated all his property and razed the Athwa complex to ground. He further informs us that Asaf Jah (Hyderabad) had asked Tegh Beg Khan to spare the life of the trader. But Tegh Beg Khan actually killed him while making public that the trader had been released.

16 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 177.

17 *Ibid.*, II. pp. 175-6; *Bombay Quarterly review*, IV, p.203.

18 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 177.

from the Emperor. The circumstances, however, made it necessary. Mulla Muhammad Ali had earlier (1732) attempted destabilisation of his position. On the other hand, the imperial court appointed Momin Khan as the *mutasaddi* of the port. Simultaneously Tegh Beg Khan, a virtual imperial rebel, was ordered to take charge of *faujdari* of Cambay. Teg Beg Khan paid no heed to the imperial decree. Instead, he retained his position by putting armed resistance to the new incumbent.[19] Nor did he proceed to Cambay. At the moment he might have thought the obtaining of the *sanad* of confirmation an expedient way out of the situation. Hence he deputed some reliable messengers to the court. By offering costly presents, seven Arab horses and ten thousand *asharfis*, he was confirmed (1737) in the position he already possessed by virtue of conquest.[20] The imperial approval was nothing but a mere recognition of the position which it could not change.

Having obtained legal confirmation, the port officer

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19 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 153, 156-7. Momin Khan's deputy could not succeed against Tegh Beg Khan *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f. 62.

20 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 156-7 .

(*mutasaddi*) without seeking due permission, from the court, appointed his younger brother Safdar Muhammad Khan as Deputy port-officer (*naib mutasaddi*) and put the city under his charge.[21] The commander of the fort(*qiladari*) of the port was still held by the *mutasaddi*'s elder brother, Beglar Khan For all practical purposes the principle of 'division of power' had ceased to operate.[22] Not content, Tegh Beg Khan discarded the official designation of *mutasaddi* and styled himself as *Nawab*.[23]

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21 *English Documents*, I, pp. 16-7., *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 157, 340. *The Surat District Gazetteer*, pp. 141-2.

22 After Beglar Khan the commander of the fort (*qiladari*) was held by his son, Aibak Khan, who was succeeded by his son-in law, Waqar Muhammad Khan, the son of Safdar Muhammad Khan. As such the port officership (*mutasaddi-giri*) and *qiladari* both, were held by the same family. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 340, 352, 362-3.

23 *English Documents*, pp. 16-7; *The Surat District Gazetteer*, pp 140-2. It is not certain as to whether the title was bestowed by the Emperor or assumed by himself. The British works also speak of assumption of the litle of '*Nawab*' by Sher Khan Babi (Junagadh) though it was

That Tegh Beg Khan had assumed a position of practical independence is also born out by other facts. He is reported to have imposed new taxes on the populace of Surat.[24] He concluded treaty with Damaji Gaekwad, a Maratha *sardar*. According to the terms, Damaji undertook the responsibility of assessing and collecting revenues of the *mahals* dependent on Surat agreeing to pay a fixed sum to the *mutasaddi* per annum.[25] In this way the *mutasaddi*

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granted by the Emperor.

24 *English Documents*, pp. 16-8; *Surat District Gazetteer*, pp. 139-41; *Bombay Gazetteer*, VI, pp. 116-7.

25 The Maratha ascendancy in *sarkar* Surat had been established by Pilaji Gaekwad during the *mutasaddigiri* of Behram Khan. Deprived of the land revenue the *mutasaddi* closed city gates for the *riaya* for selling its produce in Surat, the only available market. The Marathas, in their turn, blocked up routes for the town-folk. The dead lock was resolved with the *riaya* agreeing to pay a share of their produce to the *mutasaddi*. Later, Damaji Gaekwad (1734-57) agreed to pay Rs. 2,36,000 as his share in the revenues annually. Soon a cleavage developed and the Maratha refused to pay at all (November 1735). Finally in

pacified the Marathas who had been enjoying a predominant position on the land in south Gujarat, and particularly in the *sarkar* of Surat.[26] As such he placed himself, relatively, in a safer position both on land around and inside the port. In his next step, he refused to pay Sidi, the incharge of Mughal Fleet, the usual amount of money out of the revenue of Surat.[27] According to the British works

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December 1735, the crisis was resolved when the '*Nawab*' (Tegh Beg Khan) agreed to accept less than the stipulated amount ***English Documents***, pp.16-8. *Ibid.*, letters dated 2nd and 26th November, 1735, and 28th December 1735; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 363-4; ***Bombay Gazetteer***, (Surat, Bharuch, Cambay), p. 117. During the period of Jawanmard Khan Babi's *subedari* (1743-53), the authority as well as the claim of the port officer did not extend beyond the walls of Surat. The *Sarkar* had entirely been occupied by the Marathas. *Account*, ff.15a, 18a-b.

26 P.G. Joshi, *Historical Selection from Baroda State Records*, I, (1724-68); Broda, 1934, Letter No. 28, p.19, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 132-3.

27 *Treaties*, VIII, pp. 353, 359; ***Bombay Gazetteer***, IV, pp.117-18.

Tegh Beg Khan, prior to his coming into open hostility with Sidi, had concluded some agreement with the British at Surat.[28] It will not be out of place to note that the *Zamindar* of Cheharmandvi (the *zortalab* i.e. recalcitrant) had supported Tegh Beg Khan against the merchant prince.[29]

From 1732 until his death (1746) Tegh Beg Khan was practically an independent ruler of Surat. He was succeeded by his younger brother Safdar Muhammad Khan, the incharge of port. Safdar Muhammad Khan also sought the *sanad* of confirmation (1747) from the court and spent a sum of 10,000 *asharfis*, besides other precious presents, to obtain it.[30]

But Safdar Muhammad Khan was not destined to enjoy the

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28 *Treaties*, VIII, p. 353; *Bombay Gazetteer*, IV, p. 117.

29 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 155, *Selection from Peshwa Diaries* III, Letter no. 185, p.129.

30 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 339-40; *English Documents*, letter dated 17th April 1747; *Treaties*, VIII pp. 352-3.

position uninterrupted. His *bakhshi*, Saiyed Moinuddin Khan alias Achchan,[31] acting under Nizam ul mulk Asaf Jah's instructions, ousted Safdar Muhammad Khan out of port and the fort. In a sudden move the *Bakhshi* captured the fort and placed the *qiladar*, Waqar Muhammed Khan who was taken by surprise, under arrest (November, 1747)[32] Determined to capture the port also, Saiyid Achchan acquired services of Madhav Rao Maratha who was invited into the fort.[33] Equally

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31 The Saiyed, brother of Saiyid Mithan, a religious man who was held in esteem by Nizamul mulk Asaf Jah. The *Nizam* had hatched a plan to oust Tegh Beg Khan earlier by working on Achchan (the *bakhshi*) through Mithan but to no avail. After Tegh Beg Khan's death, the *Nizam* renewed his effort, hence the present struggle *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 356-8.

32 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 357-8; *English Documents*, letter dated 23 November, 1747.

33 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp.358-9, 363; *English Documents*, letter dated 10 December, 1747. His services were acquired for Rs. 11,00,000 with the understanding that he would enjoy one third share in the revenues until the stipulated amount was paid. But the *sardar* was slain while the struggle was still on

determined to retain his position, Safdar Muhammed Khan obtained support of another Maratha *sardar*, Khanderao.[34] But the traders, wealthy men the British the 'nobles and ignobles' of the town who were vexed with the *mutasaddi* lent support to Achchan.[35] Having smelt general opposition and apprehending mass uprising against him, Safdar Muhammed Khan vacated the post.[36] Thus Saiyid Achchan who assumed power and made proclamation in the name of *Nizam* came to occupy (December 1747) the *mutasaddigiri* as well as the *qiladari*.[37] Thus a Mughal – rebel-noble replaced the

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34 His services were acquired for Rs. 300,000, *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II, p.364.

35 They were all opposed to Safdar Muhammed Khan and disliked him since the days of his deputy-*mutasaddigiri* *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 359-60; *English Document*, dated 18 December 1747; For his oppressive attitude under Tegh Beg Khan and reaction of the traders, *English Documents*, dated 22 January, 24 January, 1st February, and 10 February 1734.

36 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 359-60. He seems to have run short of funds also.

37 *Ibid.*, II, p. 360; *English Documents*, letter dated 18th December, 1747.

suzerainty of the Mughal emperor. But it was not a permanent feature.

Within a month of his exit, Safdar Muhammad Khan found a treasure trove and resumed the struggle (February 1748) to meet, this time, still stiffer opposition.[38]

Saiyed Achchan approached and acquired active support of the English, Dutch, the portuguese and Hafiz Masud Khan (*Vakil* of Yaqut Khan of Danda Rajpuri, in charge of Mughal Fleet.)[39] He was joined by wealthy men, traders and common populace. Apprehending ill treatment which might be meted out if Safdar Muhammed Khan succeeded they "on their own entered into an agreement together among themselves not to allow Safdar Khan, or any other person in future, to seize government (of Surat) and that they would prevent and

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38 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p.360; *English Documents*, letter dated 12th February, 1748. Safdar Muhammed Khan acquired support of the Kolis also. *Ibid.*, dated, 17th February 1748. Damaji Gaekwad also stood by him. *Ibid.*, dated 17th February 1748.

39 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 361.

obstruct him.[40] Also Nizam ul mulk endeavored to ensure support of leading men of surat in favor of Achchan by promising them favours.[41] Safdar Muhammad Khan finding himself not capable to meeting the challenge, withdrew and left for Sindh.[42] With this, Saiyed Achchan started ruling Surat by assigning *qiladari* to his son, Saiyed Hafizuddin and *naib mutasaddigiri* to Ali Nawaz Khan.[43] Nizam ul mulk, patron of Saiyed Achchan, procured imperial *farman* confirming the Saiyed in the position and granting him

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40 *Ibid.*, *English Documents*, letter dated 18th December, 1747.

41 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 361.

42 *English Documents* letter dated 4th March, 1748. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 361-2.

43 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 362. In the meantime leading men of Surat sent a petition requesting the court to appoint the Saiyed as *mutasaddi*. The court, however appointed Sadiq Ali Khan, a close friend of Hafiz Masud Khan. Sadiq Ali Khan approached his friend for help. But in view of the pact referred to above, the Hafiz refused. *Ibid*.

mansab and *khitab*.[44] It put an end to the *Nizam's de jure* suzerainty.

But the revenues of the port which he did not share with the imperial centre were not appropriated solely by Saiyed Achchan.[45] The Maratha sometime between December 1747 and February 1748 succeeded in extorting a share of one-third in the port revenues. Alongwith them, Hafiz Masud Khan also enjoyed equal share. The *mutasaddi* and *bakshi* together were left to enjoy the remaining one-third part of port revenues.[46] As such, from the point of view of shares

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44 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 360, 362.

45 *Account* ff. 15a, 18a.

46 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 363-4. The logic put forward by the Marathas in justification of their share is interesting to note. As pointed out above, Safdar Muhammad Khan had procured Khanderao's help for Rs. 300,000. But the Khan was defeated. Khanderao, then, approached Saiyed Achchan, saying "if Safdar Khan had succeeded --- he would have paid the stipulated amount of money. Now that he (i.e. Achchan) had assumed the charge of government, he must pay the amount." To press it further, he blocked up the roads of transport and communication for merchant and travellers.

in the revenues, the *nawabi* of Surat emerged as a collective holding of the three partners.

But Saiyed Achchan too failed to retain the trust and support of his allies in the port and consequently lost the position, acquisition of which had been facilitated by the *Nizam* and regularised by the Emperor. In the prevailing atmosphere of mis- trust and dis- trust Saiyed Achchan developed suspicions against his ally and partner, Hafiz Masud Khan, and antagonised him.[47] The Saiyed then planned to confiscate property and wealth of Wali ullah Khan and Kali who had served under Safdar Muhammed Khan, the ousted *mutasaddi*.[48]

Then attributing their escape to and shelter in the

Saiyed Achchan could not meet the demand immediately. He, therefore, assigned one-third of the port's revenue till he paid Rs. three lakhs. But even after the amount had been paid, the *Mutasaddi* could not expel the incharge of the Maratha share. *Ibid.*.

47 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 382-3, 385.

48 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 384.

dargah of Saiyed Edroos to *Naib mutasaddi* Ali Nawaz Khan, he ordered him too to quit.[49] Ali Nawaz Khan brought Safdar Muhammed Khan's son, Waqar Mohammed Khan into the port with the assistance of *Sajjadah Nashin* Saiyed Abdullah of the *dargah*.[50] Proclaiming Waqar Muhammed Khan the leader and declaring to bring Safdar Mohammed Khan back, he joined hands with Hafiz Masud and attracted around him pro-Safdar Khan and anti Achchan element.[51] Hafiz Masud Khan also won over the traders who lent him active assistance.[52] Saiyed Achchan's *bakhshi* deserted his master and joined hands with Hafiz Masud.[53] But the Saiyed enjoyed active support of the

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49 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 382-4. The present struggle started in May, 1749. Ali Nawaz Khan was sister's son of Saiyed Achchan and son-in-law of Safdar Muhammed Khan.

50 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 384-5. Waqar Muhammed Khan was brother-in-law of Ali Nawaz Khan and son-in-law of Baglar Khan. He had been *qiladar* under Teg Beg Khan.

51 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 383-5.

52 *Ibid.*,

53 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 386-7.

British whereas his opponents acquired support of the Dutch.[54] By November 1749, the fort had passed into the possession of Hafiz Masud and the port (*darbar*) had been occupied by Waqar Muhammed Khan who brought Safdar Khan back from Sindh and installed (1750) him in the position which had likewise been lost.[55]

The inability of the Emperor in protecting Surat region against Maratha inroads and making effective interference there, seems to have motivated the merchant prince to turn adventurer. By the year 1728-29 the routes between Cambay, Bharuch and Surat had been occupied by the Marathas.[56] Thus the city was isolated from the rest of

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54 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 387-9.

55 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 387-90. But Saiyed Achchan resumed the struggle with the support of the British who finally emerged as the real master of the port. The British pensioned off the Saiyed family and acquired full hold over the place. Syed Achchan's descendant, Mir Sultan Alam Khan, happened to be last to enjoy British pension.

56 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 132, 239, 363-4, 521, V.G. Dighe *Peshwa Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion*, pp. 20-30; *Bombay Gazetteer*, IV, p.109.

Mughal empire. Therefore, the development at Surat went unchecked though not un-noticed. Under such circumstances it was the turn of adventurers who might take risks and make their fortunes by the dint of intrigue and sword. Tegh Beg Khan at the instance of the traders and Saiyed Achchan at the instance of Nizam-ul mulk turned ones such, carved out a principality out of Mughal empire and listed themselves among the *Nawabs*.

The struggle for acquiring hold over the most important port of western India, Surat, is an important development from more than one angel. Here a trader tried to grab the power, directly or indirectly, and change his class. But he failed. The Nizam ul mulk's attempt to acquire hold over the place speaks of his endeavour to extend his sphere of influence from Deccan to western India and, perhaps, use the place to check any imperial advance into his domins. Thirdly, traders of the port too did not remain inactive, for, in their own interest, they tried to be a party in the struggle, presumably to ensure peace and continuity in trading activities. The Europeans who adventured to defy Mughal authority though unsuccessfuly during the seventeenth century, played, likewise, an important role for making capital out of fluid situation

obtaining at the port. In addition to ensuring their safety and trading interest, the Europeans acted as active political characters. The prevailing rifts and continuing warfare between various contesting parties ultimately facilitated the emergence of the East India Company as the master of the place.

CHAPTER III

INTERA-CLASS SHIFTING LOYALTIES:

(A) *NAWABI* OF BHARUCH[1] (PORT)

By an expedient use of sheer diplomacy Abdullah Beg, the *faujdar-amin* of *pargana* Bharuch succeeded in estblishing his personal rule and in carving out a principality. The process of emergence of the *Nawabi* at

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1 Bhruch,a well known port-town, is situated in southern Gujarat, at between Surat and Baroda on the bank of river Narbada. Situated on comparatively an easy route for Deccan, the town was strongly fortified. Its fort was known for its "impregbanity and solidarity". *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 445; Hamilton, *New Act*, I, p. 49; Munshi Abbas Ali, *Qissa-i Ghamgin*, Baroda, 1975 couplet No. 74, p. 5. Aministratively, the town was a *sarkar* and *pargana* headquarter of the same name. The port was however the administrative concern of the port officer of Surat. But the *sarkar* and *pargana* were the administrative charge of the *faujdar*. Generally, *pargana* Haveli Bharuch was assigned in *khalsa*. A *faujdar* with a conditional *mansab* of 250 *sawars* was appointed. *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, p. 205.

Bharuch furnishes an intresting instance of how prudent and shrewd Mughal official could succeed in defying the authority by alingning himself with and placing himself under the political protection of another strong defiant, Nizamul-ul mulk Asaf Jah of Deccan.

Abdullah Beg was appointed *faujdar* and *amin* of *pargana* Bharuch by *subadar* Mubariz-ul mulk at the recommendation of his son, Khanzad Khan (1725)[2]. Prior to his appointment, the *pargana* had been hit by the Marathas and their claim for *chauth* accepted by Hamid Khan, and later on, renewed by Mubariz-ul mulk himself[3]. Subsequent to his appointment, the Marathas cut the land routes which connected Bharuch

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2 The *pargana* still formed part of *jagir* of Nizam-ul mulk. Mubaraz-ul mulk had encroched upon the *khalsa* and *jagir* lands in the *suba*. The appointment of *faujdar* to the *sarkar* was an imperial prerogative which too had thus been usurped by the *subadar*. *Mirat-i Ahamdi*, II, p. 91.

3 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 55,89; *English Documents* see letter dated 23rd December 1772 which summarizes the development concerning Bharuch; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 65; *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, f. 10.

with Surat, The seat of the Port-officer, and Ahmadabad, the seat of provincial authority.[4] Then, the Port officers of Surat came to be locked up in internecine wars with the *qiladars* in addition to fighting defensive battles between themselves and against the Marathas,[5] Thus neither the *subadar*, nor the *mutasaddi* had an easy access and a free hand to take any effective interest in the affairs of Bharuch whose *faujdar* thus would act the way he deemed fit.

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4 Thus the *mustasddi*-designate of *Surat*, Mustafid Khan (1726) could not go to Surat from Ahmadbad through land route. He reached Khanbat (Cambay) and thence reached Bharuch by sea route. Since he lacked boldness to cross the river Narbada, so opened communication with Pilaji Gaekwad and agreed to surrender *chauth* of Surat for ensuring his safe arrival there. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 132. For Maratha occupation of Baroda (1727) and Dabhoi (1726-7), the towns situated between Ahmadabad and Bharuch , *Ibid.*, II, pp. 95-6.

5 The struggle that went unabated, started in 1726. For details please see discussion under *Nawabi* of Surat.

With the assumption of *subadari* by Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37) and his successful march against the Marathas as far as Baroda, the situation seems to have taken an alarming turn for Abdullah Beg. The Beg, like his master Mubariz-ul mulk, who had already been expelled from Ahmadbad, apprehended his own ouster from Bharuch by the new *Nazim*[6]. In order to ensure his continuity in office and do away with the fear of expected action, the Beg "with foresight approached" Nizam-ul mulk Asaf Jah (technically still *jagirdar* of Bharuch), the strongest defiant of the empires. Asaf Jah granted him *sanad-i Nayabat*, a *mansab* and

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6 Abdullah Beg had stood neutral in the battle that took place between Mubariz-ul mulk who resisted his ouster and Maharaja Abhay Singh. As such he managed his survival. But the Maharaja who had taken hold of the *jagir* and *khalsa* lands, could obviously occupy Bharuch as it was held by the Beg as *faujdar* under Mubariz-ul mulk. (*Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 132). By occupying Baroda, the Raja had shown his ability to reach Bharuch also. Above all, the court had appointed one Saiyid Azmat as *faujdar* and he had come with the *Raja* to assume charge of office. *Ibid.*, II, p.133.

title of Nek Alam Khan.[7] Having thus placed himself under Asaf jah, the Beg and his descendants continued to hold bharuch and there is, moreover, no evidence showing interference either by the imperial centre or the provincial authorities.[8] Not that, Bharuch was considered as hereditary *jagir* of the successors of Asaf Jah.[9]

The Marathas appear to have been the major disturbing

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7 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 132, 135 *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat*, ff.68-9; Forthe place being Asaf Jah's *jagir* *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 48-9, 103., *Haqiqat-ul Hind*, ff. 43-5.

8 For the continuity of Abdullah Beg and his descendents under the protection and with the approval of Asaf Jah and his successor, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 264, 380-81, 399, *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat*, f. 4, *Gazetteer of India, Gujarat State*, Bharuch, p.70. *Majmua-i Danish*, pp. 3-9, *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, ff. 43-5

9 When the imperial court asked (1749-50) Nek Alam Khan to remit Rs. 10,000/- he answered that the *pargana* after the death of Asaf Jah belonged to Nasar Jang and his permission was necessry for the purpose. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 380-1.

factor for the *Nawabs* of Bharuch[10]. Pilaji Gaekwad and later his son, Damaji Geakwad, attacked and besieged Bharuch. In view of increased as also increasing Maratha pressure, Nizam-ul mulk Asaf Jah intervened and agreed to surrender half of the revenues of the port and the *pargana*, Later on, Damaji was allowed 3/5th part of revenues.[11] It seems the *Nawab* had made it a point to live in peace with the Marathas even at the cost of open hostility with the Governor.[12]

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10 *Qissa-i Ghamgin*, p. 6 couplet Nos. 96-7. These couplets also refer to the *mawasis* i.e. recacitrants as having been fought by the *Nawab*.

11 *Ahwal -i Gaekwad*, f. 26; *Tarikh-i Maratia dar Gujarat*, f. 4., *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 65; *English Documents*, dated 23rd December, 1772, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 263-4. For the Nizam's successful pursuation of the Marathas for non-interventron, *Historical Selections from Baroda State Records*, (1724-68). Baroda, 1934; pp. 3-4, 90, 185-86.

12 Nek Alam Khan II "either through fear or at the instance of" Maratha *sardar* came into open against *subadar*-designate in 1743-44. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p.320.

Having relatively stabilised his position, Abdullah Beg's (Nek Alam Khan I) successor, Nek Alam Khan II, broke off his relationship with Nasar Jang, son and successor of Nizam-ul mulk Asaf Jah also. When Nasar Jang, instructed Nek Alam Khan II to remit his share in the port-revenues, he approached the imperial court for the award of *mansab* (2000/500), *Khitab* of Nek Alam Khan and *sanad-i pargana* which he was accordingly granted. He, thus, passed out of the tutelage of his ex-master's successer and placed himself direct under the Mughal emperor. Thereafter he appropriated " the whole amount of revenue without partnership" of Nasar Jang and the imperial court which had already lost its control over the *suba*. He prepared detailed accounts for equating expenditure with the income, submitted with the office of *Khalsa* and 'prospered'.[13]

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[13] *Ibid.*, II, p. 399; *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, ff.43-5. The *Nawabi* after passing through a long drawn struggle over the question of succession among the family members, was finally captured by the British in 1772 who had already captured Surat and demanded control over the place as imperial port-officer. *Gazetteer of India: Gujarat State*, Bharuch, p. 70. The *Nawabs*, it may be mentioned, continued to regard themselves in theory, as the imperial servant and their possession as part of *Khalsa* land.

The transformation of the official position into *Nawabi* thus presents an interesting example as to how a clever Mughal noble could utilize the prevailing political situation in his own interest. First, he served Mughal Governer (Mubariz-ul mulk) who had granted him the position of the place. Then he abondend on his patron for his services as governer had been terminated by the imperial centre. But, then, he defied the new governer Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-33). In this, he successfully put the *Nizam* against Mughal governor as well as imperial centre. Once the *Nizam* had outlived his utility Nek Alam Khan changed his master. The Marathas were bought off because neither *Nizam* who wanted to extend his area of influece could fight them succussfully nor he himself was strong enough to do so. With the capture of Surat the British assumed the office of port officer of the place (and they had been recognized as such by the imperial centre) and in their duly establish new capacity they demanded control over Bharuch. The *Nawab* could not resist them successfully and lost the place. Like Surat, the *Nawabi* of the place, survived for a very brief period.

Qissa-i Ghamgin, p. 10 couplet Nos. 168, 174.

(B) *NAWABI* OF KHANBAT[14]

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[14] The port town of Khanbat, also called Cambay, situated at a distance of 32 *kuroh* south of Ahmadabad, was also *pargana* headquarter of Chorasi Khanbat. For administrative purposes the offices of *mutasaddi* of the port and *faujdar* of the *pargana* were combined into one. The official was sub-ordinate to the *diwan-i suba*, and appointed directly by the imperial court. The port town had a strong fortification around it and was easy to defend. J.W. Watson, (ed) *Statistical Account of Bhaonagar*, Rev. edn, 1883. p. 24., *Account*, ff 240a. Even during Akbar's time Khambat was a *pargana* in *Sarkar* Ahmadabad. *Ain-i Akbari*, II, p. 494. According to *Mirat* *pargana* Chorasi bandar comprised three mahals, one of which (*Ghoga*) was located on penisular Gujarat (*Sarkar Saorath*). Besides a fort, the township had a fortification around it. The *pargana* comprised seven villages with a *jama* of 3,45,96,277 *dams*, around c. 1725. During Akbar's reign the *jama* stood at 2,21,47,986 *dams*. The *faujdar* of the place enjoyed conditional rank of 100 *sawar*. There were, in all, ten *thanas* established in the *pargana*. These *Thandars* too were appointed direct by the centre.

The place was also provided with a *Qazi* (Magistrate), a *Muhtasib* (scensor officer) and

The *mutasaddi* of Khanbat was another Mughal official of a port town to establish his personal authority and family rule over the place thus adding yet another *nawabi* to the chain of chieftaincies which were being carved out of the shattering Mughal Empire. A study of the process of convertion of the official position into a family rule significantly brings to light the way Momin Khan,[15] founder

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darogha of a mint, besides other officials of lower rank. It goes without saying that the place was well-know port and was accordingly furnished with the required establishment for managing trading activities. There was also located a *salt pan* (*Namak sar*). These officials were appointed by the imperial centre. *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, pp. 193-94.

15 Momin Khan was son-in-law of Momin Khan Dehlami, the *diwan* of Gujrat (1725-27). His original name was Fidauddin Khan and was honoured with the title of Mirza Muhammad Najm-i Sani (1735) and Najmuddawlah Momin Khan Bahadur Dilawarjang in 1738. Commonly known as Momin Khan, he was the *mutasaddi* of Khanbat (1730-43) and *subadar* of Gujarat (1737-43) until his death(1743). *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 87, 118, 195, 242, 271; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 84. For further details, *Momin Khan Sani Bahadur Wali-i Gujarat*, Bombay, n. d. pp.

of the *nawabi*, made the offices of *mutasaddi* and the *Nazim* instrumental for consolidating his hold over Khanbat.

Having been appointed the *mutasaddi* of Khanbat, and *bakhshi* and chronicler of the *suba*, Momin Khan reached Ahmadabad (1730) with *subadar*-designate Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37).[16] The *mutasaddi* seems to have remained steadfast in his duties until the year 1734-35 when a definite cleavage developed between him and Ratan Singh Bhandari, then *naib- subedar*.[17] From 1735 onward the Khan

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3-7, 29.

16 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 118. It may be mentioned that Momin Khan's services as patrolling *faujdar* of the environs of Ahmadabad had earlier been terminated by Sarbuland Khan. Momin Khan was, therefore, obliged to repair for the court. (*Ibid.*, II, p.110) Since Momin Khan also enjoyed some respect locally, his association with Maharaja Abhay Singh who was required to oust Sarbuland Khan from the *suba* is, evidently, meaningful. *Hasbnama-i Khandan-i Momin Khan* pp. 29-30, *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, ff.33-4.

17 For the service rendered to the *subadar*, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 128-30, 131-5, 136-9 *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, ff. 12-3 but in the year 1733

did not report for duty even though, he had been summoned by the *naib- subedar*.[18] *Naib-subadar* Ratan Singh Bhandari does not seeem to have been bold and strong enough to take

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Momin Khan had tried to provoke Nagar Seth Khushhal Chand who was harassed by the *Naib-subadar* to stir up trouble in Ahmadabad. Though the Khan promised him help but because of exigency' did not help the *seth*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp.170-1. However, he extended him shelter at Cambay when the *seth* was forced to leave Ahmadabad. *Ibid.*, II, 172. Momin Khan was accused of supporting the cause of Behram Khan who had fought the *Naib-subadar*. Both Behram Khan and Momin Khan were political allies of *Amir-ul umrah*, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, pp. 183-95. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, pp.207-10, 222-6.

18 The author of the *Mirat* attributes the cause of Momin Khan's disobedience to the 'fraudent nature' of Bhandari: since Momin Khan "felt unsafe from his fraud" (*Dochun kidrash itminan' n' dasht*) therefore, he did not turn up. *Ibid.*, II, p. 191. It must, however, be kept in mind that the author had himself suffered at the hands of Marwaris whom he hated whereas he happened to be a family friend of Momin Khan. See also *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, f. 16.

action against Momin Khan who commanded respect locally and enjoyed patronage of *Amir-ul umrah*, the strongman at the court. Determined however to expel the Khan from *pargana* Petland which he held on *ijara*, Ratan Singh Bhandari pursuaded Jawanmard Khan Babi to join his camp and assigned the *pargana* to Sher Khan Babi "who bore displeasure" with Momin Khan.[19] With a firm resolution to expel Momin Khan from Petlad, the Bhandari directed Sher Khan Babi to march against him and himself started for extending moral and material support to Babi.[20]

Momin Khan who seems to have perceived the consequence of his act of defiance, in the meantime, strengthened his position. He undertook repairs of the fortress and made it 'strong enough' to face attacks.[21] Then he avoided confontration with the Marathas who were quite active in

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19 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 191-3. The Bhandari wrote off Jawanmard Khan Babi's debt for ensuring his support.

20 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 192-3. The *naib-subadar* terminated Momin Khan's *ijara* of Petlad before the expiry of the stipulated period. But Momin Khan refused to vacate it on one or the other pretext.

21 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 193-4.

the surrounding areas. First, he 'entertained' Kanthaji in the vicinity of Khanbat.[22] Since Kanthaji failed to assert against Renkoji, another Maratha leader, the Khan allowed the latter to appoint *naib* for collection of *chauth* form the port.[23] Soon after Ratan Singh Bhandari and Sher Khan Babi's march, Momin Khan won over Renkoji's support to use him as a shield against the inevitable threat which he thus avoided.[24]

To counteract Ratan Singh Bhandari's moves further, Momim Khan approached his political patron, *Amir-ul Umrah* and, at his instance, undertook to oust Bhandari from the office of *subadar*. In order to ensure success against Bhandari, he acquired Maratha support by surrendering half

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22 *Ibid.*, II, p. 185.

23 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 185, 318, 398. The claim of *chauth* in the revenues of the port had been established as early as 1725. Danniel Innes to John Courtrey. Cambay, dated 6th April, 1725 and Danniel Inns to John Courtrey, Cambay, dated 29th September, 1725, *English Documents*, pp. 4 and 6.

24 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 193-4. Because of the Maratha's presence there, the Bhandari could not march at Petlad. *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* f. 83.

of the revenues of the *suba*. To retain khanbat entirely for himself, Momin Khan left *Pargana* Viramgaon entirely with the Marathas in exchange for their share in the revenues of the port.[25] With the appointment of Momin Khan as *subadar* and issuance of the *farman* long after he had entered into agreements with the Marathas, the imperial court thus put the seal of approval on his action.[26]

Momin Khan utilised his position as *subadar* (1737-43) for furthering his interests at Khanbat. Sher Khan Babi held the port of Ghoga, a feudatory of Khanbat[27] and still laid claim to the *faujdari* of Pettad. Momin Khan expelled the Babi from Ghoga and 'gave in writing several villages'

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25 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 198, 200, 203, 206, 208, 212, 219-20, 318; *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat*, f. 5; *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, ff. 17-8, 22, 23; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, ff. 84, 86.

26 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 198, 242, 273 *Hasbnama-i Momin Khan*, Bombay, p. 29

27 large vessals directed for Khanbat were sent to unload at Ghoga whence the cargo was sent in small crafts to Khanbat. JW. Watson, "Historical sketch of the town of Ghoga" *op, cit*, p. 283.

of Petlad to Renkoji, the Maratha chief, of his choice.[28] He terminated services of the *darogha-i bandar* and in sheer violation of the *Diwan's* prerogative appointed, instead, a man of his own choice.[29] Having effected administrative changes the Khan put the economy of the port in proper order.[30]

Thus before his death (February 1743) Momin Khan had successfully consolidated his position in Khanbat. It goes to his credit that he did not come into confontration with the imperial centre and, simultaneously, avoided hostilities with the Marathas whom he utilised to defend his position against the *subadar* and, then, oust him from the office though at a big cost. Moreover, he made the port free of Maratha interference and established his sway over Ghoga.

After Momin Khan's death the port was held

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28 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 274, 276, *Ahwal-i Geakwad* f. 29; JW Watson, *Statistical Account of Bhaonagar*, p. 21; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f 91.

29 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 261.

30 *Ibid*. Moreover, he did not remit any revenues of Khanbat to the court. *Account*, f. 18a.

uninterrupted by his decendents, the imperial authority simply put the seal of approval on the succession to power.[31] Though his successors were not distrubed by the imperial authority, they however faced difficulties on other counts and failed to retain the entire inherittance intact.

The struggle for the *subadari* that ensued after the death of Momin Khan put his successor and the Marathas in opposite camps. Ronkoji, a Maratha *sardar* exerted pressure on the *mutasaddi* with the design to capture Khanbat. Najam Khan, son-in-law and successor of Momin Khan yielded and "purchased Renloji's friendship by allowing him half the revenues" of the port.[32] During the post-1743 period, the *mutasaddis* faced Maratha forces on more than one occasion,

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31 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp, 352-3, 366; *English Documents*, letter dated 22nd October, 1743; *Hashama-i Momin Khan*, pp. 30, 32. 36-40; *Tarikh-i maratha dar Gujarat*, f. 7, Kishoredas Munshi, *Majmua-i Danish*, pp. viii, 2-9.

32 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 277-84, 286. 288-9, 300-1, 306-18; *English Documents*, letters dated 31st May, 8th June, 12th and 18th September and 18th October 1743; *Hasbnama-i Momin Khan*, p. 32.

each time defending the place successfully but yielding to pay dictated, or else bargained sums of money levied under one or the other pretexts, to the invading *sardars*.[33] The *mutasaddis* enterneched behind the strong fortifications could defend the port with relative ease but the land routes leading to and from the port passed through the open lands of the *pargana Chowrasi* Khanbat where the Marathas enjoyed predominant position.[34]

Because of the surrender of *chauth* to the Marathas,

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33 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 398, 418, 423-4, 449-50; *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, f. 38, *Precis Relating to the History and Affairs of the Nawabs of Combay*, Bombay, 1864, p.5 The levy so imposed is termed '*ghas-dana*' (grass and grain). It was a military levy which could be exacted not only from the hostile tarritory but also from the territories included in the Maratha domain. It was imposed arbitrarily and exacted forcibly. "The fear of whole-sale plunder and destruction, and not the free consent motivated the payment of *ghasdana* tax." H.B. Vashishta, *Land Revenue and Rublic Finance in Maratha Administration*, Delhi 1975, pp. 13-7.

34 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 438-41, 448; *Precis*, p.5 *Ahwal-i Gaekwad*, ff. 44-5, 53-4.

imposition of a *dakhla* (entry) fee on the marchandise and exactions levied by them and, then, disturbed political conditions affected trading activities adversely, and finally increased expenditure on the military establishments, rendared the financial position of the *mutasaddis* so precarious that they could not come out of the vicious circle and contiued to face difficulties.[35]

Having been confronted with financial difficulties the *mutasaddis* resorted to oppressive acts. Momin Khan's immediated successor captured the goods of silk merchants, imposed additional taxes on the town-dwellers and 'plundered the merchants of Khanbat in May 1743.[36] A few months later, the traders of the port were again forced to

35 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 438, 448-50, 535, 538; *English Documents*, letters dated 6th, 7th, 11th, 15th 19th April and 4th May, 1725; 9th February, 1730, 20th May 1740, 16th Septemeber, 1743, 18th October 1743.

36 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 286, *English Documents* letter dated 22nd May 1743 states that "the *Nawab* has begun to plunder the merchants giving an obligation by way of borrowing". he extorted a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- *Ibid.*, letter dated 24th May 1743.

pay Rs. 100,000/-.[37] Illegal extortions led to the desertion of the port by traders, who reached Borsad and Jamusr, thus reducing the income of the port.[38] Some of the traders who had deserted the port early in 1744 developed strong suspicions against the *mutasaddi* and could agree to return only after some influential persons at the port became "securities of *Nizam* (i.e. Najam) Khan's mild behaviour" towards the marchants.[39] Thus Momin Khan's successors lost the faith and trust of the real masters of the source of their financial strength---the traders/tax payers.

It may, thus, been seen that Momin Khan, who was a duly appointed official of the empire transformed his non-hereditary official positions into hereditary one. In this, he made use of the starife ridden condition at the imperial court which lent support to him. The court enabled him, though only morally, to oust Ratan Singh Bhandari, the *Naib-subadar* from the provincial capital. Prior to that he had

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37 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 318; *English Documents*, letter dated 16th September, 10th and 22nd October 1743 and 16th February 1744.

38 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 452.

39 *English Documents*, dated 8th April 1744 and reply to it.

entered into a comporomise with Marathas independent of the centre and against the Governor in office. He made the office of Governor instrumental for promoting his personal interests at Khambat. He was strong and wise enough to defend the place against the Marathas, the Mughal Governor and other local nobles, whether by treaties, diplomacy or by the use of power and purse. It is surprising to note that Jawanmard Khan Babi, who became *de- facto* governor (1743-53) of the province did not disturb Momin Khan's successor in their possession of Khambat. It is despite the fact that the Babi chief had come into conflict with Momin khan under Ratan Singh Bhandari's instigation as pointed out above. Presumebably, the Babi chief who had similar interest in Radhanpur, did not find it expedient to fight a man treading the same path.

CHAPTER IV

THE RISE OF LOCAL ADVENTUREROUS OFFICIAL: *NAWABI*[1] OF JUNAGADH

Next Mughal official who transformed his official position (*faujdari*) into hereditary *nawabi* was Sher Khan Babi, The Babi chief acquired Junagadh,[2] as will be seen

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[1] Muhammad Bahadur Babi, who was the son of Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi (500/250) was ennobled as Sher Khan during the period of Haider Quli Khan's *subadari*. Like his father, Sher Khan was *watandar* of Balasinor (Barasinwara) Sher Khan's father came to lime light during Aurangzeb's reign. He played an active role in the provincial politics during later years. M. S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 169-70, 212, 432n and 435.

[2] Junagadh held as important position in what was called Soreth during the Mughal days. It had been held by varios Rajputs chiefs during pre-Sultanate period. Even during the period of Gujarati Sultans it continued to be headquarter of the region.

The city of Junagadh remained the headquarter of *faujdar* of *sarkar* Soreth. The

below, fraudulently during the days of decline of Mughal rule in the province. It may be seen that the Babi chief tried his luck first on the main land where he could not make much headway. He, then, returned to the peninsula (Soreth) and established himself at Junagadh. With strong Junagadh fort and city safe in his hands. Sher Khan re-entered the main field of the provincial politics, but this type, he adopted a new approach and persuad the different purpose. The distasteful, as also not so appreciable as experience there, compelled him to retire to Junagadh to consolidate his position in the climate of political uncertainty. Our main point of concern, therefore, is Junagadh; however, for a better appraisal of the whole development a study of Sher Khan's achievements,

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city had a formidable line of defence. Apart from the imposing fortifications of *upperkot* and mountains, it was, further, surrounded by an extensive line of city walls. Situated at the Girnar range of hills within deep forests, Junagadh enjoyed a natural setting.

During Mughal time a new mint was establish at Junagadh and it contunued to function as late as, if not later than 1718; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp., 67, 121, 165.

failures and strategy on the main land seems to be pertinent.

To beginwith, Sher Khan Babi during the early years (1719-37) of his career endeavoured to remain loyal to the state and acquired and the position on the main lands, except for short duration (1729-30)[3]. According to the available evidence, he began his career as the *faujdar* of the environ (*gird*) of the city of Ahmadabad (1719). The position which he continued to hold under *naib subadar* Mehar Ali Khan.[4] In 1721, the Babi, however, came into conflict with the *naib subadar* Shujat Khan (1721-22), who bore enimty towards the Babis threatened them in their respective positions. But their grievances against the Khan's humiliating behavior were re-dressed by *subadar* Moiz-ud dawlah Haider Quli Khan (1721-22) who appointed him *thanedar* of Sadra and Birpur, managed award of *mansab* and

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3 Sher Khan held Junagadh (1728-30) as *naib* of his father who had been appointed *naib-faujdar* of the place by the dying *faujdar*; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 101, 103.,

4 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, P. 22 .

confirmation in the *Jagirs*.[5]

But Sher Khan Babi lost his above mention ***thanedari*** within an year Further (1730) Sher Khan was **left in** his sole (*watandari*) possessions of Khera.[6] But **a change** in *subadari* opened new channel for Sher Khan **Babi**, **whose** valuable services were needed by the Governor **in** office. Since Sher Khan Babi surrendered, much needed **service** to the new *subadar*, he, therefore, recommended to **the imperial** centre for assigning Barasinwra, the ***watandari*** of his father and fort of Ghoga after his father's **death** to Sher

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5 *Ibid*, II, pp. 41-2., *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, **pp**. 259-60; He was awarded a *mansab* of 500/270 **and** *khitab* of Sher Khan. His father was, likewise, allowed to hold Barasinwra as *watandar* **and** Sher Khan to continue in the *watandari* **of** Khera.

6 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 48-49, 69-70, **His** father was continuously favoured and **then**, disfavoured by Nizamul Mulk, Hamid Khan **and** Surbuland Khan. But at the time of his death, he held Barasinwra as *watandar* and Ghoga **as** *faujdar* and manager of the King's mother **who** held it in *taiyul* (i.e. *jagir*), *Ibid*, II, **pp**. 10, 21-2, 48-9, 69-70, 78, 81-82, 86, 116.

Khan Babi.[7] The imperial court rejected the *Nazim's* proposal and deprived him of Ghogha, an easily manageable and prosperous port-town which Sher Khan Babi had already occupied.[8]

A little later Sher Khan's fortune witnessed fluctuations in his other assignments also. Maharaja Abhay Singh appointed him *faujdar* of Baroda (1731) in South Gujarat. But soon (1733) the place was recaptured by the Marathas when Sher Khan was in Barasinwra.[9] Similarly, he

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7 He was allowed to retain his father's *mansab* and *jagir*, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 132, 165-66, *Ibid.*, *Supplement* p. 191.

8 Instead, Behram Khan was assigned Ghoga. He ousted Sher Khan's younger brother by force; *Ibid*, II, pp. 165-6, *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 261, 263, 267.

9 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 144, 162, 167. By this time Marathas had come to acquire a pre-dominent position in south Gujarat. Maharaja Abhay Singh had been able to oust Marathas from Baroda town but failed to expell them from as *Dabhoi*, a nearby town. In his apprent attempt to enlist support of the local elits. He had assigned the *faujdar* of the place to

was appointed *faujdar* of Viramgaon (1733) by the deputy Governor Ratan Singh Bhandari. The imperial centre assigned the place to another noble (Behram Khan). At the instigation and under the command of the deputy Governor, Sher Khan Babi fought a new incumbent to finish. But, then, the deputy Governor, who wanted to deprive the *desai* of the place of his wealth, replaced Babi by another person of his liking so as to attain his goal.[10] As such, if the many areas/position at one or the other time at his disposal, he was left only with his *watandari* possessions of Barasinwra and Khera.[11] It may also be seen that Sher Khan Babi was

Sher Khan Babi.

10 The *faujdari* was granted to the Babi chief because he maintained cordial relations with the *desai* without whose cooperation management of affairs was a difficult task. *Ibid*, II, pp. 168, 179, 184. *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 264-65.

11 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 106, 115, 161, 184, 276. *Ibid.*, *Supplement*. p. 191; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 259-61, 263-66, 267. It may be pointed out that Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi, his father, had raised fortification around Barasinwra and named it Salabat Nagar before his death.

generally beneficiary of the *subadars*' favour.[12] and at times a looser at the hands of the imperial court. It may be further seen that except the incident of Viramgaon-- the strategically significant fortified town between the main-land and Soreth---- Sher Khan, by and large, followed the imperial command peacefully. Moreover, he was continuously at the service of *Nazim*.[13] But the *Nazim* too seems to have gradually lost its credibility as the source of providing favours and therefore Sher Khan Babi was, as will be seen a little later, with reason obliged to proceed accordingly.

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12 The *subadars* needed services of the Babi chief on more than one count. From the reign of Muhammad Shah each *subadar*- designate had to oust the *subadar-in*-office. Secondly, the *zamindars* of the region seem to have some kind of relationship with the Babis who are almost invariably mentioned as acting mediator between the tribute_collecting expeditionary forces and the *zamindars*. One or the other Babi is likewise mentioned as one of the leading nobles accompying almost every expedition led by Mughal *subadars*.

13 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 41-2, 48-9, 86, 101, 103, 318.

Sher Khan Babi seems to have some inclination to acquire an hold over Junagadh for, as early as 1728, he was reluctant to surrender the place to the deputy of the *faujdar* appointed by the imperial court. Sher Khan held the place since 1727 as deputy of the *deputy-faujdar* Salabat Muhammad Khan under *faujdar* Asad Quli Khan, who died in 1727. The next (absentee) *faujdar*, Ghulam Muhiuddin Khan also appointed him his deputy. In 1728, Ghulam Muhiuddin Khan, with royal consent, deputed Mir Ismail in Sher Khan's stead. But Sher Khan did not let him assume office.[14] Mubariz-ul Mulk, then *subadar*, recommended (1729) that Sher Khan be allowed to continue by way of *Ijarah-i nayabat*.[15] But the following year (1730), Sher Khan, for reasons unknown, vacated the office for Mir Ismail Khan.[16]

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14 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 101, 103, *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 260.

15 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 103; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 260.

16 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 117, *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 259. His father Salabat Muhammad Khan had died in 1730. Apprently, Sher Khan Babi would not like to annoy the new *Subadar*, (Maharaja Abhay Singh) and the court at the juncture when he needed imperial

Nevertheless Sher Khan's interest is evident from his early action. In the year 1736 at the time he had been deprived of all his positions except ones in Barasinwra and Khera, Sher Khan Babi was appointed *faujdar* of Petlad by Deputy Governor Ratan Singh Bhandari. The Bhandari in spite of proceeding with a firm determination (*azm-i musammam*) however, failed to install Sher khan Babi by ousting Momin Khan, the *ijarahdar* of Patled.[17] The incident which reflected the weaknesses and inability of the highest provincial authority, seems to have proved an eye-opener for Sher Khan. Before analyzing evidence and development for the ensuring years, it will not be out of place to have a retrospect of the preceding developments--- Sher Khan's obvious endeavours to hold some positions on main- land which had resulted in almost a fiasco.

On the basis of available evidence it may be submitted that until the year 1736-37 Sher Khan had associated

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favours.

17 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 192-94, Momin Khan, the first *nawab* of Khanbat, was also a strong noble having roots in the soil of land. For details please see discussion under Khanbat.

himself with the *subadar* and obviously he seems to have seen an identity of interests with those of the latter i.e. the *Nazims* of the *suba*. In principle, no doubt, he was bound to serve the *subadars* in his various official capacities but he did, in this association, something more even apart from, and also in violation of the rules and regulations. It was at the instigation of Ratan Singh Bhandari, the deputy-Governor incharge of the *suba* that Sher Khan fought the *faujdar*-designate of Viramgaon to the finish.[18] Moreover, he was, generally, with the *subadar* in their *peshkash* collecting expeditions. It was, apparently, because of his association with the *subadar* that since the days of Maharaja Ajit Singh (1719-21) almost every *subadar* favoured him by making assignments, recommending *khitab* and increase in *mansab* and on two occasions favours came in violation of imperial regulations and rules.[19] But such favours neither proved lasting nor even secure. As pointed out above, Sher Khan was deprived of all his positions, excepting the *watandari* of Barasinwra and Khera by the year

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[18] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 103, 133-4, 192-4, *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 163, 246-7, 265.

[19] *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 103, 144, 168; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 260-1.

1736. Even Barasinwra was exposed to Maratha inroads twice in 1733 and 1736. The Babi could retain it only by offering a huge sum by way of *Khandni* (security money).[20] As such, Sher Khan might have observed that while the *subadars* could assign position and make grants, it was the recipient alone who could retain these by virtue of his own strength. Moreover, inability and failure of Bhandari against Momin Khan highlightened the fact that the highest authority of the *suba* was neither capable of ousting a determined officials nor, therefore, in a position to bestow favours even on its favourites. The conditions of insecurity and instability were further created, at least for Sher Khan by the *subadar* themselves. Ratan Singh Bhandari took *faujdari* of Viramgaon from him. To all appearances Sher Khan's strategy i.e. acquiring and retaining position through the good offices of *subadar* by helping them in the *suba*, failed to meet the desired aim.

With regard to his field of action- the mainland-it may be submitted that it was like the hunting ground of Maratha armies. Besides extorting *Khandni* they had successfully aimed at territorial acquisitions, as distinct

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20 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, p. 191.

from their policy of collecting only *Khandni* (security money) from the peninsular Gujarat.[21] The mainland was relatively vulnerable and within easy reach of Marathas as well as the Mughal *subadars*. Above all, since he failed to retain his positions on the mainland, therefore, he would welcome a change in the area of operations. Hence forward (1736), Sher Khan seems to have decided to act independent of the state authority to acquire as well as consolidate his position in his own right.

The long armed struggle (April 1736 to May 1737) that started between Momin Khan (the future *subadar*) and Ratan Singh Bhandari (the deputy Governor in charge) for the occupation of Ahmadabad provided Sher Khan an opportunity to act. Instead of taking sides, Sher Khan Babi utilised the opportunity to expel state officials and occupy Dehgam and korwa which were located in the vicinity of Barasinwara.[22] Having acquired tacit approval of the new *subadar* who did not disturb him in his new acquisition,

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21 *Ibid.*, II, p. 27; Wilberforce, *op. cit.* pp. 121-34; Hamilton, *op. cit.*, I, p. 615, *Bombay Gazetteer*, VIII, p. 116.

22 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 198.

Sher Khan Babi called on him (September 1737) and served him for sometime.[23] In the meantime situation at Junagadh took a favourable turn for the Babi chief.

Hazbar Khan, *faujdar* of Soreth, deputed two deputies, Sher Muhammad Khan and Mamur Khan one after another to take over Junagadh from Mir Dost Ali, the deputy incharge in office. In the meantime, Sher Khan Babi designed to capture Junagadh and proceeded to Ghoga (which was situated on the peninsula and had already been occupied by him) and instigated the unpaid Gujarati soldiers of Mir Dost Ali who was simultaneously threatened in his position by the *naibs* designate and, moreover, when he was shorts of funds too. The soldiers "were internally in concord with Sher Khan Babi" and "that helpless man (i.e. Mir Dost Ali) was entangled in the snare of their strategam". Mir Dost Ali whose incapacity to ensure availability of the required amount for maintaining establishment, was forced to invite Sher Khan Babi, "On an agreement of half to half" for collecting revenues. Having thus entered the citadel of Junagadh, Sher Khan Babi ousted Mir Dost Ali, occupied the

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23 *Ibid*, II, pp. 243, 245.

place for himself without partnership of anyone.[24] A little later the imperial court appointed Himmat Ali Khan, nephew of *subadar* Momin Khan (1737-43), as ***faujdar***, obviously to ensure the Babi's ouster with the expected help of the Governor. But in view of Maratha's presence in and around the -provincial capital and Sher Khan Babi's strength (for he was entrenched in the strong citadel of Junagadh) the *subadar* could not even venture to act against him.[25] and the imperial order could, thus, not be enforced. Sher Khan, therefore, captured the place and continued to hold it in his own right, uninterrupted.

During the years 1738-43, Sher Khan confined his activities to Junagadh and took no part in politics on the main-land.[26] Because of the paucity of evidence nothing can be stated with confidence, however, according to the author

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24 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 245-7, He expelled the ***naib*** after his entry into the citadel.

25 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 246-7.

26 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 247-8, ***Mirat-i Mustafabad***, pp. 267-8. Apparently he did not serve the ***Nazim*** too.

of the *Mirat-i Mustafabad*. Sher Khan, during these years, subdued the recalcitrant elements there.[27] In all probability Sher Khan Babi might have utilised the time to consolidate his position at Junagadh. That his wives, Ladli and Amani, succeeded in administering the region during the years of Sher Khan's absence (1743-45 - and 1746-47) is indicative of the degree of success he had attained.[28] During the period Sher Khan Babi confirmed the holders of the *madad-i ma'sh, in'am, pusaita* and other grants in their possessions. In the first place the Babi chief renewed the grants which had already been made by Mughal Emperors from Akbar to Muhammad Shah. Thus the family of Shaikh Bukhari, recepient of villages, nine (9) in number granted during Shah Jahan's reign continued to hold the same under Sher Khan Babi and his successors.[29] The emperor had also granted

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27 *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 268-69.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 274; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*. II, pp. 314-27, 395-96.

29 (*Barakhali* settled cases), District Record Office (here after, Junagadh SC No.) *Junagadh* SC No. 2 EX. 1, and SC Nos. 413, 420, 1137, 1162, 1192 (*Mahal* Una)

the same number of villages to Shaikh Fatto, besides, 700 *bighas* of land under cultivation in 1629 and 1644. One saiyed Faizullah Saiyed Azam, Saiyed Chand, Saiyed Idris and Saiyed Akbar were likewise granted lands by the same emperor. The Babi chief allowed them to hold these lands under their own authority.[30] Similarly, the grants which were made during Aurangzeb's reign, were likewise renewed and allowed to be retain by Sher Khan Babi and later on his successors.[31]

The above mention grants were initially made by Mughal emperors in favour of various Muslim families. But there were also the grants which the Mughals, made in favour of the non Muslims and who too, were, likewise, allowed to retain the same intact by Sher Khan Babi and his successors. Akbar had favoured one Somji Bhat (*bad farosh*)_

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[30] *Ibid.*, SC No. 426, Ex 1 to 1d; 912, EX Nos. 3,5 and 7, SC. no. 425. SC. No. 554, Ex. E-1, 1/2, 1/3 2/1 2/5 (*Mahal* Pattan Deo.)

[31] *Junagadh*, SC. No. 1201 Ex 4/3 (*Mahal Junagadh*). His desscendents were confirmed in the grant by emperor Aurangzeb, in 1097 AH/1684. *Ibid.*, SC. No. 263 (*Mahal* Junagadh)

with a *madad-i ma'sh* grant comprising 30 *bighas* of land and *mawza* Ahmadpur entirely(*dar-o bast*). The same, had family, was confirmed in the same possession by emperor Aurangzeb in 1684 A.D. and later on by Sher Khan Babi.[32] Likewise, Emperor Jahangir's grants comprising two entire villages made in favour of Shankar Bhatt in *Pargana* Mangrole and 10 *bighas* of land in favour of Chandu Sanghvi in *mawza* Akbarpur were renewed and kept intact under Sher Khan Babi.[33] Similarly Shah Jahan's *madad-i Ma'sh* grant of 15 *bighas* of land in favour of Naraindas and Aurangzeb's grant of 15 *bighas* of land (1070 AH) together with a well made in favour of the same family, were renewed under the Babi chief.[34] Subsequently, Bhan Singh, another Bhat, was granted Tari (*pargana* kutiyana alias Muzaffarbad, *sarkar* Soreth) entirely and 3350 *bighas* of land in another village some

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32 *Junagadh*, SC. No. 1201, Ex 4/3 (*Mahal* Junagadh), *Ibid.*, SC. No. 263, (*Mahal* Junagadh).

33 *Ibid.*, SC. No. 995 Exs. 11/1, 11/2 (*Mahal* Mangrole).

34 *Junagadh*, SC. No. 40, Ex. 6/5 (*Mahal* Una); *Ibid.*, SC. No. 40 Ex. 6/4 (*Mahal* Una).

time during Shah-Jahan's reign.[35]

All these grantees continued to hold these grants under the Babis and are noticed in their possessions as late as 1880-90. Besides the *madad-i ma'sh* grant the Emperor had also granted *Inam* lands in favour of various individuals who were, likewise, allowed to retain the same by the Babis.[36] Similarly, conditional grants were likewise kept by the Sher Khan Babi.[37] The grant which were made

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35 *Ibid.*, SC. No. 1009 (*Mahal* kutiyana); The emperor added yet another village, Choolyana, to his possession. *Ibid.*, SC. No. 996A, Ex A/1 (*Mahal* kutiyana); *Ibid.*, SC. No. 995 Ex. 11/1, 11/2, 11/5, 15/7 (*Mahal* kutiyana), *Ibid.*, SC. No. 992 (*Mahal* Mangrole), *Ibid.*, SC. No. 70 and 171 (*Mahal* Sutrapara).

36 *Junagadh*, SC. No. 406 Ex. 6/4 (*Mahal* Una) *Ibid.*, SC. No. 992 (*Mahal* mangrole) Aurangzeb added 45 *bighas* of *chahi* (irrigated) land alongwith a well in 1670; *Ibid.*, SC. No. 406 Ex 6/5 (*Mahal* Una); *Junagadh*, SC. No. 894 (*Mahal* kutiyana), *Ibid.*, SC. No. 286 Ex A (*Mahal* mangrole), *Ibid.*, SC. No. 668 Ex 8/4.

37 *Junagadh*, SC. No. 224 (*Mahal* Mangrole).

after the death of Aurangzeb were, in the same way, confirmed by the chiefs of Junagadh.[38]

Besides the *faujdar* turned *nawab* of Junagadh also made fresh grants. Thus Purashottum Das was granted (1748) a village by way of *madad-i kharch* for defraying expenses on the *bhog* on the Srinath (?) in *pargana* Mangrole.[39] Also, he is reported to have made a grant of four villages in favour of a local *zamindar*.[40] It seems that the Babi chief tried to win strong and influential local person to his side by assuring *status quo* or else by extending them some favours.

Having made necessary arangements at Junagadh Sher Khan re-appeared on the political scene on the main-land

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38 *Junagadh*, SC. Nos. 983 (*Mahal* Junagadh); *Ibid.*, SC. No. 443, (*Mahal* Una); *Ibid.*, SC. No. 409 (*Mahal* Balagam), Junagadh, SC. No. 995 (*Mahal* kutiyana) *Ibid.*, SC. No. 1042 Ex No. 5, 13/3 (*Mahal* Seel), *Ibid.*, SC. Nos 170, 171 (*Mahal* Sutrapara), *Ibid.*, SC. No. 359, (*Mahal* Sutarpara)

39 *Ibid.*, SC. No. 364 A, (*Mahal* Mangrole).

40 *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagadh MS) f, 17.

1743-1745. He came at the invitation of Maratha chief, Rengoji, who had promised him deputy Governorship of the *suba* under Marathas.[41] Having found no rooms for materializing his objective of getting deputy Governorship, he plundered villages and then joined hands with the then Mughal Deputy Governors[42] as mercenary against the Marathas.[43] But his endeavours to ensure installation to Fida-ud din Khan and Fakhr-ud din Khan in the seat of power were successfully thwarted by his cousin, Jawanmard Khan Babi who aspired for and succeeded in capturing the office of *Subadar* for himself.[44] Sher Khan Babi who had thus supported the Khans against the Marathas, then, joined, the latter against the former and latter against his own cousin, in

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41 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 286, 289, 290, 293.

42 After the death of Momin Khan in 1743, the charge of the *suba* was held by Fakhruddin Khan and Fidauddin Khan jointly as deputy-Governors. They were engaged in a struggle with Renkoji who wanted to oust them from Ahmadabad.

43 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 289-90, 293.

44 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 290, 293, 295-8, 311, 317.

effect followed a policy of convenience. Still he failed to realise his go goal at Ahmadabad.

Once Jawanmard Khan Babi captured Ahmadabad, Sher Khan Babi, endeavoured to consolidate his position by occupying Kapadbanj and Thamna, the territories adjoining Barasinwra, which was held by his son, Sardar Muhammad Khan.[45]

Sher Khan, it may be seen, had by now abandoned the policy of association with *subadars* and remaining aloof from the politics of the *suba*. Between 1743 and 1745 Sher Khan took an active part in the shifting politics of the time allying himself indiscriminately with the *subadars*, with other Mughal nobles with Rengoji and other Maratha sardars, with the phantom *subadar*, Fakhruddawlah and with Rai Singh, the *jagirdar* chief of Idar according to convenience. During all these years his only permanentally seems to have been Rai Singh (Idar) the man with identical interests.[46] In 1745-46 finding no possibility of adventure

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45 *Ibid.*, II, p. 311.

46 Sher khan with Raja Rai Singh of Idar warmly welcomed Fakhruddawala, the *Nazim* designate in 1743-44, but within few days he deserted the *Nazim* designate and joined hands with Potaji,

on the mainland and having strengthened **his position at** Barasinwra he retired to Junagadh where **his** wives **had** carried the management of affairs.[47]

Post 1746-48 developments more clearly **show** Sher Khan

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the Maratha chief who alongwith Jawanmard Khan Babi was opposed to Fakhr-ud dawlah. In the year 1744 Fakhr-ud dawlah attacked Sher Khan's camp but could not achieve success. Sher Khan, subsequently, entered into league with Rengoji, the other Maratha chief in the ***suba***. The new alliance forced Fakhruddawalah to open dialogue with Sher Khan. But Sher Khan could not be desisted. In the struggle between Jawanmard Khan, the *de-facto subedar* and Rengoji, Sher Khan supported the latter but during the following years, he deserted Rengoji who was fighting Khanderao, another Maratha chief. While the struggle for supremacy between Rengoji and Fidauddin Khan was on, Sher Khan changed his sides twice. ***Mirat-i Ahmadi***, II, pp. 286, 289, 290, 293, 296-8 314-25, 327-30, 334-8, 355-6, 395-6, 402-11, 502-12; ***Mirat-i Mustafabad***, pp. 270-4.

47 ***Mirat-i Mustafabad***,. p. 274, Barasinwra, under Sher Khan Babi's son , also acquired the status of *Nawabi*.

acting as an independent ruler. Available evidence, though little in quantity, is significant for the light it casts on Sher Khan's ways of asserting and consolidating position.

Sher Khan shifted to the policy of opposing Mughals in case he was disturbed, and earning confidence of the local elements. The very position of *faujdari*, as pointed out above, was gained by him by seizure rather than by sanction. Also, he continued to hold it without having legal approval and against the wishes of the Emperor. During the closing days of 1746, Sher Khan opposed and fought Fakhr-ud dawlah the *subadar* at Benthali, 10 miles east of Junagadh.[48] At Khera and Barasinwra, Sher Khan's son and deputy resisted imposition of *peshkash* by the *subadar* but was forced to offer it twice.[49] Sher Khan's son agreed to share revenues of Barasinwra with the Marathas, under

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48 *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 278-9, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 353-4. In the 1742, Momin Khan, the *subadar* occupied Ghoga. But Sher Khan remained indifferent.

49 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 40-1, 145, 258-66.

the pressure of arms.[50]

Sher Khan in an apparent effort to growing roots in the soil granted certain concessions to the local *zamindars*. He granted them exemption from paying *salami* on their *chauth* rights.[51] As such the possessions of the *chauthias* were made free of the main monetary obligations. One Weera Kathi of Jeetpur was permitted to raise fortification at the same place. He was also granted a *jagir* in the *pargana* of Jeetpur.[52] Basant, a Rajput, was granted the revenues from the Panchala villages.[53] The *mahant* of Koili was granted revenues of village Koili in the *pargana* of Banthali.[54] Dholqa was assigned to the

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50 *Ibid*, II, pp. 562-5.

51 *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 284-85. The loss in terms of revenues must have been quite considerable because there were, inall 400 such villages as contained *chauth* possessions and the exemption was not withdrawn; *Tarikh-i Soreth* (*Junagadh* MS),f.7.

52 *Tarikh-i Soreth*, (Junagadh MS.) f. 37, *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 285.

53 *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 280.

qasbatis-- wealthy-- soldierly class-- who had killed the Mughal *faujdar* of the town.[55] Town of Una was likewise granted to the local *qasbatis* as *watan*. [56] He also assigned *talluqa* of Bantwa and Sardargarh, also known as Gidar, to his younger brother.[57] He did not disturb the *zamindar* of Porbandar in his new acquisitions, instead demanded *peshkash* only.[58] On the whole he seems to have maintained cordial relation with the old as well as newly emerging *zamindars*.[59] But his authority did not extend to cover the entire area that once lay within the jurisdiction of

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54 *Ibid.*, p. 286.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 351.

56 *Tarikh-i Soreth*, (Junagadh MS) f. 69.

57 *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, p. 286.

58 *Tarikh-i Soreth* (Junagarh MS) f. 69.

59 For his relations with Pahad Khan Jalori (chief of Palanpur) and Raja of Idar, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 245; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 261-2, 272-4, with *muqaddam* of Padra and the *desai* of Viramgaon, *Mirat-i Ahmadi* II, pp. 144, 162, 168, 179, 184.

faujdar of *sarkar* Soreth, for the chief of Sehore and founder of Bhaonagar and those of the Kathiawara, Palitana etc. stood independent of the Babi Chief.

In spite of ruling Junagadh like an independent chief, Sher Khan never broke his relations with the Emperor till his death (1758). He was addressed as *Nawab* Sher Khan *Bahadur fidwi-i Badshah.*[60] However, he did not share revenues with the Mughal Emperors.[61]

To sum up, Sher Khan Babi the founder of *Nawabi* of Junagadh, first unsuccessfully tried his fortune on the main-land and attempted holding positions with the consent and support of *subadar*. Since he failed to retain any

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60 Britishers wrongly assumed that Sher Khan Babi assumed the appellation of *Nawab* and *Bahadur*, see *Bombay Gazetteer*, VI, p. 99; Wilberforce, *op. cit.* p. 129; *Treaties* VI, pp 84-5. The *Khitabs* were granted by Emperor Muhammad Shah, see *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 259, 261-2, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 132, 144. Even his grand-son was addressed with the same title see *Mirat-i Mustabad*, p. 285.

61 *Account*, ff. 10b, 18a.

position of significance with the *Nazim's* help and had to part with his position on the mainland[62] he consolidated his position at Junagadh by acquiring support of the local elements. The period of uncertain political conditions thus provided opportunity to one more Mughal noble to carve out an independent principality.

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62 However his son continued to hold Barasinwra and Kheda on the mainland even after extinction of Mughal rule from the *suba*.

CHAPTER V

COMPROMISED *DE FACTO* - GOVERNORSHIP:

(A) *NAWABI* OF RADHANPUR[1]

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1 According to *Ain-i Akbari*, "Radhanpur had a brick fort. It had a jama of 4,000000 *dams*. Kolis who are mentioned in the caste column appeared to be the leading *Zamindars* in the *pargana* which was located in *sarkar* pattan, *Ain-i Akbari*, II, p. 259. Radhanpur was located 60 kroh north-west of Ahmadabad. According to the *Mirat*, the town had a brick fort located on the high mount. It was called *Fatahkot* Subsequently, Jawanmard Khan Babi (senior) changed the site of township and raised fortification around it during the reign of Farrukh Siyar. After his death, his son, Safdar Khan Babi retained the *faujdari* of the place and erected a fort along the bank of a pound. During post Aurangzeb period the *pargana* comprised 45 villages. At the time Jawanmard Khan Babi (senior) was appointed *watandar* (in addition to *jagirdar faujdar*). Its *jama* was reduced to 25 lakh *dam*, reduction having being applied on account of the adjustment the *watandari* rights of unspecified nature. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 202-3.

Radhanpur emerged as a hereditary *nawabi* carved out of the Mughal province by Jawanmard Khan **Babi**, a leading member of the well known Babi family[2] and ***de facto*** Governor (1743-1753) of Mughal Gujarat. Though the **Babi** chief failed

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2 For a brief view of the Babis who **played** a significant political role during the **first** half of the eighteenth century, M. S.Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp 169-70, 212, 432n and 435.
The family tree of Babis who **established** *nawabis* during the period is as under;

Safdar Khan Babi (d.1725)

a. *Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi* (d.1730)

Bahadur Khan(Sher Khan Babi) (d.1758) *Nawab of Junagarh*

1.Mahabat Khan [II Nawab of Junagadh(1758-79)]
2.Safdar Muhammad Khan[Nawab of Balasinor]

b. Jawanmard Khan Babi(senior) (d. 1728)

b. 1. Kamaluddin Khan (Jawanmard Khan-Junior) [Nawab of Radhanpur]
2. Muhammad Anwar(Safdar Khan)

to retain provincial capital in the face of Maratha pressure but succeeded in retaining and transforming the position of *faujdar- watandar- jagirdar* into hereditary *nawabi* which he and, later, his descendants continued to hold even after the extinction of Mughal rule from the province. Like his other clan members Jawanmard Khan Babi displayed his ability to muster support by making effective use of nativity and acquaintance with the region. Besides the prevailing situation these factors seem to have weighed heavily in his favour, enabling him to acquire and retain position in the region.

The Babis fortune scaled new hights during the chaotic condition that engulfed the region, particularly from the second decade of the eighteenth century. The first assignment of significance to the Babis during the eighteenth century was made during emperor Farrukh Siyar's reign (1713-19). The emperor granted Jawanmard Khan Babi, the senior (died 1728) and father of the founder of the *nawabi*, the *watandari*[3] rights over Radhanpur which place

3 Precise nature of the *watandari* rights is not known. However, it seems, the *watandari* right implied grant of some financial benefits for, according to the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, (*Supplement* pp. 202-3) the *jama* of the *pargana* was reduced

was also assigned in his *jagir* and, later, formed the seat of *nawabi's* power.[4] The place was continously held by the same family that also made valuable acquisitions in terms of administrative assignment and territorial sway during later year.

From the time of Hamid Khan the *Naib subadar* under Nizam-ul mulk every succeeding *subadar* ensured to acquire services of the Babis who, in their turn, were accordingly rewarded. In order to ensure active support of the Babis, Hamid Khan appointed (1726) Salabat Muhammad Khan as *faujdar* of Viramgaon.[5] But as the Babis moves for extending support to the incoming *subadar* became evident,

at the time of his appointment as *watandar*.

4 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 202-3.

5 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 78

the *faujdari* was taken away.[6] The incoming *subadar* Mubariz-ul mulk, acquired and ensured Babis' support for ousting Hamid Khan who held Ahmadabad by promising, beforehand, *faujdari* of the same place to Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi and that of Pattan (*Sarkar* Pattan) to Jawanmard Khan Babi (d. 1728)[7]. In appreciation of their valuable services which they rendered against Hamid Khan, an imperial rebel, and, presumably, for ensuring their active assistance in future, the *subadar* appointed Jawanmard Khan Babi as *faujdar-amin* of *pargana* Petlad (*Sarkar* Ahmadabad) also.[8] At his death in 1728, the *subadar* proposed the award of *khitab*, (Jawanmard Khan) and *mansab* (700/?) for his eldest son, Kamaluddin Khan thus ennobled as Jawanmard

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6 *Ibid.*, II, p. 81.

7 *Ibid.*, II, p.86 Salabat Muhammad Khan died in office (*Ibid.*, II, p. 116) at the time of Maharaja Abhay Singh's arrival.

8 *Ibid.*, II, p.105; For their support against Hamid Khan and for assistance to Mubariz-ul mulk, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 79-80, 83, 86, 88, 92, 93, 98.

Khan Babi (junior), and *jagir* in the ***parganas* of** Sami and Monjpur (*Sarkar* Pattan). The younge son, **Muhammad** Anwar Khan, (ennobled Safdar Khan) got the ***mansab*** of 500/? and the *faujdari* of (*pargana*) Radhanpur along with its dependency, *Terwara*.[9]

With the arrival of *subadar*- designate **Maharaja** Abhay Singh and determination of Mubariz-ul mulk (Governor in office) to resist his ouster, Jawanmard **Khan** changed side and opted for rendering active support to the former.[10] In view of his active assistance and for **compensating** the apparent loss of Pattan the *maharaja* procured for Jawanmard Khan Babi an addition to *mansab* and *watandari* of *pargana* Badnagar (*Sarkar* Pattan).[11] Later (1731) the Babi chief

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9 *Ibid.*, II, p. 106; he had also contracted *ijara* right on *pargana* Petled (***Sarkar*** Ahmadabad), but died before the completion of the stipulated period. *Ibid.*, II, p. 112.

10 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 119-20.

11 *Ibid.*, II, p. 133; In the meantime, *faujdari* of *pargana* Pattan had been granted to **Raja** Bakht Singh, brother of the *Nazim* by imperial

acquired *parganas* of Kadi, and Bijapur (Vijapur) on *ijara*.[12] His brother, like-wise, acquired *parganas* of Munda, Matar (Arharmatar) and Nadiad (*Sarkar* Ahmadabad) on *ijara* basis.[13]

Jawanmard Khan Babi reoccupied *pargana* Pattan at (*subadar*-designate) Momin Khan's instance who needed his support for ousting Maharaja Abhay Singh's deputy, Ratan Singh Bhandari from Ahmadabad and, therefore, assigned *faujdari* of the *pargana* before hand to align the Babi with him.[14] Jawanmard Khan also obtained from Momin Khan *pargana*

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court. *Ibid.*, II, p. 193. Badnagar was one of the most prosperous towns of Gujarat. It was characterised as one of the two precious wings of Gujarat, the other being Umreth. *Ibid.*, *Supplemet*, pp. 199-200. As such the loss of Pattan was more than compensated, at least economically.

12 *Ibid.*, P. 168; Sometime before 1753 Kadi was lost to the Marathas; MS No. 191/1f 13.

13 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 183; Of these *pargnas* Nadiad could not be retained.

14 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 196-97. The *faujdari* of the *pargana*, as pointed out in a preceding note, had been assigned to Raja Bakht Singh, the brother of Maharaja. The Babi chief seems to

Kheralu (*Sarkar* Pattan) for his brother, Zorwar Khan.[15]

It may thus be seen that Jawanmard Khan Babi by following a policy of shifting loyalty, emerged beneficiary after every change in the *subadari*. The Babi chief almost consistently remained 'loyal' to the *subadar-in-office*, rendering them active assistance.[16] Once the *subadar*-in-

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have been hurt and was inclined to get it back which he did by expelling the Raja's *naib* from Pattan forcibly; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 83.

15 He was assigned *pargana* Prantij for paying ransom money to the Marathas who held Zorawar Khan, his brother as hostage. Later, he got Kheralu instead. Even after his brother's release, the *pargana* was retained by them, *Mirat i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 205-6, 239.

16 Please see particularly, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 48-9,54-5, 62-3, 69-70, 73, 78, 81, 82 against Moizuddawalah and under Nizam ul mulk and his deputy, Hamid Khan; *Ibid.*, II, pp. 79-80,83, 86,88,92-3,98,107, against Hamid and Mubariz ul mulk; *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 120, 144, 159, 161; against Mubariz and under Maharaja Abhay Singh

office was dismissed, he threw his lot with the Governor designate after his arrival in the *suba* for ousting his predecessor by force of arms.[17] The Babi chief extended his support and extorted one or the other official position which, barring exceptions already mentioned, he and members of his family continued to hold. Then, in 1743, a little after Momin Khan's death, Jawanmard Khan occupied Ahmadabad/ *subadari* which he made instrumental for ensuring continued possession of Radhanpur.[18]

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and his deputy (Ratan Singh Bhandari) *Ibid.*, II, pp. 191, 196-7, 200-1, 236, 239, 242-3, 248-9,261-2,272, against Bhandari and Momin Khan.

17 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 48-9 (with Nizam-ul mulk and against Moiz-ud dawlah) *Ibid.*, II, pp. 83,86,88 (with Mubariz-ul mulk against Nizamul mulk's deputy Hamid Khan); *Ibid.*, pp. 119-20 (with Maharaja Abhay Singh against Mubariz-ul Mulk) *Ibid.*, II, pp. 191, 196-197, 200-1, 236.-239(with Momin Khan against Maharaja's *naib* Ratan Singh Bhandari).

18 Having entered into an agreement with the Marathas, he surrendered Ahmadabad to them in 1753. As per the terms and conditions settled

Despite holding *faujdaris*, enjoying *mansab jagir* and *watandari* Jawanmard Khan Babi ceased to render services at least from the time to Momin Khan's period (1737-43) of *subadari*. Instead, he served as a mercenary charging "an amount of money by way of daily expenses of his troops" for rendering service which the *nazim* procured while leading military expeditions for extorting tribute from *Zamindars* every year.[19]

Since the amount charged by Jawanmard Khan Babi was found "to be heavy", Momin Khan chose to engage his brother, Zorawar Khan, who also held *pargana* Kheralu in

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between them, Jawanmard Khan was to retain entirely and exclusively (*dar-o-bast bila shirkat*) the *parganas* of Pattan, Badnagar, Sami, Monjpur, Baisalnagar, Tharad, Kheralu, Radhanpur, Terwara and Vijapur. Moreover his family members were to retain one third of revenues of *qasbah* Matar, Kheda, Vasna and Munda, beside the villages which they held in *jagir*.

[19] *Ibid.*, II, 257.

'*jagir*' on an 'agreement of less expenses'[20] as a mercenary. Evidently the service of the Babis in general and those of Jawanmard Khan in particular, seem to have become virtually indispensable for the *subadars*. From the time of Hamid Khan, each *subadar* was keen to ensure their support and, procure their services for taking possession of the provincial capital by ousting the (dismissed) Governor-in-office, dealing with the Marathas, running the administration and effecting assessment and collection of revenues and extorting *peshkash* from the *Zamindars*.[21] Jawanmard Khan Babi like his father and other members of the family, seems to have established good rapport with some of the leading magnets of the region.[22] The Babis were

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20 *Ibid.*

21 See, for instance, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 48-9, 54-5, 62-3, 69-70,78-83,86, 88, 92-3, 98,101-2, 105-7,119-20, 144, 157, 159, 161, 179, 191, 196-7, 200-01, 236, 239, 242-3, 248-9, 257, 261-2, 272; Ms. No. 191/1, f. 21.

22 *Ruqqat-i Alamgiri*, letter no. XIX (1708), pp. 24-6; For the Babis enjoying confidence of the leading elements of the region, *Mirat-i*

capable of mustering support for assisting the *Nazims* as well as for fighting them.[23] It may particularly be mentioned that the *Zamindars*, *girasias*, kolis and other recalcitrants were among the ones who assisted them against the *Nazim*.[24] The Babis who were duly recognised as natives of the region [25] might have, presumably, been better placed to consolidate their position with the cooperation of local elements.

But the Babi chief failed to retain the provincial capital which he had occupied by ousting (1743-44) the *de-jure* Governor from the provincial capital. But, Jawanmard Khan Babi, the *de-facto subadar*, lost popularity with, 'particularly', the people of Ahmadabad populace of which

Ahmadi, II, pp. 40-1, 78-81, 144, 170-1; Jawanmard Khan Babi for being hailed as man of the region (*ham watani*) by the Gujaratis, *Ibid.*, II, p. 312.

23 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 40-1, 172.

24 *Ibid.*

25 *Ibid.*, II, p. 312.

place he had forced to pay undue sums of money on various pritex due to his inability to ensure remittance of revenues and pay his troops.[26] He tried to extort Rs. 50,000 from his own officials who, in turn, decided to avoid payment planned to deprive him of the authority of the place (Ahmadabad). Under the guise of friendly advice, they undermined his confidence to maintain the defence of Ahmadabad which was under Maratha seige and impressed upon him that it was impossible to oppose the might of the Peshwa 'who was the hero of the age'. He, therefore, opened negotiation for surrender. The Babi chief who had no legal authority to do so, however, surrendered the provincial capital in 1753 in lieu of procuring *parganas* of Pattan, Wadnagar, Vijapur, Visalnagar, Therad, Kheralu, Sami, Monjpur, Terwara and, of course, Radhanpur. These *mahals* constituted a solid block of territory in the extreme north of Gujarat. Thus Jawanmard Khan Babi agreed to abandon the capital city, which he could no longer hold out, in return

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[26] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 243-45, 250, 260, 323, 351, 381. It may be mentioned, however, that, only a decade later his sons were deprived of all these *parganas*, except Radhanpur and Sami by Damaji 'Gaekward; M.S. Commissariat', *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 513.

for these *parganas* which would constitute for him and for his heirs an extensive principality.[27]

In this way the province was lost to the Mughals as well as Jawanmard Khan. But the Babi chief, an official as also a rebel of the empire, survived as one of the leading *nawabs*.

HEREDITARY OFFICIAL TO *NAWAB*:

(B) *NAWABI* OF PALANPUR

The study of the *faujdari* of Palanpur[28] and Deesa which

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27 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 504-5.

28 Palanpur, which is reflected wrongly as Pathanpur in the *Ain*, was a *pargana* in *Sarkar* Pattan situated in the North-eastern part of Gujarat. It was noted for its turbulent Kolis, perticularly the one of *Chunwal*. In order to provide constant and intensive control over the *pargana*, according to *Mirat*, the place was provided with high numbers (28) of *thanas*, dependent upon the *faujdari*; *Mirat-iAhmadi*, *Supplement*, P. 201.

remained confined to the well-known Jalori family[29] from

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[29] The Jaloris preceeded the establishment of Mughal rule in Gujarat. They are noted to have been there in the region as early as the end of the 14th century. The family continued to hold various administrative positions during the reign of different Mughal emperors. However, with the execution of Pahad Khan Jalori (1617) the family was deprived of *pargana* Jalor until 1680 when the same was restored by emperor Aurangzeb. Firoz Khan, the uncle of Pahad Khan, settled at Palanpur (1635) in the reign of Shahjahan and from that date onward, the Jalori continued to stay at Palanpur, the place remained their family residence and later on the seat of the family headquarter up to the mearger of 1949, In consequance of thier parmanent stay at Palanpur, a large number of families from the old town of Jalor came and settled down their during Mujahid Khan's (1638-63) period of *faujdari*. It is probably this fact, alongwith the geographical position of the town and its commercial connections provided and explanation for the admixture of the languages, dress, manners and customs of Marwar with those of Gujarat in the population of Palanpur; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat* Vol. II, pp. 54-5, 132, 560n.

reign of Aurangzeb (1697) to the close of our period, provides a significant example of the transformation of *faujdari* into a *Zamindari*. The process of conversion of official position into a *zamindari* commenced with the of death of Bahadur Shah and reached its culmination in Muhammad Shah's reign.

At the time Emperor Aurangzeb took away the *pargana* of Jalor from the Jalories in 1697, he also confirmed *diwan* Mujahid Khan Jalori as *faujdar* of Palanpur, Dantiware and Deesa. In addition to the revenues conditional (*mashrut*) on *faujdari*, Mujahid Khan was also granted *tankhwah jagir* (assingment in lieu of salary) out of the revenues of the aforesaid *pargana* against a *mansab* of 1500/1500.[30] The rest was settled as *Jagir* of the *Jagirdars*. Mujahid Khan, besides his duties associated with *faujdari* within the *pargana*, was also commanded to serve the *Nazims* at the head of specified contingents.[31]

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30 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 341-2; *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, pp. 195, 201-2, *Hadiqat-ul Hind*, f.33.

31 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 342; *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, p.200. The *faujdar* was also under the obligation of offering panthers through the

The author of *Mirat-i Ahmadi* tells us nothing about Mujahid Khan Jalori after 1697. But at the time of assumption of *faujdari* by *diwan* Firoz Jalori alias Ghazni Khan (1715), our author records that "he (i.e., Ghazni Khan) occupied (Palanpur and Deesa) from the beginning (?) of revolts as *zamindar*" and "abstained from royal service and occupied by force some of the places in the neighbourhood and brought them under his control".[32] In the *pargana wise* description of *suba* Gujarat he remarks that "earlier (?) they assisted Governors. Now (i.e. sixth/seventh decade of the eighteenth century) the Governor leads an expedition and captures *peshkash* according to his power and strength. They have divided the *mulk* among themselves like *zamindars*, (b *tariq-i Zamindaran*) and they (i.e.Jaloris) do not behave well",[33] though the post of *faujdari* was held by them till

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diwan-i Suba to the emperor for the same were found in abundance in the region; *Ibid.*, p. 201, *Account.*, f. 27a.

32 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 341-2; *Ibid.*, *Supplement* pp. 201-2.

33 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 341-2; *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, pp. 201-2; The *faujdar* of the place therefore, came to be described as the rebal (*faujdar baghi*), *Account*. f. 46.

the book was being written.[34]

From the detailed statements of the *Mirat* quoted above it may be inferred that the Jaloris occupied the *pargana* like *zamindars* conquered the lands not belonging to them (i.e.made unauthorised conquests) did not perform the functions attached to their office, divided the lands among themselves, turned *zortalb-peshkashi* but continued as imperial *faujdar*. Before reaching a final conclusion, it would be better to examine in detail the available evidence not merely for checking the statement of the *Mirat* but also for a better appreciation of the new dimensions being added to the position of *faujdar* that had been held on a hereditary basis by the same family.

According to the author of *Tarikh-i- Palanpur*, the family history of Jaloris, Muhammad Kamal Khan Jalori had occupied *pargana* Tehard sometime between 1711 and 1712[35].... the first undesirable action on the part of a *faujdar* from the point of view of imperial authority. Diwan Ghazni

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34 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 341; *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, pp. 200-201.

35 *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, p. 212.

Khan, the next *faujdar*, (1715-29) exorted **peshkash** from Rana Pachanji, *zamindar* of *Pargana* Wao soon after he assumed the office of *faujdar*.[36] Sometime later the Khan incorporated the said *parganas* into his possessions[37]. Similarly he forced the *zamindars* of Kakosi, Kedonar, Rohu, Dabhela, Dhaner, Malana and Sorbhakri to pay *peshkash*. In the subsequant years the *zamindars* of these places met the fate of Rana Pachanji. [38] Firuz Khan alias Ghazni Khan is also reported to have forced the *jagirdar* of Kakrej to offer "*Peshkesh* and *Nazrana*" to him and some time later he annexed the entire *pargana*.[39] Ghazni Khan's successor, *diwan* Karimdad Khan extorted *peshkash* from Bajodhodi of Nagor, invaded Danta and occupied the place.[40] Rana Amar Singh of Danta was forced to offer his daughter in marriage to Khan in return for his possesions.[41] Jaloris are also reported to have occupied the *jagir* of Sharwanis sometime in the

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36 *Ibid.*

37 *Ibid.*

38 *Ibid.*, p. 213.

39 *Ibid.*

40 *Ibid.*, pp. 227, 237, 239-40.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 240.

year 1742-43.[42] Thus *Mirat's* observation that Firuz Khan had occupied some of the neighbouring territories by force is borne out by corroborative evidence.

The *Mirat* observations that the *faujdari* of Palanpur and Deesa was held by Jaloris, at least during our period, is also corroborated by detailed evidence. As we have noted earlier Mujahid Khan Jalori was confirmed as *faujdar* of Palanpur and Deesa in 1697.[43] At his death, his eldest son Muhammad Kamal Khan assumed the office even without seeking the approval of the emperor. Emperor FarrukhSiyar appointed Rahim Yar Khan (1715) who arrived at Palanpur to take charge. But Ghazni Khan, who had, in the meantime, assumed the charge asserted his right, gave a battle and did not allow him to occupy the office.[44] But in order to seek imperial confirmation of his *de-facto* position, he "sent presents, and *peshkash* to His Majesty and with an offering of money obtained the *farman-i bahali* to continue at the

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42 *Ibid.*, p. 241.

43 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I p. 342; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* (f. 83) describes him and his successors as *watandars* of Palanpur; M.S. Commissariate, *History of Gujarat*, II, p. 132.

44 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, p. 342; *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, p.214.

same post.[45] No action against the definat Jalori seems to have been taken by the imperial centre who thus prefered to accept the *fait accompli*. Ghazni Khan was so confident of the continuity of the position that during his life time itself he divided the territory among his sons, thus assigning Deesa to his younger son and rest to the eldest one, Karimdad Khan, who succeeded him at his death.[46] Karimdad Khan Jalori lived for about two years and died in 1730 at Ahmadabad, while serving Maharaja Abhay (1730-37) Singh the Governor. The Governor is reported to have got *diwan* Muhammad Pahad Khan Jalori confirmed in the rank and position of his deceased father.[47] Muhammad Pahad Khan was succeeded by his uncle, Bahadur Khan (1744) who held the office for the rest of our period.[48] It is, therefore, evident that the principle of hereditary succession to the

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45 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p.3; *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, pp. 200-1.

46 *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, pp. 214-6; *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p. 342.

47 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 119, 132-3.

48 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, pp. 341-2, 373, 413, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 119, 132-3, 321-2, *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*,. f. 83.

office of *faujdar* had virtually been established and it was enforced through the use of sword, diplomacy and the purse. The imperial authority acted merely as regularising authority.

The *Mirat's* assertion that *diwan* Firuz Khan alias Ghazni Khan and his successors did not serve the *Nazims* is only partly borne out by other evidence for we notice Ghazni Khan, and later on his son at Governor's service Ghazni Khan served Maharaja Ajit Singh during the latter's tenure as Governor (1715-17) of Gujarat.[49] *Diwan* Karimdad Khan (1729-30) accompanied Maharaja Abhay Singh while the latter passed through Palanpur to take charge of the province in 1730.[50] However, none of the *faujdars* of Palanpur after Maharaja Abhay Singh's withdrawal from the province seem to have served any of succeeding Governors.

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49 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 18-20; The Khan was invited to assume the office of *Naib* Governer by Daood Khan Panni when the latter left for Deccan. But before the arrival of Maharaja Ghazni Khan had left for Palanpur. It must be remembered that the Khan did not serve Daood Khan; *Ibid.*, I, p. 413; Also Ghazni Khan served as Maharaja's *naib.*, II, p. 20.

50 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 119, 132, *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 71.

It is important to note that the assumption of office by Ghazni Khan in 1715 and his son Karimdad Khan in 1729, almost coincided with the posting of Maharaja Ajit Singh and his son, Maharaja Abhay Singh as Governors in 1715 and 1730 respectively.[51] That the Jaloris served only these two Governors nay not be regarded as a matter of mere conincidence. The Two Rajput princes were the immediate hereditary and strong neighbourers of Palanpur.[52] For Jaloris it might be politic to maintain good relations, or at least not to allow any suspicion to arise in the minds of their neighbours. Secondly, Ghazni Khan in 1715 had opposed the officially apppointed *faujdar* and was waiting for the award of *sanad-i bahali* from the imperial court.[53] Fear of armed action and the hope of securing recommendation of the Maharaja might have compelled Ghazni Khan to render service. Partly his desire to be confirmed in his position might have motivated him to serve the Raja.

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51 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 3, 119, 132-3.

52 For details, M.S Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 560 and n.

53 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 3, 119, 133; *Ibid.*, I, p. 342

Lastly, both the princes- Governors passed **through** Palanpur at the head of strong contingents while the **other** Governors had adopted the other route.[54] Maharaja Abhay Singh's **march** was directed against Sarbuland Khan, Mubariz-ul mulk, then Governor in office, who had concluded **treaty** with the Marathas and against the latter who had **imposed** *Khandni* upon the Jaloris.[55] Obviously the Jaloris **might** have visualised a strong general in the person of **the** Maharaja who could provide protection against the Marathas and put an end to the Governorship of Surbuland Khan **who had** let the Jaloris suffer at the hands of the Marathas.[56] The very next

54 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 3, 16-18, 119, 132-3, 193, 240; *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat* f-70; Moreover, Panad Khan Jalori was also favoured with the office of *naib faujdar* of Pattan under Bakhat Singh who had accompanied the Maharaja; B.N Reu "(A letter from Rajdhiraj Bakhat Singh of Nafanr (MARWAR) dated Oct. 10, 1737)", *Proc. ICH* 1949.

55 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 99-100, 102-3. *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, pp. 222, 228-9.

56 For Maratha imposition on Jaloris, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 99-100, 102-3; *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, pp. 288-9. *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat*, f. 16.

year (1731)the Jaloris were again exposed to Maratha imposition and the Maharaja could do nothing about it. The Maharaja could not protect even Ahmadabad well.[57] It might have proved an eye opener to the Jaloris .At this stage the Jaloris might have with reason decided to look after their own possessions instead of rendering service at Ahmadabad. Hence they fortified Palanpur, raised strong fortifications[58] and after 1733 never came to serve the Governor.

The *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, as mentioned above, has reported that as the *faujdars* did not come to serve the *Nazim*,the latter led expeditions and extorted *peshkash* from them "according to his strenth and capacity.[59] We have seen that the Jaloris rendered service for the last time in 1732-33. The first reported expedition, for *peshkash* from Jaloris was led in 1734-35 by Ratan Singh Bhandari,the *naib* of

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57 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 157-61, 235-6, *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujrat*, f. 16.

58 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, *Supplement*, pp. 200-01.

59 *Ibid.*, *Supplement*, pp. 201-2, *Account*. f. 46a.

Maharaja Abhay Singh.[60] Three years later, Momine Khan extorted *peshkash* fron Jaloris who offered it through Sher Khan Babi.[61] The last expedition under Jawanmard Khan Babi, the *de-facto* Governor was led in 1748.[62] Thus the Mughal Governors who could not extort regular military service from the Jalori *faujdars*, decided to extort occasional *peshkash* at least, as in the case of chieftains of long standing.

It is, therefore, evident that the Jaloris who held *faujdari* of Palanpur and Deesa, acquired the position of

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60 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 190 *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat*, f. 15.

61 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 245; For Jaloris close association with the Babis, the founder of the *Nawabis* of Radhanpur and Junagarh, see *Ibid.*, II, pp. 16-8.

62 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 403-4; *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat*, f. 21; Having paid the *peshkash* the Jalori chief is reported to have pursusded Jawanamard Khan Babi, who was short of funds to plunder territory of the chief of Sirohi, The Jalori seem to have had strained relations with Sirohi.

chieftains who not merely ruled within the territory like autonomous chiefs but also behaved like independant rulers. With expedient use of the power of sword, diplomacy and purse they converted the *faujdari* into *Zamindari*, though technically speaking they continued to regard the Mughals as their sovereign.[63] But they seized to share revenues and/ or offer the panthers (cheetas)as was incumbent upon them and had been an established norms as, late as, if not later, than, the reign of Bahadur Shah.[64]

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63 Even the Jaloris continued to recognize the Mughal emperor as their sovereign. Please see them seeking and getting favours from the court, Basheeruddin Khan (ed) *Faramin-i Salatin-i Hind*, Delhi 1926, pp. 160-6; also *Parwana*, dt. 15 Jamadi 11, 22 Ry of Muhammad Shah in possession of Hamiduddin Amir Miyan, *Shehr Qazi* of Palanpur.

64 Account f. 46a.

CHAPTER VI

FROM MARWAR TO GUJARAT:

(A) *RAJA* OF IDAR [1]

The history of the establishment of what came to be known as "Later Rathor dynasty[2]" at Idar is an interesting

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1 Idar is located forty five Kroh off Ahamdabad adjoining the territory of Udaipur and another chieftaincy, Dungarpur. The place had a fort located on a hillock. It was originally the possession of Rathors *Zamindar* who had matrimonial links with the Sisodias of Udaipur.

During Akbar's time *pargana* Idar (*sarkar* Ahmadabad) had a *jama* of 16,16000 *dams*. By the year 1725, its *jama* rose to 1,20,00000 *dams*. *Ain-i Akbari*, II, pp. 248, 258; *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, p. 190, M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, p. 178.

2 Prior to 1678, Idar was held by the Rajput *Zamindar* of Rathor clan. In 1679, this territory as a result of the confrontation which started in the wake of Rajput wars between the Rathors and Aurangzeb, annexed and was incorporated into *khalsa* lands. The ruling Rathor family retired to Pol which place it retained till the post-independence merger.

episode of the gradual transformations of *Jagir*, acquired virtually by force, into a hereditary possession. The disturbed state of affairs in Gujarat helped the two Rathor brothers, Anand Singh and Rai Singh, in their endeavours to acquire Idar and subsequently to retain it by the force of arms, diplomacy and money, though at times the process was also hindered by the forces at work in the region.

The episode of the establishment of the hold of Anand Singh and Rai Singh, the younger brothers of Maharaja Abhay Singh, over Idar had its roots in the family feud that followed the death of Maharaja Ajit Singh in 1724 for the *gaddi* of Jodhpur.[3] Maharaja Ajit Singh's younger sons,

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For details, M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujrat*, II, pp 2,10, 49n, 178. K. Kamdar, "Conquest of Jamnagar by Aurangzeb", p. 215. proc. *IHC*. 1957.

3 Maharaja Ajit Singh was believed to have been poisoned by his son Bakht Singh at the instigation of Abhay Singh; after his death, Ajit's sons were divided into two rival groups, viz., Bakht Singh and Abhay Singh, and Anand Singh and Rai Singh. For details G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas (1724-1843)*. Jodhpur, 1968, pp. 26-30; B.N. Reu, *Marwar Ka Itihas* (Hindi), *Jodhpur*, 1968, I, pp. 328-33;

Anand Singh and Rai Singh, raised the standard of revolt against Abhay Singh who had been recognized as the ruler of Jodhpur by empror Muhammad Shah[4]. The two brothers, having thus failed in Marwar, retired to Gujarat and made an attempt to capture Idar which Maharaja Abhay Singh held as *jagir*.[5] In order to strengthen their position the Rathor brothers,, Anand Singh and Rai Singh allied themselves with the anti Mughal force, the Marathas who had begun their onslaught on Idar in the middle of 1725.[6] Though the

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by the same author, *Glories of Marwar Marwar and Glorious Rathors*, 1943, pp. 127-29.

4 B.N. Reu, "Mr Forbes and the House of Jodhpur", *Indian Antiquity*, LVIII, 1929, p. 60; G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p. 26; B.N. Reu, *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathor*, pp. XL-XLII.

5 A *Kharita* from Abhay Singh to Jai Singh, dated March 31, 1726; *Kharita* from Jai Singh to Abhay Singh, September 29, 1725 *cited* in Parihar's *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 21,26-8; B.N. Reu, "Maharaja Ajit Singh of Marwar", *Journal of Indian History*, XII, No.1, Madras, April, 1933, pp. 85-6. *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 83; *Vir Vinod*, p. 968

6 A *kharita* from Jai Singh to Abhay Singh, September 29, 1725, *cited* in Parihar, *Marwar*

Rathor brothers failed to weaken Abhay Singh's hold on the territory, their "regular incursions ruined sources of revenue" and transformed the possession from an asset into a liability.[7]

At that time Idar was passing through a critical phase of its history. The *desais* and other *zamindars* who are reported to have formed one group, were at daggers drawn with the *Qasbatis* the professional soldiers and money lenders.[8] Members of the extinct ruling house of Idar had, as yet, not forgotten the loss of their possession and were active in the politics of Idar.[9] In addition to the havoc caused by Maratha forces, Idar, even internally did not enjoy peace at the moment.

Interested less in Idar and more in his patrimony Maharaja Abhay Singh, devised a plan to deal with his brothers, the claimant to the *gaddi* of Jodhpur. He

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and the Marathas, p. 30.

7 A *Kharita* from Abhay Singh to Jai Singh, September 23, 1726, *cited* by Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 30-1.

8 *Rasmala*, pp. 340, 346, 450.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 345-6.

designed to hand over the *jagir* of Idar to the Maharaja of Udaipur on condition that the Rana would get both the brothers, Anand Singh and Rai Singh, murdered.[10] But the Rana did not lay hands on the two brothers. Instead the Maharaja entertained overtures from Anand Singh for a compromise between the brothers. Abhay Singh did not like the move.[11] However, the circumstances forced Abhay Singh to accept the dictum of events. In the meantime Pilaji and Kanthaji, the two Maratha generals, invaded Marwar and looted the area of Jalor which was then held in *jagir* by Bakht Singh, the brother of Maharaja.[12] Anand Singh and Rai Singh capitalised the situation and took possession of Idar (1728) which by then was included in the *jagir* of

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10 A *Kharita* from Abhay Singh to Jai Singh, 31st May, 1727, *cited* in Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p. 31, *Vir Vinod*, p. 967, *Kharita* dated August 1724 written by the ruler of Jodhpur declares Idar as "part of Marwar" *Ibid.*, pp. 968-9.

11 A *Kharita* from Jai Singh to Abhay Singh, 6th August, 1726, *cited* by Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 31-32. *Vir Vinod*, pp. 969-70.

12 *Marwad khayat*, p. 131, *cited* in Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, p. 32.

Abhay Singh.[13] The Maharaja did not oppose their action probably keeping in view of maintaining undisturbed peace in Marwar. Even the then *subadar* of Gujarat, Surbuland Khan (1724-30) seems not to have taken note of this incident. Virtually forced by circumstances, Maharaja Abhay Singh agreed to the proposal of Maharana of Udaipur to close down the long struggle with his brothers by agreeing, in August 1728, that Idar might be granted as *jagir* to Anand Singh and Rai Singh by the imperial court, which had already lost an effective control over the region.[14] Thus Anand Singh and Rai Singh who started the struggle with their eyes on the *gaddi* of Jodhpur succeeded in capturing Idar by force and, then acquiring the place as a political concession from imperial court through Abhay Singh.

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13 B. N. Reu, *Marwar Ka Itihas*, p. 355, *Rasmala*, p. 346; B.N. Reu, "Ajit of Marwar" pp. 85-7; *Bombay Gazetteer*, V. pp. 404, 406; *Ibid.*, II, pp. 213-16.

14 A *Kharita* from Abhay Singh to Rana of Udaipur, 10th August, 1728, *cited* in Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, pp. 33-5; B.N. Reu, *Marwar Ka Itihas*, p. 335; B.N. Reu "Maharaja Ajit Singh of Marwar", *Journal of Indian History*, Madras, vol. XII, No. 1, April 1933, pp. 106-7, *Bombay Gazetteer*, II, pp. 404-06.

The *jagir* of Idar so acquired was retained by the Rathor brothers by using force, bribery and diplomacy. Jawanmard Khan Babi, then *faujdar* of Viramgaon, resolved to secure possession of Idar with the help of Akraji, the Koli *zamindar* of Katosan and Amra Koli, the *zamindar* of Ilol Kanrah (*pargana* Ahmadnagar) to compensate losses which he had suffered in his *ijara* lands. He marched against Idar in 1734. It so happened that at this time two Maratha generals, Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindia, were proceeding to Malwa. Messengers for help were accordingly sent by the Rathor brothers and it was readily granted. Idar, because of this timely help was saved.[15] But the Rathor's had to part with half of the Idar revenue as *chauth* to Damaji Gaekwad sometime between 1734 and 1741.[16] The incident shows that the Rathor brothers were not strong enough, by then, as to defend the place on their own. They do not appear to have grown roots, as yet, in the soil of

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15 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 172-5; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, p. 449. The Rathor had to pay the cost of assistance they had acquired. *Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat*, f. 83; Ms No. 191/1. f. 13.

16 *Rasmala*, pp. 424-33; M.S. Commisariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, p. 450.

Idar.

In 1742, the Rehwar Rajputs in league with *qasbatis*, the professional soldiers and money-lenders, attacked and took Idar, killing Raja Anand Singh. On hearing of the disaster his brother Rai Singh, taking leave of the *Nazim*, Momin Khan (1737-43), went to Idar.[17] With the help of *desais* and *zamindars* and his clansmen, he drove out the Rehwars and killed many *qasbatis* who had supported them and reoccupied Idar.[18] The Mughal *subadars* all through those years neither lent any support nor intervened in the affairs of Idar. It was due to the effort of Rathor brothers themselves that they succeeded in retaining their possessions against the potential threat both from within and without.[19]

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17 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 265, 269-71.

18 *Bombay Gazetteer*, V. pp. 406, 409; M. S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, p. 450; For the presence of the *desais* in *pargana* of Idar, *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*, p. 236.

19 Ratan Singh Bhandari, deputy to Abhay Singh, the *Nazim* of the *Suba* acted as silent spectator while Idar was besieged by Jawanmard Khan Babi. Nor even Momin Khan came to help them either against Marathas or the Rehwari

The Rathor brothers are, in our sources, nowhere reported to have been rendering military assistance to the then *subadar* Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37). Expediency seems to have dictated the Maharaja not to press his brother for service, even though they were under the obligation of serving the empire.

But during the years 1738-42 the Rathor brothers are reported to have served the then *subadar*, Momin Khan (1737-1743). They came to Momin Khan's camp when he visited the area. After matters about the payment of *peshkash* (which was, otherwise, levied from the *zamindars* and not from the *jagirdars*) had been settled, the elder brother returned to Idar while Rai Singh remained with the *Nazim*.[20] The Governor collected *peshkash* from other *zamindar*, of *pargana* Idar through Rathor brothers; Sarjit singh, *zamindar* of Mohanpur paid *peshkash* to the *Nazim* through Rai Singh.[21] At the time Momin Khan laid siege to Viramgaon in

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Rajputs.

20 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 224-5.

21 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 247-8.

1740, Rai Singh was present in the *Nazim's* camp.[22] Two years later (1742), Rai Singh, for the last time, is noted in the company of the *Nazim*, Momin Khan.[23]

After Momin Khan's death (1743) the Rathor prince changed his attitude towards the Governor. Raja Rai Singh was summoned by Fakhruddawla; the *Nazim* designate (1743), to assist him against Jawanmard Khan Babi, the *de-facto subadar* (1743-53). The Raja joined Fakhruddawla near Kapadwanj (*sarkar* Patan) as a mercenary general. Since the *Nazim*-designate refused to meet the expense of his troops on the plea of his holding the *jagir*, he abandoned his camp and joined hands with Jawanmard Khan who had readily agreed to bear the expenses.[24] Until the year of his death (1750) Rai Singh took an active part in the shifting politics of

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22 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 261-2.

23 *Ibid.*, II, p. 265, Rai Singh took leave of the *Nazim* to settle affairs at Idar in 1742. The next year (1743), the Raja did not come to help and remained busy at his and his brother's *jagir* - Idar.

24 *Ibid*; II, pp. 314-26, 327-31, 395-6; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 493-9.

the time, allying himself indiscriminately with other Mughal nobles, with Maratha chief, Rengoji, with Fakhr-ud awlah (*subadar*- designate), with Sher Khan Babi, the first *Nawab* of Junagadh as it suited his purpose and ambition.[25] For all practical purposes Anand Singh acted as an independent mercanary general, having no regard for any authority, except his personal interests.

At the death of Raja Anand Singh at the hands of some local Rajputs... probably a *zamindar*, his son, Shiv Singh, who was only six years old, succeeded to the *gaddi*

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25 Raja Rai Singh joined with Fakhr-ud dawlah, the *subadar*-designate, in 1743-4. Since the *subadar* failed to pay him, the Raja deserted him and joined hands with Jawanmard Khan Babi, the *de-facto Subadar*, who undertook to pay him for his services. Again, Raja Rai Singh left Jawanmard in 1744-5 and allied himself with Ronkoji, the Maratha chief against the *de-facto subadar*. Since Renkoji failed to meet his claims, the Raja deserted him and left for his *jagir*. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 269-71, 327-8, 328-30, 334-36, 355-6, 358-69, 394, 402-12; *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, pp. 270-74.

of Idar in 1742.[26] His uncle Rai Singh who died in 1750 acted as incharge of affairs.[27] After 1750, Raja Shiv Singh enjoyed a long period of rule at Idar till his death in 1791.[28] The Rathors had thus established principle of succession based on hereditary and independent of outside interference.

It may be seen, then, that the Rathor brothers who had acquired the *jagir* of Idar by virtue of conquest, retained it in a likewise manner. From the year 1742, they rendered neither service nor paid *peshkash* mainly because the power of collecting the revenue had almost gone. The prevailing state of affairs proved them helpful not merely in acquiring the *jagir* but also converting it gradually into *zamindari* with virtual hereditary claim on it.

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26 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 265; *Rasmala*, II, pp. 424-33; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, p. 450.

27 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 265, 483-8; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, pp. 494, 496-7.

28 M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 450-1. The family retained the place till the post-1947 merger.

'DESAIGIRI' TO CHIEFTAINCY:

(B) *Thakur* of Patdi

Bhao Singh,[29] the *desai* of *pargana* Viramgaon (*sarkar* Ahmdabad), cashed upon the disorderly situation created by Maratha pressure in the province, and, utilising his own sources of strength turned from the *desai* of *pargana* viramgaon[30] into the *Thakur* of Patdi.

Bhao Singh was a wealthy and influential person holding a key position in the affairs (*madar-i kaar*) of the *pargana*. It may be seen from the fact that the *desai* had

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29 Bhao Singh's family, Kavda Kunbi by caste, is said to have come from Champaner, settled at Viramgaon in the sixteenth century, first as *Patel* and afterwards, under Aurangzeb, as *desai* rose to wealth and importance. *Bombay Gazetteer*, IV, pp. 348-354n.

30 Viramgaon, the headquarter of Jhalwarah (Jhalawar) was an important township which connected main land with the peninsular Gujarat. The town is situated in the north of Ahmadabad. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 116.

withheld the revenues of the villages under him sometime during the *subadari* of Ghazi-ud din Khan. The *subadar* is, therefore, reflected to have collected *khichri* instead.[31]

Moreover, the *desai* does not seem to have had coordial relation with all the *zamindars* holding *zamindari* within the *pargana*. When Surbuland Khan (1724-26), forced the *Zamindar* of Wadhwan (*pargana* Viramgaon) to offer *peshkash* and land revenues, the *desai* of the *pargana* mis-represented *Zamindar's* position before the Governor. The *Zamindar* was co-erced to resist the Governor and it ultimately disserved his cause and weakened his position.[32]

It may be seen that the *desai* on the whole, held an important position identical to the Chaudhary of north-India. In a nutshell the *desai* was an intermediary *Zamindar* at *pargana* level and responsible for the assessment and collection of revenues with the help of village headman, known as *Patel* in Gujarat. The position was by an large hereditary. Like chieftains, they were

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31 *Nazr-i Peshkash-o Khichdi waghaira* Pune, pc No. 29.

32 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp, 93-94.

required to offer *peshkash* (tribute). They were also required to maintain accounts. They were responsible for the advancement of the agricultural loan (*taqavi*), and enforcement of the state regulations for trade and commerce. They were entitled to a fix percentage of revenue called *desaigiri* and some revenue free grants.[33]

The *desai* of Viramgaon seems to have been more influential than its counterparts in other parts of the province. According to *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Udai Karan *desai*, father of Bhao Singh, had defended the Viramgaon-township when Maratha *sardar* Rengoji put armed pressure. The populace of Viramgaon arranged, on the advice of Udai Karan, enough amount to buy off the enemy. The *desai* had, however, with much foresight, secured from the people a contribution over and above what was required for the security money(*Khandni*) to be paid to Rengoji and with the help of that surplus a fortification was built around the town for its protection at his initiative.[34]

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33 B.R. Grover, "The position of Desais in *pargana* Administration of *suba* Gujarat, Proc. IHC, 1961, pp. 150-57.

34 *Mirat-i Ahamadi*, II, p. 64

During the *subadari* of Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37) a cleavage developed between the Deputy Governor, Ratan Singh Bhandari, and the *desai* of Viramgaon. Ratan Singh Bhandari with an eye on the *desai's* wealth, deputed a special *faujdar* to bring the latter to Ahmadabad. While coming to Ahmadabad, the *desai* came to know of Bhandari's interest which he seems to have perceived even earlier and had, therefore, demanded sureties. With the cooperation of sureties, who perhaps were unable to protect the *desai*, he secured his release. The following year (1734) Ratan Singh appointed a Marwari as the *faujdar* of Viramgaon in place of Sher Khan Babi who was trusted by the *desai*. Bhao Singh distrusted the Marwari. Therefore, he sent a secrete massage to Damaji Gaekward at *Dholka*, a nearby town, inviting him to take possession of Viramgaon.[35]

The Maratha chief was admitted to the town while the *qasbatis* who were opposed to *desai* and had also killed Udai Karan, father of Bhao Singh, were driven out.[36] During the

35 *Mirat-i Ahmadi;* II, pp. 166-7.

36 *Ibid.*, II, p. 188; see also *Ibid.*, II, p. 116. Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi was deputed by *Nazim* to investigate death of Udai Karan who had been murdered by a *qasbati*. But the Khan

following months, in the year 1737, Ratan Singh Bhandari, *Naib Nazim*, laid siege to the city but he failed to capture it.[37]

In the year 1740, Bhao Singh finding the Maratha garrisons troublesome, engaged a body of Arabs and Rohillas and expelled the Marathas.[38] The gates were closed and provision and war material were collected for the city's defence. Rengoji and Momin Khan, then Governor of Gujarat (1737-43) having agreed to a joint investment of Viramgaon, proceeded with their forces to that town and the siege began. After a month's progress, Momin Khan left for

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died of cholera while on rout to Viramgaon. No action, even subsequently, was taken against the *qasbati* who, like at Idar, were at dagger's drawn with the *desai*.

37 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 188-9; M. S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, p. 452.

38 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, (II, p.261) states that "Bhao Singh was tired of the rascality of a batch of Maratha".

collecting *peshkash* from the *suba*. Rangoji had to carry on the operation alone. Meanwhile, the Arab and Rohilla mercenaries of the *desai* made demands for the arears of their pay and Bhao Singh, being unable to satisfy them immediately, and fearing their desertion thought it advisable to bring the matter to an end. It was agreed with Rangoji that the fort of Patdi, with several depended villages on the Rann of Kutch, would be handed over to him while the town of Viramgaon with the rest of *pargana* was restored to the Marathas.[39] From the year (1740) Patdi came under the Patidar family of the *desai* of Viramgaon where he ruled as *Thakur*.[40]

It may be seen that the *desai* who held a key position (*madar-i kaar*) in the affairs of Viramgaon and had defended the town from Marathas was forced by Ratan Singh

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39 *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 261-2; *Bombay Gazetteer*, V, pp. 348-54; M.S. Commissariat, *History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 452n and 474.

40 M.S. Commissariat,"*History of Gujarat*, II, pp. 452n and n, 474. The rule of *desai* at Patdi is reported to have lasted for more than 200 years.

Bhandari to befriend the ones i.e. Marathas, whom he had regarded as enemies. Again, as he could not pull on well with his new ally and the prevailing state of affairs permitted him, he turned against both, the Marathas as well as Mughals. The *desai* purchased the services of mercenaries and put himself in a bargaining position. As a result, he was allowed to establish his authority at Patdi, a place though fertile but not as strategic as the town of Viramgaon which commanded route between mainland and the peninsular Gujarat.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The first half of the eighteenth century is a period of transition in the History of Gujarat. The preceding century witnessed an era of relative stability and , then, entered in to a phase which is marked by chaos, declining control and complete reversal of the process of consolidation and systematic administration. In this, the imperial centre failed to keep its own instruments of administration within the limits prescribed and enforced earlier. This was rendered possible by increasing revolts of *Zamindars* and the Maratha penetration into the region, besides the ongoing struggle for supremacy between the emperor(s) and various sections of nobility at the centre and its sub-ordinate officials in the region.

Amongst the state officials, the Governors happened to be the first to defy imperial centre. The development seems to have been facilitated by the factional consideration in regard to the selection of perspective Governors and, then, the increased and increasing recalcitrance in the province,

adversly affecting the power to asses and collect revenue. This, on the one hand, rendered the positon of revenue-officials more vulnerable necessiating increased reliance on military commanders. Consequently, the positions of revenue- officials were bracketted with those of the executives and, above all, the Governor encroached upon the jurisdiction of *diwan*. Concentration of power in the hands of military officials thus put an end to the principle of 'checks and balances' which was established by adopting a policy of division of power and maintained by a strong and watchful imperial centre. The subordinate officials followed in the foot-steps of the Governor and, then, defied him the same way.

The officials posted in *Suba* were exposed to insecurity. The imperial centre and its Governor miserably failed to extend a helping hand. They had to ensure the protection of their official as well as personal position on their own, for they could neither expect imperial succor, nor likewise, apprehend effective imperial action against them. Therefore, they had been exposed to decide and act independent of the centre.

The prevailing situation, thus, forced the non-hereditary imperial officer posted in the *Suba* to

protect their position by creating a power base of their own. Following the policy of conciliation and coercion towards the other contestants, the defiant officials volunteered concessions to the locally influential and powerful segments of society. They identified themselves with the prevailing trend and grew roots in the soil of the land. 'Local elements' prejudice against the Mughals and predilection for the local officials turning Zamindars seem to have been one of bases of the letter's strength.

Forts, and fortification seem to have formed an important source of strength in providing safety and protection, against, particularly, the Marathas and Mughal Governors. The port town *nawabis* (Surat, Bharoch and Cambay) were equipped with forts which were well-known for their strength. Junagadh had likewise an equally strong fort. The official at Radhanpur, Palanpur and (the *desai* of) Viramgaon raised ones on their own. Idar also had a strong fort.

It may further be seen that the new officials, turned *nawabs*, belonged to different castes and communities. The Rajas of Idar were (Rathod) Rajputs, the ruler of Patdi was a Kunbi-desai whereas the *nawabs* of Radhanpur and Junagadh were Babi- Afghans, the founder of the *nawabi* of port-towns

were likewise Saiyed and Afghans. In a way all of them belonged to 'upper' castes.

In terms of official- positions there were the *naib-faujdar*, *faujdar*, port-officer, desai, a *jagirdar* and Governor of province (besides a non -official of Surat) who established their rule. Thus the process of transformation covered almost every important official- cadre and position.

In terms of location in the region, the *nawabis* covered almost every major geographical direction of the *suba*. Surat. Cambay and Bharoach emerged in South Gujarat, Palanpur in North-East Radhanpur in the North-west, Junagadh on the Peninsular Gujarat and Patdi in North-Gujarat. Evidently the process and trend of laying socio-political roots covered every portion and, thereby, every segment of society.

Also, none of these *nawabs* could acquire complete control over the entire *pargana/sarkar*, headquarter of which they continued to hold. The country-side was held by the Marathas and /or other *Zamindars* of the region. They, thus, exercised qualified authority over curtailed territorial jurisdiction within and over which they had not

been able to acquire full administrative authority. Evidently the process of adjustment of interest between leading forces was in operation. None of them could find it feasible / expedient to eradicate others out right.

The Mughal empire was inherited by different segments of society and the Mughal nobility happened to be one amongst them. In this regard it is important to note that none of the founder of new dynasties repudiated his relationship with the imperial centre which continued to act as a rubber stamp approving the succession. The necessity of procuring imperial approval seems to have been arisen out of the *nawabs* & desire to legitimatise their position. This provided a new lease of life and a source of income to the empire which, at the time of each succession was offered tribute (*peshkash*).

Then, these *nawabis* may not be treated as Sovereign states, for each of them had to share its revenue with the Marathas, besides, recognizing the suzerainty, though only[1] technically, of the Mughal emperors.

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1 Satish Chandra, *The 18th century in India: the economy and the role of Marathas, the Jats, the Sikhs and the Afghans*, Revised ed., Delhi, 1991.

In the context of present study, it is also evident that the Mughal nobility showed a remarkable tenacity to survive the fall of empire. It seems to have possessed the required potential to transform its position from imperial servant to landed magnate without repudiating its relationship with the shadow kings, and by entering into the Maratha fold. Secondly, though they had succeeded in their attempts to ensure their survival during the first half of the eighteenth century when the empire collapsed. But they seem to have felt no need to go further. It is not surprising, therefore, that among the new states inherited from the collapsing empire there was a remarkable continuity of the Mughal institutions. They, thus, provided a leadership that remained essentially conservative from the point of view of long term of social and economic change.[2]

Even their inclusion amongst the socially and economically influential class of *Zamindars* does not seem to have altered the over all fabric of socially dominant section of the society of the region. Not so significant numerically, the new etrants, moreover belonged to the ruling section of society.


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2 *Ibid.*,

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
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GUJARAT

ECONOMIC

7 B



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1. Muhammad Latif bin Muhammad Ali. — *Mirat-ul Hind dar mahasil-i subjat,* K.R.Cama Institute Bombay, (Rehtasek 7.V/102) M.S. No. 58 From Timur to Jahandar Shah. It records *Jama* and *hasil* etc., for the period from Aurangzeb to Bahadur Shah.

2. Diwan Ranchhodji Amarji — *Tarikh-i Soreth,* S.H. Desai, Junagadh (Original MS); and BBRAS (Central library) Bombay M.S. No.10

3. Anonymous — *Dar-Madakhil-o mahasil-i Hindustan (Haqiqat-hai Hindustan),* K.R.Cama Institute (Rehtasek IV) S.No. 60 (Prachin Panchayat library collection, Bombay). M.S. is dated 1204 AH. It covers upto Muhammad Shah's reign. The work reproduces the statistical account of the *Supplement* to *Mirat-i Ahmadi* but contains additional information also.

4. Anonymous — *Dastur-ul amal-i Shah Akbar--Alamgir*, MS. No.2401, Jama Masjid, Bombay. It reproduces some imperial regulations as contained in the *Ain* and the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*. It furnishes some additional information also.

5. Anonymous — *Tarikh-i Maratha dar Gujarat*, Apparao Bholanath collection, MS. No. 255 B, (new) Accession No. 147 Ahmadabad. By and large it is an abridged version of the *Mirat-i Ahamadi*, However it contains some valuable information about the Marathas and Mughal officials in Gujarat.

6. Anonymous, — M.S. 191/1, Apparao Bholanath collection, Ahmadabad (Title page missing). Abridgement of the *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*. It contains some additional information about the Marathas and the emerging *Nawabs* in Gujarat.

7. Anonymous

Hadiqat-ul Hind, BBRAS MS. No.10(78425), preserved at Central library Bombay. It is partly an abridged version of the *Supplement* to the *Mirat-i Ahamdi*. But it furnishes useful informations on *Jama* and *hasil* and some *zamindars*, *Faujdars* and emerging *Nawabs*. It was prepared sometime during the eighth decade of twelfth century A.H. The work furnishes some useful information about the Maratha's entry into Gujarat. At times it furnishes some informations which is not available in the *Mirat*.

8. Ali Muhammad Khan

(No title), MS No 227. (*diwanu khatanu pustak, i.e. Diwan's book of Account*), Apparao Bholanath Collection, Ahmadabad. The most useful documentary work besides the *Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement*. (For comment please see Introduction.)

Sarabhai Mehta	*Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat (Haqiqat-i Naziman-i Gujarat)*, M.S. No. 146 Apparao Bholanath Collection, Ahmadabad. The MS furnishes *subadar-wise* information as in the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II. It casually furnishes some additional information in regard to the *faujdars*, Marathas and the locally influential nobles.

Printed Works:

Abul Fazal Allami	*Ain-i Akbari*, Vol. II, Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1872.
Aurangzeb Alamgir.	*Ruqat-i Alamgir*; (tr.) G.H. Billimoria, Delhi, 1872.
Diwan Ranchhod Ji Amarji	*Tarikh-i Soreth*, (tr.) Rehtasek; ed., J. Burgess, Bombay, 1882.
Munshi Hasan Saudaqar Barelvi	*Hasbnama-i Khandan-i Momin Khan Sani Bahadur*, Bombay, n.d.

5. Mehmud Bukhari — *Tarikh-i Salatin-i Gujarat* ed., S.A. I, Tirmizi, Aligarh. 1964.

6. Ali Muhammad Khan. — *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, ed., Saiyid Nawab Ali, Pts I & II. and Supplement, GOS. Baroda. 1927-30.

7. Balamukand Mehta — *Balmukandnama*, ed. Satish Chandra, Asia, 1972.

8. Sikandar Muhammad — *Mirat-i Sikandri*, *eds*., M.L.Rehman and S.C. Misra, Baroda, 1961.

9. Kishoredas Munshi — *Majmua-i Danish;* Pt I Vol II, ed., S. Maqbul Ahmad (Persian); Tr. S.Hasan, Allahabad, n.d.

10. Madhoram — *Insha-i Madho Ram*, (Litho), Lahore, n.d.

12. Mir Abu Turab — *Tarikh-i Gujarat*, ed., Sir E. Denison Ross, Bib. Ind., 1909.

II. *MARATHA SOURCES*

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2. RB Ganesh Chimmanji Ved & DB Parasnis, eds., *Selection from the **Satara Raja** and Peshwa Diaries - III **Balaji, Baji** Rao Peshwa* Vol I & II. Bombay 1907.

3. P G Joshi, ed., *Historical Selections from the Baroda State Records*, Vol. I (1924-68), Baroda, 1934.

4. P M Joshi, ed., *Selections from the **Peshwa Daftar** (new Series): Expansion of Maratha Power* (1707-1761), Bombay, 1957.

5. P V Maujee and D B Parasnis ed., *Selections from the **Government** Records in the Alienation office*, Aurangabad, (*sanads* and letters), Aurangabad 1913.

6. D B Parasnis, ed., *Selections from the Satara Raja and the Peshwa Diaries* - III. Vols, I & II. Bombay 1906 & 1907.

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8. G.S. Sardesai *Selections from the Records of Baroda Government; jamabandi of the villages of Kodram, Indrana and Varsada*, Bombay 1912.

9. G.S. Sardesai *Selections from the Records of Baroda Government*, No. B *Junagadh Zortalbi claim*, Baroda, 1914.

10. G.S. Sardesai *Selections from the Records of Baroda Government (Giras)*, No, II, Vol II, Baroda, 1890.

III. *URDU AND HINDI WORKS*

1. Munshi Abbas Ali *Qissa-i Ghamgin*, ed., S C Misra, Baroda, 1975.

2. Sheikh Bahadur *Haqiqat-ul Surat*, Bombay, 1892.

3. Saiyed Abdul Hai — *Yad-i Ayyam (Tarikh-i Gujarat)*, ed., A. Ali, Lucknow, n.d.

4. Sheikh Ghulam Muhammad — *Mirat-i Mustafabad*, Bombay, 1916.

5. Saiyed Gulab Khan — *Tarikh-i Palanpur*, Bombay 1913.

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IV. *BRITISH SOURCES*

A. *Primary works*

1. C.U. Aitchison eds., — *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and nieghbouring Countries*, Rvsd and Contd *upto* Ist July 1906, Calcutta, 1909-1937

2. G.W. Forest, ed., — *Selections From the Letters, Despatches and other State papers preserved in the Bombay Secretariat*, I, Bombay, 1885.

J.H. Gense & Banaji (ed) — *The Gaekwads of Baroda, (English Documents)*, I (1720-68) Bombay, 1936

4. R. Richard — *India or facts submitted to illustrate the characters and condition of the native inhabitants* London, 1928.

5. A. Kintoch — *Hindoo Annals of Western Goozerat-Rasma a,* (Reprint) New Delhi 197?.

6. R. H. Thomas ed., — *Selection From the Records office of Bombay Government,* Nos. XI, XVI, XVIII, (New Series) 1853, 1855, 1856.

7. Pyner — *Mr. Asstt. Collector Pyner's Representation on Balasinor,* 1827.

8. Hamilton Walter — *Geographical, Statistical and Historical Description of Hindustan and its adjoining territories* (J. Murry), vol. 1, 1820 (Reprint)

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10 John William | *A, reements Between the East India Company and Thakors of Bhaonagar.*

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12. ------- | *East India Company Papers-III* Bombay Govt. Selection, XXXIX (New Series)

13. ------- | *Precis relating to the History and affairs of the Nawabs of Cambay,* Bombay, 1864.

14. --------- | *Bharoch Commission's* Report of 25 August, 1805.

B. *Administrative Works and Manuals*

1. J.W. Watson | *Statistical Accounts of Junagadh,* Bombay, 1879.

2. John William | *Junagadh Zortalbi Claim* (Decision) Govt., Press, n.d.

3. ____________ | Report from HW Gpggle to Lieut. Col. A. Walker, Resident at Baroda, 10 May 1804.

V. RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS INCLUDING COLLECTANDEA

A. (i) Records Preserved by State Agencies.

1. *District Record Office Junagadh*. The documents are available in Files, known as Settled Cases (*Barakhli*). These files contain copies of *farmans, hasb-ul hukms, nishans, parwanas, arzdashts, dastur-ul-amals*, Sale-deeds, documents concerning land grants, *desaigiri, muqaddami* and other *zamindari* rights. A few documents belong to the 14th century, most of these appertain to the 17th - 18th centuries.

2. *District Record Office Palanpur* There are available a few documents concerning *muqaddams'* perquisites and appertain to the 18th century. We have particularly consulted *Liki Rawli parwanas*, Huzoor office Files Numbered WTN/SR/627; F.14,22; *Aghal parwano* and *Ravli parwanas*.

8. ***Maharashtra State Archives*** (formerly Peshwa **Daftar**) – Aurangabad (*Farsi daftar*): The collection is very rich. It contains *farmans, hasbul hukms, nishans, muchalkas, dastaks, wajib-ul arz: raqba-bandi, qist bandi* documents *rahn-names, sale deeds, dastur-ul amals, naqlganwat, mawazna-i suba, mawazna-i dehat, mawazna-i deh sala, jama subajat, jama-o kharj, awarja jama-o kharj: yad-dasht, haqiqat and nuskhas of various description, fard-i hisab, khasra mazruat*, accounts of *jagirs* and other documents from the level of Governor/*Suba* down to the level of *zamindar*-cultivator/villages. These documents appertain to the 16th-18th centuries and are of great use for a study of agrarian relation for Mughal Gujarat and other parts of the empire. The documents are bundled together in *Roomals* (1-71) and have yet not been classified/catalogued.

(ii) ***Institutions***

1. ***Apparao Bholanath Collections***, **Ahmadabad**. The collection contains a number of sale-deeds, private leters, mortgage deeds. Most important of these is the MS No. 227 which is a systematic compilation of various documents covering almost every aspect of revenue matters. It is an extremely rich source of information for a study of *zamindars* in general and the *sarkar* Ahmadabad in particular for the Mughal period.

Documents and other MSS are systematically arranged and preserved.

2. *K.R. Cama Institute* (formerly Mulla Firoz Library and Parsi Panchayat Library collection), Bombay.

(B) Documents Published

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4. Qazi Saiyed Nuruddin — *Kaziona Insaf Pad Udti nazar*, Reprint from *Forbes Gujarati Saba Quarterly*, Book XVII, Nos. 3 - 4 March, 1947.

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6. G.H. Khare — *Aetihasik Farsi Sahitya: Aurangzebachya Darbarache Akhabar*, 1973.

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9. B.N. Reu — "Some imperial farms addressed to the Rulers of Jodhpur" *IHRC* vol X, 1947.

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5. Satish Chandra — *Parties and politics at the Mughal Court* - 1707-40; 3rd edn. New Delhi, 1979.

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10. M.B. Desai — *The Rural Economic life of Gujarat*, Oxford University Press, 1948.

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13. S. Gopal — *Commerce and crafts in Gujarat, 16th and 17th centuries*, New Delhi, 1975.

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22. M.R. Majumdar — *Cultural History of Gujarat*, Bombay 1965.

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